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Essays on the Determinants of Worker Productivity
and Labor Market Outcomes
Melissa Christine LoPalo, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019
Supervisors: Sandra B Youngblood
Dean E Spears
This dissertation examines determinants of worker productivity, labor market out-
comes, and population health.
The first chapter, previously published in the Journal of Public Economics, examines
the impacts of cash assistance on refugee labor market outcomes. I exploit variation across
states and over time in the generosity of cash assistance available to refugees upon arrival in
the U.S. and study the impacts on wages and employment. I argue that cash assistance is
randomly assigned to refugees conditional on characteristics such as education and country of
origin, as refugee placement is decided by a committee that does not meet with the refugees
or learn their preferences. I find that refugees resettled with more generous cash assistance
go on to earn higher wages, with no significant change in the probability of employment.
The effects are largest for highly-educated refugees.
The second chapter examines the impact of temperature on the productivity and job
performance of outdoor workers in developing countries. I overcome data challenges with
studying individual-level productivity by studying household survey interviewers as workers.
Using data from Demographic and Health Survey interviewers in 46 countries, I find that
v
interviewers complete fewer interviews per hour worked on hot and humid days, driven by
an increase in working hours. I also find evidence that suggests that workers allocate their
effort towards tasks that are more easily observed by supervisors on hot days.
The third chapter, previously published in Social Justice Research and co-authored
with Diane Coffey and Dean Spears, examines the role of social inequality in population
health outcomes in India, focusing on the case of casteism and child height in India. We de-
scribe evidence from the India Human Development Survey showing that children in villages
with more strongly casteist attitudes are shorter on average, an association that is statisti-
cally explained by the association between casteism and the prevalence of open defecation.
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Chapter 1
The Effects of Cash Assistance on Refugee Outcomes1
1.1 Introduction
The United States accepted approximately 70,000 refugees in 2015, incurring initial
resettlement costs of $1.1 billion with the goal of helping refugees achieve self-sufficiency
as quickly as possible. In addition to resettlement assistance for basic needs such as rent
and food upon arrival, refugees have access to several forms of cash assistance during the
resettlement process. Refugees who come with families are eligible for Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) for up to five years, while refugees who meet the eligibility
requirements for TANF but do not have access to the program for categorical reasons, such
as not having any children, are eligible for up to eight months of Refugee Cash Assistance
(RCA), which is designed to match TANF benefit levels in most states.
However, poverty rates among refugees remain high relative to natives. According to
a recent report, 44 percent of refugees lived in households with family incomes below 200
percent of the poverty line in 2009-2011, compared with 33 percent of natives (Randy Capps
and Kathleen Newland, 2015). The same report found that reliance on public assistance was
higher among refugees than both natives and economic immigrants. In the general debate
over public assistance programs such as TANF, policymakers generally weigh the efficiency
1This paper was published in the Journal of Public Economics, as Melissa LoPalo (2019).
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consequences of disincentivizing labor against the consumption smoothing benefits of this
temporary social insurance. Indeed, there is evidence that access to welfare programs such
as TANF among non-refugees generally results in lower probability of employment and lower
wages for the affected populations (see, for example, Robert A. Moffitt (2003)).
Refugees, however, are a unique population. Refugees often arrive in the U.S. with
few resources at their disposal, but many arrive with significant human capital. Refugees are
as likely as U.S. natives to have a college degree, but median household incomes are lower
than both natives and other immigrants (Capps and Newland, 2015). Given their unique
educational and income profile, refugees may interact differently with welfare programs than
natives and other immigrants, potentially shifting the typical efficiency-equity tradeoff.
Refugees in the U.S. offer a unique opportunity to examine the impact of cash as-
sistance on liquidity-constrained, college-educated individuals entering a new labor market.
Average treatment effects of cash assistance across the whole welfare receiving population
may mask substantial heterogeneity for individuals who do not fit the average profile of a
welfare recipient: newly-arrived, highly-educated immigrants may have a particularly large
amount to gain from cash assistance. In addition, despite the differences between refugees
and average welfare recipients, refugees present a unique opportunity to examine the long-
term impacts of a temporary welfare program; the vast majority of them use some form of
cash assistance in the first years after arrival, making it possible to examine the long-term
impacts of cash assistance despite the lack of data on eligibility and welfare use upon arrival.
Finally, there is little evidence on the effect of the refugee resettlement program on
labor market outcomes. Performance measures within the refugee resettlement program
are structured to reflect the priority of short-term self sufficiency: the Office of Refugee
2
Resettlement (ORR) requires resettlement agencies to track employment retention and wages
for refugees, but only for 90 days after resettlement, making it difficult to track the effect of
the overall resettlement program on longer-term outcomes. In this paper, I provide the first
econometric analysis evaluating the effect of access to cash assistance in the years following
resettlement on longer-term refugee labor market outcomes. In particular, I examine the
effects of wage generosity rules in likely refugees’ state of residence at the time of their
arrival on wages and other outcomes in household survey data.
I use variation across states and over time in TANF generosity, measured simply as
the maximum benefit level for a family of three in a given state, to evaluate the effect of
government assistance on the outcomes of likely refugees, since most refugees receive cash
benefits based on TANF rates upon arrival in the U.S. Notably, this means that the levels
of benefits most refugees receive were set for the population as a whole, since TANF is a
population-wide program and not specific to refugees. Therefore, variation in TANF levels
is arguably exogenous to voters’ and policymakers’ attitudes towards refugees.
Using decennial Census and American Community Survey data and the sample of
refugees resettled since the inception of the TANF program in 1996,2 I estimate substan-
tial positive wage effects of 5-8% per $100 of cash benefit levels among employed refugees.
The strongest effects accrue to the most highly educated refugees, whose wages increase
by approximately 8-11%. I find that the types of jobs that refugees work in change in re-
sponse to TANF: the mean educational level of refugees’ occupations increases, suggesting
that refugees get better jobs following more generous cash assistance. In contrast, I do not
2I exclude refugees settled under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which
preceded TANF, due to the lack of data on benefit levels by state for several years in the period 1980-1996.
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find significant results on employment or use of food stamps. I test for heterogeneity in
wage effects on several additional dimensions, finding further evidence that the wage effects
accrue to refugees who are more primed for labor market success: the effects are larger
for refugees with higher English ability and fewer children, for example. In addition, event
study difference-in-differences plots around the timing of changes to state TANF policies
show that labor outcomes for refugees follow a parallel path prior to increases in generos-
ity and then diverge for refugees settled in the periods after the increase, supporting the
underlying assumptions of the empirical strategy.
Overall, the results provide suggestive evidence that, while the welfare system largely
treats refugees the same as other low-income populations, they may have a higher marginal
benefit from additional cash assistance than other recipients. In fact, the size of the coeffi-
cients suggest that the positive impacts on wages rival the impacts of interventions targeted
specifically to improve labor market outcomes of low-income populations, such as training
and workforce development programs (Michael Greenstone and Adam Looney, 2011). The
magnitude of these results suggest that there may be substantial potential for positive effects
of cash assistance among underemployed populations in the U.S. In addition, by focusing
on short-term labor market outcomes of refugees, analysis of the resettlement program may
be overlooking an important effect of cash assistance on long-term wages. Furthermore, the
findings lend empirical support to the idea—pointed out in past Government Accountability
Office (GAO) reviews—that the emphasis on short-term outcomes can come at the cost of
the provision of services that may improve refugee labor market outcomes in the long run,
such as helping refugees that arrive in the U.S. with foreign credentials to overcome barriers
to using their skills in the U.S. (GAO, 2012).
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1.2 Motivation and Previous Literature
This paper contributes to the prior literature in several ways. The literature on
TANF’s predecessor, AFDC, generally finds that higher benefit levels reduce labor supply
and increase caseloads (Moffitt, 2003). In addition, the sizable literature on welfare reform
in the U.S., which introduced time limits, work requirements, and greater state ownership of
welfare programs, among other changes, generally finds that the reforms were associated with
decreased caseloads, increased employment, and increased wages (Rebecca Blank, 2002).
Similar results have been found among immigrants as well (Robert Kaestner and Neeraj
Kaushal, 2005). However, refugees are quite different from the overall population of welfare
recipients who are the focus of these studies. Most of the evidence on the effects of welfare
participation on labor market outcomes in the U.S. necessarily focuses on recipients with
low educational attainment: in fiscal year 2015, only 7.5 percent of adult TANF recipients
had more than a high school education (HHS, 2016). Given that 28 percent of refugees have
a bachelor’s degree or higher, refugees present a unique opportunity to examine the impact
of welfare participation among beneficiaries with high levels of human capital.
In addition, very little evidence exists on the impacts of cash assistance on the longer-
term outcomes of adults who use it. Studies that have examined longer-term effects have also
tended to find negative impacts, with David J. Price and Jae Song (2018) finding that adults
who used cash assistance worked in less prestigious jobs in the long term, while Elizabeth T.
Wilde, Zohn Rosen, Kenneth Coutch and Peter A. Muennig (2014) find some evidence of
increased mortality hazards.
There are several mechanisms through which cash assistance could affect labor market
outcomes such as wages and employment in the long run. It is well understood that many
5
highly-educated immigrants are underemployed in the United States, partially because of ob-
stacles to practicing their professions such as re-certification requirements (Capps and New-
land, 2015). For example, immigrants who were nurses in their country of origin must pass a
standardized examination and a professional evaluation of their credentials and prove their
English proficiency, along with potentially passing additional nursing courses before prac-
ticing in the U.S. (ORR, 2012). This means that refugees wishing to use advanced degrees
in the U.S. often have to invest in U.S.-specific human capital such as English proficiency
and American certifications upon arrival (Kalena E. Cortes, 2004). Cash assistance may
help recipients overcome liquidity constraints to partake in labor market outcome-enhancing
investments.3
Additional aid could also provide a cushion that allows refugees to hold out for a better
job match in their initial search, leading to improved labor market outcomes. Alternatively,
and especially given the income requirements to remain on TANF and RCA, welfare receipt
may crowd out work. Each of these effects implies longer periods of decreased employment
among newly arrived refugees, but the welfare implications are different.4 Finally, refugee
resettlement agencies generally provide aid with the employment search process, and fast
employment is a priority. These services could also affect labor market outcomes in the long
run without causing delayed employment, although, as I discuss in Section 3, funding for
these services is generally allocated based on refugee arrivals and is therefore not likely to
be correlated across states and over time with cash assistance.
3In Appendix A.0.1, I use a simple framework similar to (Cortes, 2004) to derive the prediction that
U.S.-specific human capital investments may increase if refugees receive higher welfare benefits upon arrival
in the U.S.
4See Raj Chetty (2008) for a theoretical framework examining a similar tradeoff in the context of unem-
ployment insurance.
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I provide evidence on the welfare impacts of the resettlement program by examining
the effect of cash assistance generosity on the long-run employment status of refugees and
the wages of employed refugees.5 As publicly available data on outcomes such as recertifi-
cation do not exist, these outcomes provide the best possible evidence of the effect of the
resettlement program on the ultimate success of refugees in the labor market. Furthermore,
I am able to observe heterogeneity in the effect by educational attainment, allowing me to
examine whether the effect is concentrated among refugees who likely had qualifications to
practice highly-skilled professions in their home countries.
This analysis also contributes to our general understanding of the determinants of
refugee success in the U.S. While this is the first study to examine the relationship between
welfare assistance for refugees and their labor market outcomes, previous studies have used
similar identification strategies to examine other determinants of refugee success, in partic-
ular network effects within refugee communities. The existing literature on refugees tends
to make the argument that placement of refugees is exogenous and looks at network effects
within refugee communities. Per-Anders Edin, Peter Fredriksson and Olof Aslund (2003)
argue that refugees in Sweden are effectively placed randomly conditional on observable char-
acteristics, since they are not able to choose where they live within Sweden. They focus on a
period when the housing market in Sweden was particularly tight, which meant that refugee
placement was largely based on the availability of housing in different areas of Sweden. They
find that living in enclaves is associated with an earnings gain, particularly for high-income
ethnic groups. Olof Aslund, Per-Anders Edin, Peter Fredriksson and Hans Gro¨nqvist (2011)
5Evidence from the Annual Survey of Refugees suggests that by 4 years after arrival, the employment
rate of refugees matches that of the whole U.S. population (ORR, 2016).
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use a similar identification strategy to investigate the effect of living in a neighborhood with
adults of the same ethnicity on the school performance of immigrant children in Sweden.
They find that a standard deviation increase in the share of highly-educated members of
one’s own ethnicity improves one’s GPA by 0.9 percentile ranks.
A similar argument that placement of refugees is random conditional on observables
can be made in the U.S., since refugees do not meet with the committees that decide their
placement nor do they express their location preferences. Lori Beaman (2012) uses data from
a voluntary agency that resettles refugees in the U.S. to examine the effects of social networks
on labor market outcomes, making the assumption that placement is random controlling for
refugee characteristics. She finds that outcomes improve with the number of tenured refugees
in one’s social network, while they deteriorate with the number of refugees settled in the
same year or prior year, perhaps due to competition. I also make the assumption that
placement of refugees is random conditional on observable characteristics, but I focus on the
effect of government cash assistance on the labor market outcomes of refugees resettled in the
United States, a topic that to my knowledge has not yet been covered in the literature. This
question has direct implications for the optimal design of a refugee resettlement program.
Unlike Beaman (2012) I do not observe the refugee status of the individuals in my
dataset. I follow several papers in the U.S. context in using household survey data to
identify likely refugees. George J. Borjas (2000) uses 1980 and 1990 decennial Census data
to compare the effects of living in ethnic enclaves for refugees, identified by country of origin,
and economic migrants. Cortes (2004) also uses 1980 and 1990 Census data and examines the
differences in characteristics and outcomes of refugees and economic immigrants that arrived
in 1975-1980. She finds that refugees initially had lower earnings and worked fewer hours
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but by 1990 earned more, worked more, and spoke better English compared to economic
immigrants. Like Borjas (2000) and Cortes (2004), I identify likely refugees based on country
of origin, but I make additional restrictions to my sample based on year of arrival.
1.3 The “Lottery Effect”: Refugee Resettlement in the U.S.
1.3.1 Placement Decisions
After receiving refugee status, newly arrived refugees are matched with one of nine
voluntary resettlement agencies that provide services to refugees.6 Importantly, the com-
mittee does not meet the refugees before deciding their placements, and refugees have no
channel for expressing location preferences. Refugees with relatives already living in the U.S.
are likely to be placed near them.
For refugees without ties in the U.S., the resettlement agencies consider factors such as
language capacity in the host community, average rent, public assistance rates, employment
opportunities, and existing ethnic communities in making a match (Refugee Council, 2015).
Given that the committee has some biographical information on refugees and is aware of state
budget trends and economic opportunities in potential settlement sites, it is vital that my
identification strategy control for any refugee characteristics that may influence placement.
I explore this issue in detail below. Resettlement agencies also consider the number of
refugees already resettled in a community, often placing refugees in areas that have had
success with refugee resettlement in the past (GAO, 2012). The refugee is then transported
6The refugees are allocated to the resettlement agencies in “round-robin fashion according to... approved
percentages” (Refugee Council, 2015) at weekly meetings of representatives of each agency. Each organization
has offices throughout the U.S., and the largest states have sites run by most, if not all resettlement agencies.
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to the community chosen for them out of about 190 that currently resettle refugees.
In the past, refugees came from a relatively small number of countries, but the group
has become increasingly diverse in recent years, with the implication that fewer are placed
near family and more in a relatively random location (Andorra Bruno, 2011). Placement of
refugees who have family in the U.S. is arguably less random, but this fact will not bias my
estimates unless the location of family members is systematically related to welfare generosity
in different states. This would occur only if either placement of the first wave of refugees
from a certain sending country was not random conditional on observables, or if endogenous
secondary migration occurred among the first arrivals from that country. Both concerns are
addressed to the extent possible in the identification strategy outlined below.
1.3.2 Resettlement Program
A majority of refugees enroll in either TANF or RCA upon arrival: in 2015, 40.3
percent of refugee households that had been in the U.S. for less than one year reported using
TANF benefits, while 24.9 percent used RCA (ORR, 2016). Use of these programs declines
sharply with years in the U.S.; only 6.4 percent of households that had been in the U.S.
for five years reported still using TANF. Benefit levels for RCA are generally based on the
TANF formula for that state. Levels in states with public private partnership or Wilson/Fish
programs,7 however, vary from the amount suggested by the TANF formula to a higher
amount approved by the ORR (GAO, 2011). Given that my empirical specification assumes
that all refugees are exposed to the variation in TANF benefits across states, the effect of
7These states are Oregon, Alaska, Idaho, Nevada, Colorado, Texas, Oklahoma, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Minnesota, Louisiana, Alabama, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Vermont.
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the inclusion of states with higher-than-predicted benefit levels should be to attenuate the
estimated effects on labor market outcomes. I present results excluding these states in a
robustness check.
TANF rates, in turn, vary significantly by state, creating part of the phenomenon
known as the “lottery effect” in refugee placement (GAO, 2011). As of July 2016, maximum
benefit levels for a single-parent family of three varied from $170 per month in Mississippi
to $923 per month in Alaska, with a median benefit level of $431 (Ife Floyd and Liz Schott,
2015). The variation persists even after accounting for differences in costs of living. Figure 1.1
shows the maximum monthly benefit for a family of three in 2015 in each state after adjusting
the dollar amounts using the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Implicit Regional Price
Deflator (IRPD).
After controlling for differences in costs of living by state, the maximum benefit levels
vary from about $180 to $626 per month, providing significant cross-sectional variation for
use in identification. Cost of living data by state is not readily available for my entire
sample period (the BEA index runs from 2008 to 2015), so I am unable to control for
any changes in cost of living in my regression framework.8 However, I control for state
fixed effects, which will absorb any time-invariant differences in cost of living, and year of
immigration fixed effects, which will control for any common trends in costs of living across
states. Specifications with state-specific trends will account for any linear changes within
8In Table A6 I test the robustness of my results to using the 2008-2015 IRPD data to adjust my measure
of TANF generosity. In this test, I fit a linear trend in the IRPD data for each state and extrapolate the
trend backwards to 1996 and forwards to 2016. The results are not statistically significantly different, though
the magnitude on the effect on wages in my preferred specification is slightly larger. This is to be expected
given some of the cross-state variation in benefit levels I use for identification is not attributable to actual
differences in generosity.
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the states.
Furthermore, there has been significant variation in both absolute and relative gen-
erosity of the program by state over time since its inception as a replacement for the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in 1996. For example, in July 1996,
Wyoming was the 27th most generous state, offering $360 per month, while in July 2016 it
had risen to 5th, offering $652. The real value of TANF benefits has fallen in many states
since 1996. The differential extent to which the generosity declined was due in several cases
to differing policies by state for adjusting the benefits over time rather than to actual changes
in welfare policy. For example, Texas adjusts its benefit levels each year in proportion to
changes in the federal poverty level, while Wyoming adjusts according to changes in the
state’s cost of living index. Meanwhile, 15 states have not adjusted the nominal level of their
benefits since 1996. There have also been instances of states adjusting benefit levels due to
changes in the business cycle or voter preferences, among other reasons. For example, sev-
eral states, including the large refugee resettlement states of California and Washington, cut
cash assistance benefits during the Great Recession (Liz Schott and Ladonna Pavetti, 2011).
Since business cycle conditions also likely affect the outcomes studied, it is important to
control for them. I therefore include controls for the unemployment rate in the resettlement
state both in the year the refugee arrived and in the year of interview.
Figure 1.2 shows changes in the real value of TANF maximum benefit levels for a
family of three in the nine largest states for refugee resettlement in my sample.
It is clear that a good deal of the variation over time occurs due to the erosion in the
real value of benefits resulting from states opting to not adjust the nominal benefit levels.
However, there are multiple instances of sharp rule changes, as well. Specifications using
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only state, year of interview, and year of immigration fixed effects will use the erosion in
real values of benefits as a source of variation over time, while specifications using state
time trends will use it to a lesser degree, since any linear changes in determinants of the
outcome variables over time will be parsed out. Figure 1.3 shows variation over time in TANF
benefits for the same states, but with state-specific linear time trends removed. Specifically,
the figure shows the residuals from regressions of TANF benefits on a variable for year. The
figure shows that the majority of the variation left over after removing state time trends
comes from a few states, especially California, New York, and Illinois.
In fiscal year 2015, over 3.1 million households used TANF benefits, suggesting that
refugees constitute a very small portion of TANF beneficiaries and are unlikely to influence
the policymaking process. The significant variation both across states and over time in
welfare benefit levels for a program not explicitly designed to serve refugees presents an
opportunity for examining the effects of welfare generosity on refugee labor market outcomes
without concern about endogeneity of benefit levels with respect to refugee characteristics.
Although outcomes for refugees may vary with many other features of the communities in
which they are placed, such as the quality of public transportation, public attitudes towards
immigrants and refugees, and services offered by local branches of resettlement organizations,
examining the effects of variation in welfare generosity gets at one crucial aspect of the
“lottery effect.”
States have many degrees of freedom in designing TANF laws beyond setting ben-
efit levels (Moffitt, 2003). These include differential time limits, for which I control in a
robustness check, as well as other aspects such as work exemptions, asset limits, and other
eligibility requirements. While refugees are especially likely to be eligible for TANF due to
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their low income and lack of assets upon arrival in the U.S., they are likely to be exposed to
variation in welfare rules beyond what is represented using my simple measure of generos-
ity.9 Furthermore, a minority of refugees use other welfare programs such as Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) and General Assistance in applicable states which also vary in gen-
erosity by state. In my preferred specification, however, these other policies would have to
be changing in a non-linear manner at the same time as benefit levels to bias my estimates.
In addition, although most refugees who receive cash assistance from the ORR obtain
it through RCA, a portion receives money through the Matching Grant program, which is a
federal program that provides matching funds to resettlement agencies to offer cash assistance
for four to six months. In fiscal year 2009, 31 percent of refugees who received cash assistance
from the ORR (this does not include refugees using TANF or SSI) used the Matching Grant
program (GAO, 2011).10 The effect of the Matching Grant program should be to attenuate
the estimates of the effects of TANF generosity, since some of the refugees in my sample
will essentially not be treated, and also because the association between number of slots and
benefit levels will effectively dampen the variation across states in generosity.
9For example, refugees are eligible for food stamps as well, and food stamp benefits are calculated based
on income, which includes TANF income. This results in food stamps dampening the variation in assistance
generosity. In results not presented here but available upon request, I use total SNAP and TANF maximum
benefits as the treatment variable. The results are very similar.
10The exact level of the cash benefits is decided by the resettlement agency but must exceed $200 per
month. An ORR employee indicated in an interview that the agencies do not vary the level of Matching
Grant benefits by state of placement, but that they do tend to allocate their Matching Grant “slots” to areas
with the highest demand. TANF benefit generosity could be one factor determining demand for Matching
Grant slots. While I do not have data on number of Matching Grant slots by state for every year in my
sample and am thus unable to directly control for any differences in slot numbers, I do have data for several
years from the ORR. In results not presented here, I compare number of slots to TANF benefit levels for
2010-2014, finding a correlation of -0.016. This indicates that a generous TANF program does predict a
lower number of Matching Grant slots, but the association is weak.
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Refugees also have access to services through resettlement agencies upon arrival to
the U.S. These organizations provide case management services, such as aid with initial hous-
ing, clothing, and transportation needs and with enrolling any children in nearby schools.
They also provide employment services and help refugees find English classes. Resettlement
agencies receive funding to provide these services through the ORR according to the number
of refugee arrivals. In addition, the ORR allocates money through grants to states, resettle-
ment agencies, and local resettling communities through several additional programs, such
as the Targeted Assistance Program (TAG), which provides additional funding to states with
large refugee populations, high unemployment, high secondary migration, or high rates of
public assistance use. This funding is not correlated in the cross section across states with
TANF maximum benefit levels. Therefore, while these types of services may have significant
impacts on refugee labor market outcomes, they are unlikely to represent a major pathway
for the results I estimate in this paper.
1.4 Data and Summary Statistics
My main dataset comes from the 2000 decennial Census Public Use Microdata files
(PUMS), which provide a 5 percent random sample of the United States, as well as the 2001-
2016 American Community Survey (ACS) data, which replaced the long-form Census. The
first few years had smaller sample sizes, but since 2005 each year of ACS data has provided
a one percent sample of the U.S. My sample is composed of probable refugees (details in
section 4.1) aged 25 and older, who are likely to have completed their formal education by
the time I observe them. I exclude refugees who arrived before the TANF program began in
1996.
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Summary statistics on major control variables are presented in Table 1.1 for different
sending populations in the 2012-2016 ACS data. Mobility rates vary significantly by sending
region, with some of the more recent waves, such as Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle
East, having higher rates of mobility. This may suggest that refugees reshuﬄe somewhat in
the first few years after arriving before settling down more permanently in a state. The ORR
Annual Reports to Congress generally mention that secondary migration of refugees mainly
occurs in the first year after resettlement (ORR, 2016). Indicators of economic success vary
substantially by sending population as well, and it appears that older sending populations
are on average more successful in terms of wages, again consistent with either cohort effects
or assimilation.
Summary statistics on the same variables are presented in Table A1 for the full sample
of refugees (above the age of 24) as well as economic migrants, defined as the foreign born
who do not fall into my refugee sample, in the 2000 Census and 2012-2016 ACS, respectively.
According to this dataset, about 2.1 percent of refugees have moved between states in the
last year. In the 2016 ACS data, about 2.4 percent of the population as a whole had moved
between states in the prior year. This suggests that refugees are not a particularly mobile
group once they arrive in the U.S., which is reassuring evidence in favor of the assumption
that endogenous secondary migration isn’t a major problem for the identification strategy.
Table A1 also shows evidence of possible cohort effects and/or assimilation among the refugee
population; refugees observed in 2012-2016 have higher wages, employment rates, and labor
force participation rates and are more likely to speak English than refugees observed in 2000.
This could occur if more recently arrived refugees have different skill distributions from older
sending populations, or it could reflect improved outcomes among populations with greater
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tenure in the U.S. The latter would occur if the sample of refugees observed in 2012-2016
had greater experience in the U.S. due to a decreased arrival rate. Of course, the changes
could also occur due to changes in labor market or other conditions for refugees between
2000 and 2012-2016. In addition, the 2000 Census sampled a larger proportion of the U.S.
population than is reflected in the 2012-2016 numbers, suggesting that the sample means in
2000 may be closer to the population average.
1.4.1 Identification of Refugees
As mentioned previously, I identify likely refugees by country of origin and year of
arrival, as neither the Census nor the ACS ask the foreign born whether they are refugees
or economic immigrants. Previous papers such as Cortes (2004) and Borjas (2000) identify
refugees based on country of origin; their selections are not time-varying. I introduce a
methodology for selecting probable refugees based on fluctuations in arrival numbers over
time; that is, I classify a country as a refugee country only in years in which numbers
of refugee arrivals are high relative to the number of total arrivals (including economic
immigrants). I use data from the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, which is put together
by the Department of Homeland Security, on refugee arrivals and immigrant visas issued by
region and country of nationality from 1996 to present to identify refugee sending countries.11
If refugees make up more than 60 percent of total arrivals, defined as refugee arrivals plus
immigrant visas issued, for a certain country-year, immigrants arriving in that year that
11The sending countries in my sample are: members of the former Soviet Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Bhutan, Burma (Myanmar), Laos, Afghanistan, Iraq, Cuba, Congo, Eritrea, Liberia, Somalia, and
Sudan. See the Appendix for more details on sample construction.
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were born in that country are identified as likely refugees.12 For example, arrivals from
the Balkans during the 1990s are coded as likely refugees, while immigrants from Mexico
are not. My methodology is similar to a Migration Policy Institute (MPI) report that
identifies immigrants from country-years when refugee admissions exceeded 40 percent of
the estimated foreign born population identified in the ACS as probable refugees (Capps
and Newland, 2015). Given that my identification strategy relies on the precise timing of
the arrival of the refugee, I focus on refugees per immigrant in a given year of arrival instead.
Finally, to limit variation in the sample from small changes in actual arrival numbers, I use
a five-year centered moving average of the fraction of refugees.
Figure 1.4 shows the percent of refugees in the sample of refugees arriving since 1996
residing in each state. About 50 percent of the refugees in the sample reside in three states:
California, Florida, and New York. This compares to around a quarter of the population 25
and over as a whole, according to the 2016 ACS. Furthermore, about 72 percent of refugees
live in the top 10 receiving states. This compares with about 54 percent of the general
population. The amount of geographic concentration among refugees is similar to that
of the non-refugee foreign born population in my sample, though the state rankings differ
slightly; refugees are much more concentrated in Florida, while relatively smaller populations
reside in California and Texas, for example. The concentration of refugees is perhaps not
surprising given that historical refugee populations tend to be reinforced by the arrival
of family reunification cases and the fact that placement decisions are made taking into
consideration local resources.
12I examine the robustness of my results to higher thresholds below.
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Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of refugees across states compiled from arrivals data
by state from the ORR from 1996-2015. Summed across years, this data gives the distribu-
tion that would have occurred if all refugees stayed in their original state of resettlement.
Comparing Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5 jointly provides a check on my method for identifying
refugees and on the extent of secondary migration of refugees in the years of my sample. The
patterns are broadly similar; however, there are a few differences in the distribution worth
noting. The ORR data suggest that about 21 percent of refugees were resettled in Florida
between 1996 and 2015, while about 36 percent in my sample live in Florida. In contrast,
California, Texas, and Minnesota, among others, have relatively fewer refugees in my sample
than in the ORR data.
Secondary migration data is available for select years during the sample period from
the ORR (2012-2015;1995-1998). The secondary migration data back up the increased con-
centration of refugees in Florida, but they also suggest that Minnesota has received very large
inflows of secondary migration on average, for example. The differences in the distribution
I observe in the data from the one implied by the ORR data on initial resettlement and
net secondary migration may in part be a consequence of the relative difficulty in picking
up refugees from smaller sending countries using my method. For instance, Minnesota has
large populations of refugees from various African countries, such as Somalia. Given that
the total sending populations are smaller from these areas than from countries such as Cuba
or the Soviet Union, my measure of how many live in a certain state may be relatively noisy.
A related but different issue is that my method for identifying refugees will likely
classify some economic migrants as refugees. For example, there are many Vietnamese living
in the U.S. who arrived as refugees, but there are also many more who arrived through
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other channels, such as through family-based immigration (MPI, 2015). In Table A2, I show
the average (smoothed) fraction of refugees issued for each country in my sample.13 The
proportions vary widely by sending country, with Croatia having an average refugee share
of about 0.65 and Bhutan having a ratio of 0.94.14 If this misclassification occurs randomly
with respect to my identifying variation in welfare generosity, then it may be expected to
bias my estimates downwards, since some of the individuals that I identify as refugees will
not be exposed to the “treatment” of interest.
1.4.2 Welfare Generosity Measure
For data on TANF benefit levels and other features of the TANF programs, I use the
Welfare Rules Database. The database was put together by the Urban Institute and allows
users to make queries on various aspects of TANF programs, such as activities exemptions,
dollar amounts, time limits, and income eligibility tests. For my baseline measure of welfare
generosity, I use maximum monthly benefits for a family of three,15 filling any gaps in in-
formation with Center on Budget and Policy Priorities data (Floyd and Schott, 2015). The
Welfare Rules Database also contains information on time limits; most states allow benefi-
ciaries to be on TANF for up to five years, but a handful of states, including Connecticut,
13The denominator is refugees plus immigrant visas.
14Note that the immigrant totals are not comprehensive: I give only immigrant visa numbers, not including
migrants on nonimmigrant (temporary) visas.
15Among refugees aged 25 and older in my sample who have at least one child, the median family size is
over four for both the whole sample and for the recently arrived. However, the median family size is three
for the refugee sample overall. In the main results, I focus on benefit level for a family of three because it
is a standard metric for reporting welfare generosity, allowing me to fill in any gaps in information in the
Welfare Rules Database and cross-reference using other sources. However, I test the robustness of my results
to using the rules for a family of four in Table A7. The results are qualitatively unchanged, though the
magnitudes are smaller.
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Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, and Michigan, have adopted shorter time limits. The
shortest is Connecticut, at 21 months. Given that the eligibility time limits may be impor-
tant in determining the responsiveness of refugee outcomes to welfare money, I exclude any
variation in welfare generosity coming from changes in time limits as a robustness check.
1.5 Empirical Methodology
I exploit variation both across states and over time in TANF benefit levels to estimate
the effect of being randomly (conditional on observable characteristics) settled in a state with
a certain level of generosity on outcomes, accounting for time-invariant state characteristics
as well as year of interview and arrival fixed effects. Specifically, I estimate the following
equation on the 2000-2016 repeated cross section data:
yisT t = βGsT + γXit + δURsT + αURst + θs + ξt + ηT + isT t (1.1)
where yisT t is the outcome of refugee i in year t who lives in state s and arrived in
the U.S. in year T and Xit is a vector of characteristics of the individual that may influence
placement outcomes. I control for country of origin,16 number of children, marital status,
educational attainment in four categories,17 and English ability,18 as well as age and its
square.
The need to control for biographical data that may have an effect on placement deci-
sions presents a challenge for identification of the effect of welfare generosity on labor market
16The countries are listed in Table A2.
17Less than high school, high school, some college, and college and above.
18I create a dummy variable for English ability, coding those who respond that they either don’t speak
English or don’t speak English well in the Census or ACS form as not speaking English, and those who
respond that they speak English well or very well or only speak English as speaking English.
21
outcomes if some of these characteristics themselves respond to welfare generosity. For ex-
ample, if educational attainment influences allocation of refugees to more or less generous
states, but refugees have a tendency to increase their educational attainment after arrival
in response to welfare generosity, then it will be difficult to disentangle the effect of welfare
on labor market outcomes from the effect of the increased educational attainment on labor
market outcomes. I explore this issue more carefully below.
I also control for business cycle conditions in both the year of arrival and the year of
interview using the unemployment rate (UR).19 To the extent that the resettlement agency
committee responds to local business cycle conditions in making placement decisions or state
legislatures respond to business cycle conditions in setting TANF benefit levels, these time-
varying state characteristics may not be exogenous to the placement decision or welfare
generosity. θs, ξt, and ηT are state, year of interview, and year of arrival fixed effects,
respectively, allowing me to parse out any time-invariant characteristics of a particular state
that may affect refugee outcomes, such as general attitudes towards refugees. I am unable to
simultaneously control for year of interview and year of arrival fixed effects and the number
of years the refugee has been in the U.S. In Table A10 I test the robustness of my results
to removing year of interview fixed effects and adding controls for number of years in the
U.S. The results are virtually unchanged. The coefficient of interest, β, measures the effect
of welfare generosity in terms of TANF maximum benefit levels for a family of three in the
refugee’s state of residence at the time of his or her arrival, represented by GTs. I cluster
standard errors at the state level.
19I downloaded unemployment rate data from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database,
which uses Bureau of Labor Statistics data on unemployment.
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I estimate Equation 1.1 using several outcome variables available in the data, but my
main results look at the effects of welfare generosity on log earnings; I estimate the effect on
yearly earnings excluding refugees who do not have positive wages.20 Using yearly earnings
allows for the possibility that some of the effects occur through refugees adjusting labor
supply along the intensive margin.
1.5.1 Support for Identifying Assumptions
As mentioned previously, the committee that makes placement decisions has the
pertinent information on cash assistance levels and trends by state, so it is critical to my
identification strategy that the committee not be sending refugees with certain unobserved
characteristics that predict their success to more generous states, that the levels of states’
cash assistance do not themselves respond to refugee placement decisions, and that other
state-level correlates of refugee outcomes are not changing at the same time as cash assistance
levels. I examine these assumptions more carefully in this section, and Section 7 contains
further discussion of alternative explanations.
1.5.1.1 Refugee Characteristics and Placement Decisions
One of the identifying assumptions is that placement is exogenous conditional on ob-
servable characteristics, or in other words, that refugees are not systematically sorted into
more or less generous states based on unobservable characteristics. There is no method for
directly testing whether this identification assumption is valid (Esther Duflo, Rachel Glen-
20All annual earnings are deflated to real 2016 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price
Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W).
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nerster and Michael Kremer, 2008). However, the specifications minimize the potential bias
from endogeneity of placement by controlling for state fixed effects. If the refugee resettle-
ment committee does sort more needy refugees into more generous states, by, for example,
taking into account a broader range of lottery effect characteristics such as public transporta-
tion and public attitudes, then as long as the perception of these state characteristics do
not change with TANF benefit levels over time, the state fixed effects should parse this out.
Furthermore, in my preferred specification, with the addition of state linear time trends,
confounding factors would have to change nonlinearly at the same time as TANF benefit
levels to bias my estimates.
However, it is clear from documentation of the placement process that resettlement
agencies do take into consideration state trends in cash assistance levels as well as other
current local economic conditions in making placement decisions. Therefore, it is crucial that
I am able to adequately control for any information about the refugees that resettlement
organizations have when making their placement decisions. I am unable to observe some
information on refugees that the agencies have when making their decision, but fortunately,
they do not meet the refugees that they are placing before the decision is made, so the
number of unobservable characteristics that could influence placement outcomes is limited.
Resettlement organizations do have access to some medical data and information on religion
and ethnicity that I do not have, though region of origin controls may capture a good part
of the variation from the latter two characteristics. It is also somewhat reassuring that
if anything, assuming that the agencies direct needier cases to communities with better
resources, endogeneity of placement should bias me against finding any positive wage results
from increased welfare generosity.
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One way to indirectly examine the assumption of exogenous placement conditional
on observable characteristics is to test the extent to which resettlement agencies appear
to use characteristics observed by the econometrician to make placement decisions. To
this end, in Table 1.2 I show the results of Equation 1.1 run without controls for refugee
characteristics, using refugees’ observable characteristics as the outcome variables. The
regressions all include state, year of immigration, and year of interview fixed effects, as
well as linear state time trends. This table provides a rough test of the extent to which
placement officers use refugee characteristics in making placement decisions.21 The majority
of characteristics show no significant relationship with cash assistance generosity, and those
that do are sensitive to the choice of specification. Using the baseline sample, it appears
that refugees with less than a high school education and those from Southeast Asia are
more likely to receive generous cash assistance. In column 2 of Table 1.2, I widen the
sample of refugees to those who came from a country in a year when at least 40 percent of
immigrants were refugees, to rule out the possibility that the lack of correlations in the table
are driven by a lack of statistical power. In this specification, refugees with more children
get significantly more assistance, as do those from the Middle East. It is reassuring that in
general, observable characteristics do not appear to be strongly correlated with the level of
cash assistance. In addition, to the extent that they are correlated, it appears that it is the
less skilled populations that receive more money.22
21It is worth noting that these characteristics are observed at the time of interview, not in the year of
immigration. Therefore, some of them may have changed between those two points in time, making them a
potential outcome variable.
22The results of this table fit well with conclusions derived from interviews with International Rescue
Committee (IRC) officials involved in placements that are described in Beaman (2012). These interviews
implied that officials used few biographical details of refugees to make placement decisions.
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1.5.1.2 Benefit Levels and Other Determinants of Outcomes
As with any differences-in-differences empirical design, this empirical strategy relies
on a “parallel trends” assumption. In this case, the paper relies on the assumption that if
no state changed their TANF benefit levels during the sample period, refugee wages would
have evolved similarly in all states. Lacking data on refugee wages in this counterfactual
scenario, we can’t directly test this assumption. We can test, however, whether trends in
refugee wages before major TANF changes tend to match the states that did not experience
the change. Figure 1.6 shows the results of one such test for parallel pre-trends. This figure
displays the results of a version of Equation 1.1, where the independent variables of interest
are indicator variables for whether the refugee arrived in a state 2, 3, or more than 4 years
before or 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 years after an increase in TANF maximum benefit levels of at
least 3 percent, allowing us to compare wages for refugees who arrived before vs. after a
major TANF hike. The comparison group in this regression is refugees who arrived one year
before a large increase. Refugees in states that never experienced a large TANF increase are
excluded.23
The coefficients on wages for refugees arriving before a TANF increase are statistically
insignificant, providing evidence consistent with the parallel trends assumption. However, it
is important to note that refugees arriving in the years immediately before a TANF increase
are not uniformly unaffected by the increase, since refugees can be on TANF for up to five
years. Several factors may cause the lack of effect for refugees arriving in the years leading up
to a large increase. One is that cash assistance use falls precipitously in the year after arrival,
23In Figure A3 I show the results of a specification where these refugees are included in the omitted
category with refugees who arrived one year before a large increase. The results look very similar.
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with TANF use falling by half and RCA use virtually disappearing, according to the 2015
Annual Survey of Refugeess. Further, cash assistance may be most important in determining
outcomes in the year after arrival, when refugees are first settling into the new labor market,
although this is difficult to investigate empirically. Finally, refugees arriving the year before
a TANF increase are arriving in the year of a small TANF decrease on average, which could
work as a headwind against finding a positive effect of the TANF increase in the year after
arrival. In contrast, as expected, the coefficients for the year of an increase and thereafter
are positive, though not always statistically significant. This provides suggestive evidence
that TANF changes, and not other determinants of outcomes trending differentially across
states, are the cause of the main effects.
To delve further into the parallel trends assumption, I run similar tests for non-
refugee outcomes to look for correlations between TANF changes and overall labor market
conditions. In Figure A1, I examine how native wages in the year of interview evolve around
large TANF increases. That is, I compare natives interviewed before and after a TANF
increase with the excluded group of natives interviewed one year before the increase. There
is some indication that native wages are higher a few years before the increase and lower
a few years after, indicating that TANF increases may be related to the business cycle.
However, the coefficients after the increase are negative, suggesting that if anything, the
positive refugee effects are biased downwards by a negative correlation between TANF and
overall wages.24 I run similar tests for non-refugee immigrant wages in Figure A2. The
coefficients for years before a TANF change are again small and statistically insignificant.
However, a negative association appears to develop several years after the change.
24In results not presented here but available upon request, the employment pattern looks similar.
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1.6 Results
Results from Equation 1.1 are shown in Table 1.3. The effect per $100 of TANF
monthly benefit for a family of three is exhibited in the first row. The specifications all include
state, year of arrival, and year of interview fixed effects as well as state time trends. The
first two columns do not include controls for demographic characteristics or local economic
conditions; the controls are added in columns 3 and 4. Columns 2 and 4 exclude refugees
who have been in the U.S. for fewer than five years, as these refugees may still be using
TANF benefits. The coefficient on TANF generosity for log annual wages is relatively stable
across specifications; these results suggest that refugees experience around 5.2-7.7% higher
wages per $100 of maximum monthly benefit level. As expected, there are substantial wage
premiums for educational attainment and English ability (the coefficients on the educational
categories are relative to the omitted category of college and above).
Results from Equation 1.1 run separately for men and women are presented in Table
1.4. These specifications include state, year of interview, and year of immigration fixed
effects and state time trends. The results suggest that men’s wages may be more sensitive
to welfare generosity than women’s, but the difference is not statistically significant. Thus,
it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about any heterogeneity in response to welfare
generosity by gender.
The next two tables explore some potential channels through which the effect of
welfare generosity on labor market outcomes might operate. Table 1.5 presents the results
from specifications allowing for each category of educational attainment to have a different
interaction effect with the measure of welfare generosity. Since the main and interaction
effects for college-educated refugees are omitted, the coefficient on welfare generosity can be
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interpreted as the effect for college-educated workers. These results strongly suggest that
the effects are largest for highly-educated refugees. This is intuitive, as highly-educated
refugees may reasonably have the most to gain from the additional liquidity up front if it
allows them to wait for a better job match or invest in U.S.-specific human capital such as
English proficiency, which is strongly correlated with higher wages in all specifications, or
recertification.
As mentioned previously, it is possible that educational attainment could also respond
to welfare generosity. To minimize this “bad control” problem, in columns 3-4 I present re-
sults from the same specifications, but excluding refugees who arrived before the age of 25.
It is possible that refugees who arrived after this age respond to welfare generosity by in-
creasing educational attainment, but it is plausibly less likely. The results are little changed,
suggesting that educational attainment may not be an important outcome variable. In Ta-
ble A5, I examine heterogeneity in the main effect by several other refugee characteristics.
I find that cash assistance is most helpful to refugees with better English ability, refugees
with fewer children, and older refugees. This reinforces the idea that cash assistance may
be particularly helpful for refugees that are already most primed for success in the labor
market. It’s worth noting, however, that the effect of cash assistance on wages is positive
and statistically significant for nearly every group, including those with less than a high
school education and those who do not speak English.
As I mentioned in Section 2, welfare generosity may affect wages through increased
investment in U.S.-specific human capital or through an improved job match, either of which
would result in the refugee ultimately finding a higher-paying job. One way to test whether
one of these mechanisms is occurring is to look at the effect of welfare generosity on refugees’
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occupational characteristics, which I examine in Table 1.6. I investigate the impact of the
TANF generosity measure on occupational mean wage and occupational mean education
in years. A positive effect on occupational mean wage or occupational mean education
would suggest that refugees placed with higher cash assistance went on to work in better
jobs. In columns 1 and 2 the outcome variable is mean education in years for all workers
(both native and foreign born) 25 and over in the refugee’s occupation in 1990 and 2000,
respectively. In columns 3 and 4, I average the hourly wage of all individuals working in each
of the occupations identified in the Census and ACS and assign that wage by occupation to
each refugee. In each of these specifications (columns 1 through 4), the coefficient on the
TANF benefit level is positive, and the effects are statistically significant for occupational
mean education as well as occupational mean wage using the 1990 calculation, providing
significant evidence that refugees are, in fact, getting better jobs when they are resettled
with higher levels of cash assistance.
Table A4 further explores the question of whether refugees invest more in their human
capital upon arrival if they have additional liquidity from welfare benefits. Here, I examine
the effect of removing controls for English ability (column 1) and education (column 2). If the
coefficient on TANF generosity increased after removing these controls, it might suggest that
some of the effects of generosity on wages were occurring through the channel of improved
English proficiency or increased educational attainment (or that these characteristics were
important determinants of placement outcomes). Removing controls for education increases
the magnitude of the coefficient, but the difference is not statistically significant, consistent
with the conclusions of Table 1.5. Similarly, the magnitude of the main result does not
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change with the removal of the control for English ability.25 Of course, these results do not
rule out the possibility that refugees increase their U.S.-specific human capital in ways not
testable using this data: they could be completing re-certification requirements or attending
training on practicing their professions in the U.S. context, for example. More research is
needed to definitively draw conclusions on the mechanisms for the positive effects on wages
that I find here.
In Table 1.7, I examine the effects of welfare generosity on a few alternative outcome
variables: probability of employment (columns 1 and 5), use of food stamps (columns 2 and
6), probability of moving between states in the past year (columns 3 and 7), and probability
of speaking English (columns 4 and 8). The fact that I find no evidence of an effect of welfare
generosity on employment on the extensive margin may be the result of one of any number
of factors particular to refugees. For one, newly arrived refugees may have fewer resources,
making it difficult to live solely on benefits from welfare programs and pushing them to work
if they are able. In addition, resettlement agencies often tie the provision of services (such
as employment services) to compliance with employment and training rules, including an
obligation to accept any job offers unless there is an acceptable reason to decline. Finally,
cash assistance is temporary unless the refugee qualifies for SSI, so refugees I observe with
significant tenure in the U.S. likely work out of necessity. However, my results only apply to
employment effects along the extensive margin; it may be the case that refugees adjust their
hours based on available cash assistance. In addition, it’s possible that refugees do prolong
their job search in response to more generous cash assistance, but that this effect does not
25In the next table, I run a specification with the English dummy as the outcome variable, and do not
find significant effects of welfare generosity on probability of speaking English.
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last long enough to be detected using these data. Columns 2 and 6 show no significant
evidence of an effect on the use of food stamps, though the point estimate in column 6 is
negative. For secondary migration, though the effect of cash assistance in the full sample is
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, most of the coefficients on welfare generosity
are not statistically significant, and most of them are close to zero. This provides some
reassuring evidence in support of the identifying assumption that endogenous secondary
migration is limited, though it only gives evidence on the prior year. Finally, columns 4
and 8 provide additional evidence that English ability is not an important outcome variable.
If English ability responded to the level of cash assistance, it would provide evidence that
increased English language skills could be a major mechanism for the increased wages we
observe.
In order to further understand the finding of no effects on employment, I test for
heterogeneity in employment effects across a number of observable characteristics. In Table
1.8, I show the results of specifications that include interaction effects between TANF max-
imum benefit level and a number of refugee characteristics. No group of refugees in these
specifications shows a statistically significant effect of cash assistance on probability of em-
ployment. However, in some cases, the effects on employment are statistically significantly
different for different groups of refugees. For example, while neither English-speaking nor
non-English-speaking refugees have an effect of cash assistance on employment, the effect
on English speaking refugees is statistically significantly more positive.26 The same is true
26In results not presented here but available upon request, I test for interaction effects along several other
characteristics, including age, number of own children, and marital status. The interaction effect with age
is statistically significant, but very close to zero. None of the rest of the interaction effects are statistically
significant.
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for educational attainment: the effect is statistically significantly more positive for more
highly-educated people. This reinforces the idea that cash assistance is especially helpful to
highly-educated refugees in the labor market. However, the interaction effects are uniformly
quite small, never larger than about 2 percent. In Section 7.1, I examine the potential for
selection into employment in more detail.
1.7 Robustness Checks
In this section, I present several robustness checks to examine the consistency of the
results using alternative subsamples and specifications. First, as mentioned before, some
states have programs that allow more flexibility in terms of whether they prefer to set RCA
rates according to their TANF formulas. The first column of Table 1.9 presents estimates
from Equation 1.1, but excluding these states. These specifications include state, year of
interview, and year of arrival fixed effects as well as state time trends. The coefficient on log
wages is virtually the same as in earlier specifications. If the coefficient on log wage were
larger in this specification, it would have been consistent with the idea that refugees in the
excluded states are less affected by the identifying variation in welfare generosity.
As a second robustness check, I estimate Equation 1.1 excluding refugees from Cuba.
Given that this population is exceptionally geographically concentrated (84 percent in my
sample live in Florida), it is reassuring that the results appear to be robust to dropping it,
though the main coefficient marginally loses statistical significance. Finally, in column 3, I
exclude any variation in welfare generosity coming from changes in time limits for TANF. As
mentioned previously, most states use the standard time limit of five years for TANF. While
a handful of states have shorter time limits, only a few experience changes in these time
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limits during my sample period, so the vast majority of variation in generosity coming from
time limits is absorbed by state fixed effects. However, Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, New
Mexico, South Dakota, and Montana experience changes in time limit policies according to
the Welfare Rules Database during my sample period. Less than three percent of my sample
of refugees live in these states, but to exclude the possibility that these changes in generosity
are driving my results, I remove these states from my sample in these specifications.27 The
results are virtually unchanged.
In Figure 1.7 I examine the robustness of my results to experimenting with different
cutoffs for identifying likely refugees. The estimate furthest to the left in the figure presents
the results of Equation 1.1 run on the sample of all foreign born individuals, including
refugees. Moving to the right, I narrow down the sample so that the cutoff criteria for a
refugee sending country becomes more stringent. The second estimate shows results with
immigrants from country-years where the fraction of refugees exceeded 10 percent identified
as refugees. Moving to the right, each estimate increases the cutoff fraction by 10 percentage
points. The size of the point estimates generally increases as the share of refugees in the
sample grows, until the fraction reaches 0.7. The point estimates then become more volatile
as the standard errors increase, but there appears to be a downward trend. Referring to Table
A2, this is perhaps not surprising once we note that sending countries with lower refugee
shares tend to have more highly educated refugees and the results are stronger among more
highly educated individuals. The share of the sample that is college educated is plotted on
27In results not presented here, I attempt to control flexibly for these time limits, allowing for an interaction
effect between maximum benefit level and time limit. However, given the lack of variation in time limits
picked up in my estimation strategy, the results are not well identified. Therefore, while time limits and
other TANF design details may represent important dimensions for the effect of welfare generosity on welfare
outcomes, my identification strategy is not well suited to examining them.
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the second y axis.28
I also present evidence that a similar effect of TANF generosity does not exist for the
non-refugee foreign born.29 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996 mandated that non-refugee immigrants who have been in the U.S. for fewer
than five years are not eligible for federal funding under welfare programs such as TANF
and SSI, though many states have since implemented programs to extend TANF benefits to
newly arrived immigrants using state funding. Furthermore, none of the non-refugee foreign
born population is eligible for RCA.
Table 1.10 provides evidence that the positive effects I find on wages apply uniquely
to refugees. The effect of welfare generosity is negative, either indicating a causal negative
effect of TANF generosity on wages or an effect of an omitted variable that is correlated
with the non-random location decisions of immigrants. As I show in Table A9, immigrant
characteristics, in contrast to refugee characteristics, are significantly correlated with cash
assistance benefit levels in the main specification, indicating that estimates of effects for
immigrants are unlikely to be causal.30
In Table A11, I show the results of triple difference specifications using a variant of
28In Table A8, I present the main results using a lower cutoff of 40 percent. The magnitudes are smaller,
as expected given that the effect is intent to treat, but they remain statistically significant in the preferred
specifications.
29Controls for the sending regions in this specification are: Mexico, Canada, Latin America excluding
Mexico, Northern and Western Europe, Eastern Europe, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia and the
Middle East, Africa, and Oceania, rather than the refugee sending countries.
30In Table A12, I look at heterogeneity in both the wage and employment impacts of TANF generosity
on non-refugee immigrants, finding evidence that the negative impacts are concentrated among non-English
speaking and low-skilled immigrants. This reinforces the idea that interactions with the welfare system are
different for high human capital individuals, although again, the results among non-refugee immigrants are
not well identified.
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Equation 1.1 where non-refugee immigrants are used as a control. In each specification dis-
played in the table, refugee status is interacted fully with all controls, including individual
controls, fixed effects, and state-specific time trends. In all specifications, the interaction
between refugee status and TANF maximum benefit level is positive and statistically signif-
icant, while the main effect on TANF maximum benefit level is negative, indicating that the
positive effect of cash assistance generosity is specific to refugees. Columns 3 and 4 show
the coefficient on interactions between refugee status and educational attainment and En-
glish ability, showing that the returns to these types of characteristics vary strongly between
refugees and non-refugees.
Finally, in Table A13 I show the results of Equation 1.1 run on a sample of native
workers with a high school education or less. I examine the impact of cash assistance levels
in the year of interview on their wages in the same year as a check on whether high cash
assistance levels are associated with good outcomes for all workers, rather than the effect
being particular to refugees. Columns 1 and 2 show that while the impact of cash assistance
is estimated to be positive, it is small and statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, columns 3
and 4 show that the impact on employment is close to zero.31
As a final check on the sample definition for refugees, I estimate Equation 1.1 using a
few additional sample definitions; the results are shown in Table A14. Column 1 shows the
results for the baseline sample definition, which uses a five-year centered moving average of
the fraction of refugees entering in a year from a certain country to identify likely refugees.
31These results are in no way meant to represent a causal estimate of the effect of TANF programs on
native workers’ labor market outcomes. I use a simplified welfare generosity measure better suited to refugees
than to native workers, and there is of course no reason to think that location of native workers is exogenous.
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Column 2 shows the results when the fraction is not smoothed; they are virtually unchanged.
The fact that most of the variation over time in cash benefits comes from just a few
states once state time trends are removed raises the concern that the results may be driven
by policy changes other than changes in cash assistance levels in those particular states. In
Figure 1.8, I estimate Equation 1.1, dropping each of the 15 top states for refugees in my
sample one by one. In all of these specifications, the coefficient remains nearly identical.
Given that the wage results are robust to the removal of all of the states where the refugee
population is mostly concentrated (nearly 81 percent of the sample lives in these states),
we can gain confidence that they are not driven by an unrelated state-specific policy change
that affected refugee outcomes.
1.7.1 Alternative Explanations
1.7.1.1 Selection into Employment
This paper focuses on wages conditional on employment as the primary outcome of
interest. While these specifications produce economically and statistically significant results,
the possibility remains that the effects are driven by selection rather than a true causal
effect. I previously showed that there was no statistically significant effect of cash assistance
on employment, but if the average treatment effect masks significant effect heterogeneity on
observable or unobservable characteristics, it remains possible that positive selection into
the sample of employed refugees could be contributing to the results. If certain high-ability
refugees are more likely to be employed if they are resettled with more cash assistance, for
example, we may see average wages among the employed go up even if individual refugees
do not earn higher wages than they would have in the counterfactual scenario where they
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were resettled with less cash assistance.
As I noted earlier, there is some evidence of heterogeneity along observable charac-
teristics, though the effects of cash assistance on employment are not statistically significant
or sizable among any individual group. However, the presence of statistically significant
interaction effects warrants closer attention to this alternative explanation for the results.
While it’s not possible to directly decompose the effect on wages conditional on em-
ployment into a selection effect and a pure wage effect, in Table A15 I perform one indirect
test for the presence of a selection effect. The table contains the results of a version of
Equation 1.1 run without controls, using refugee characteristics as the outcome variables
of interest. This table is similar to Table 1.2, except that here the specifications are run
only on the sample of employed refugees. The results of the table provide some evidence on
how much cash assistance generosity changes the composition of employed refugees. Like in
Table 1.2, very few refugee characteristics produce statistically significant results. Column 1
contains the full sample of employed refugees while column 2 excludes those arriving in the
most recent five years. Depending on the specification, there’s some suggestion that more
generous cash assistance draws more low-educated refugees, fewer English speaking refugees,
more female refugees, or refugees with more children into employment. These groups gener-
ally have lower than average wages, suggesting that it’s unlikely that selection accounts for
positive conditional wage effects.32
32As a final test for selection effects, I estimate a Heckman two step specification (James J. Heckman, 1976),
which takes into account that the econometrician observes wages of refugees only when they are employed,
and specifies that employment is a function of observable characteristics of refugees and some error term,
which may be correlated with the error term in the wage equation. The results of this specification are in
Table A16, which suggests that there is a small yet significant degree of selection (ρ and λ are statistically
significant), but that this cannot account for the effects of cash assistance on wages.
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1.7.1.2 Cash Assistance Generosity and Refugee Populations
It is possible, in theory, that state legislatures may respond to the placement of certain
types of refugees in their state by adjusting cash assistance levels. Given that refugee cash
assistance is tied to the generosity level of TANF in the majority of states, and refugees
make up a tiny portion of overall TANF recipients, this seems unlikely.33 To confirm this, in
results not presented here but available upon request, I plot refugee arrivals for each state by
year against TANF maximum benefit levels, and find that in 26 states, they are positively
correlated, and in 21, they are negatively correlated.
It is still possible that refugee populations as they were in 1996 predict the evolution
of the generosity of cash assistance. To investigate this, in results not presented here I
look at the relationship between total arrivals between 1983 and 1995 and evolution of cash
assistance between 1996 and 2015, finding no significant association. It appears unlikely,
therefore, that states adjust their cash assistance in response to the size of their refugee
populations. It is important to note, however, that states would have to adjust their cash
assistance in response to certain characteristics of refugee populations in order to bias my
results.34
33To my knowledge, exact statistics on the number of refugees enrolled in TANF are not available. For
a quick approximation, note that according to the 2015 ORR Annual Survey of Refugees, 18 percent of
refugee households that had arrived between 2011 and 2015 used TANF. According to the ORR, between
2011 and 2015 approximately 634,000 refugees, Cuban/Haitian entrants, and other people eligible for ORR
services arrived in the U.S. (this does not count unaccompanied minors). Translating these two facts into
an estimate of the number of refugees on TANF is difficult, since we don’t know the size composition of the
refugee households. Assuming 18 percent of refugee individuals are on TANF gives 114,124 TANF enrollees,
which is just 3.6 percent of total TANF enrollment in 2015.
34Given that many rules adjust their benefit levels over time according to stated rules, in Table A3, I show
the results of instrumental variables specifications that use these rules as an instrument for actual benefit
levels. These specifications drop states that do not use rules to adjust benefit levels. The results are similar.
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1.8 Discussion
This paper explores the effect of an additional $100 in maximum benefits on refugee
outcomes, finding significant effects on wages, but no significant effect on employment. The
overall effect on wages was 7.7 percent in my preferred specification, which is intent-to-treat.
Based on Yearbook of Immigration Statistics numbers, about 81 percent of my sample are
likely to be refugees.35 This gives an estimate of the true average treatment effect of 9.5
percent.36
The median real yearly wage income for working refugees interviewed between 2012
and 2016 was $20,436, so this amounts to $1,941 in additional wages for employed refugees
per year, using an annual effect size of 9.5 percent. To get a sense of the total size of the
impact of an additional $100 in maximum benefits, note that the average employed refugee
arrived at age 32. If we assume that the effect begins five years after arrival and lasts until
retirement at age 65, then we get 33 years per refugee on average of $1,941 extra wages.
Using a discount rate of 5 percent, this means an average total increase in wages of $31,676
per employed refugee.37
On the other hand, looking at the cost of benefit provision, the cost is $100 per month
to achieve this treatment effect. These data do not have information on when and how long
the refugees use cash assistance, but the 2015 Annual Survey of Refugees suggests that use
35To calculate this, I used Table A2 to calculate the number of likely refugees in my sample from each
country based on the average refugee share in column 1 and the sample size in column 3. I then added the
number of likely refugees together and calculated the proportion of likely refugees in the entire sample.
36The 95 percent confidence interval of the effect size adjusted for the imputation is 3.0-16.0 percent.
37Following James J. Heckman, Seong Hyeok Moon, Rodrigo Pinto, Peter A. Savalyev and Adam Yavitz
(2010) I conduct sensitivity analysis with different discount rates. No discounting leads to an estimate of
$64,053, while a very conservative discount rate of 20 percent leads to an estimate of $9,699, still higher than
conservative estimates of the costs of provision.
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of any kind of cash assistance fell nearly in half from 72.4 percent to 39.9 percent within a
year of arrival (ORR, 2016). Assuming the average refugee is on cash assistance for a year,
the benefits can be compared with a cost of $1,200. Very conservatively assuming that every
employed refugee remains on cash assistance for five years leads to a total cost of $6,000.
This means that the increased wages that employed refugees earn are greater, on average,
than the cost of providing the benefits.38
Only around 64 percent of refugees in my sample are employed, meaning that the
costs should be scaled up to account for the refugees that use cash assistance and do not get
wage benefits. Incorporating the costs of cash benefits for non-working refugees (assuming
both working and non-working refugees stay on cash assistance for five years) leads to a total
net benefit of $14,273 per refugee, on average.39
Of course, comparing the costs and benefits in this manner assumes that the benefit
to the refugee of increased wages is the only outcome of interest: a full cost-benefit analysis
would calculate the fiscal impacts as well as the benefit to society as a whole of the improved
assimilation outcomes. However, additional cash benefits to refugees appear to be a very
cost effective intervention for improving long-term outcomes.
1.9 Conclusion
The recent conflict in Syria has brought worldwide refugee levels to post-war highs,
bringing refugee resettlement to the forefront of policy debate. Given the significant public
investment in refugee resettlement, the question of the long-term cost-effectiveness of cur-
38In this exercise, this remains true so long as the effects last at least 4 years.
39This is calculated as totalbenefit = 0.64 ∗ (31676− 6000) + 0.36 ∗ (−6000).
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rent assistance for recently resettled refugees is of particular interest. The results of this
paper suggest that the availability of larger cash assistance benefits upon arrival to the U.S.
helps refugees integrate into the labor market. I find that refugees with access to larger
cash benefits earn higher wages, with little to no change in probability of employment. The
magnitudes of the effects imply that increased benefits are a cost-effective intervention for
improving assimilation outcomes for refugees. Given the overall complexity of welfare offer-
ings as well as the large number of degrees of freedom that states have in designing TANF
and other programs, the results should be taken as suggestive. However, these results suggest
that refugees, in particular highly-skilled refugees, may benefit from additional liquidity in
the years directly following placement while they transfer their skills to the U.S. context and
find a suitable job match.
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Figure 1.1: Identifying Variation: Maximum Monthly Benefit by State
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Note: Map displays TANF maximum monthly benefit for a family of three in 2015, after adjusting for price
level differences using the Bureau of Economic Analysis Implicit Regional Price Deflator.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Welfare Rules Database; Floyd and Schott (2015).
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Figure 1.2: Identifying Variation: Maximum Monthly Benefit by Year
60
07
00
80
09
00
rta
nf
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
CA
30
0
40
0
50
0
rta
nf
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
FL
75
0
80
0
85
0
90
0
rta
nf
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
NY
27
02
75
28
02
85
rta
nf
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
TX
40
0
50
0
60
0
rta
nf
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
PA
50
06
00
70
08
00
rta
nf
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
MN
40
0
60
0
80
0
rta
nf
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
WA
50
0
60
0
70
0
rta
nf
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
MI
40
0
50
0
60
0
rta
nf
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
IL
Note: Chart displays real maximum monthly benefits for a family of three by state for the nine largest
resettlement states in the full dataset. The axes differ by state to better show sources of variation.
Source: Welfare Rules Database; Floyd and Schott (2015).
Figure 1.3: Maximum Monthly Benefit for a Family of 3 by Year with Linear Trends Removed
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Note: Chart displays real maximum monthly benefits for a family of three by state for the nine largest
resettlement states in the full Census and ACS panel dataset. Linear trends have been removed for each
state; each figure shows the residuals of a regression of benefit levels on year. Therefore, the remaining
variation is shown as deviations from the horizontal line at 0. The plots have all been graphed on the same
y-axis scale in this figure.
Source: Welfare Rules Database; Floyd and Schott (2015).
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Figure 1.4: Percent of Refugee Population by State
Note: Figure displays the percent of all refugees in the sample residing in each state.
Source: 2000 Census, 2001-2015 American Community Survey.
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Figure 1.5: Percent of Refugee Population by State of Initial Resettlement
Note: Figure displays the percent of all refugees that were resettled in each state between 1996 and 2015.
Source: Office of Refugee Resettlement; author’s calculations.
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Figure 1.6: Event Study: Refugee Wages Before and After Large TANF Increase
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Note: This figure displays the results of a version of 1.1, where the independent variables of interest are
indicator variables for whether a refugee arrived in the year of a large increase in TANF maximum benefit
levels (at least 3 percent) as well as whether they arrived up to 4 years before or after such an increase.
The dependent variable is log wages of employed refugees. The categories of ”4+” and ”-4” also include
refugees who arrived greater than 4 years away from the increase in either direction. Refugees in states that
never experienced a large increase in TANF benefits are omitted in this sample. The regression also includes
controls for marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment
rate in the year of arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14 sending countries,
defined as in Table A2. There are also controls for year of arrival, year of interview, and state fixed effects
as well as state time trends. The standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Figure 1.7: Robustness Check: Effects of TANF Generosity with Alternative Refugee Sample
Definitions
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Note: This figure contains results from Equation 1.1 using various alternative criteria for identifying likely
refugees. Each red circle represents the point estimate on the measure of TANF generosity using a different
cutoff to define probable refugees, while the blue bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals. From the
left, the first estimate gives results where all foreign born individuals are included in the sample. The second
estimate uses a different definition of a probable refugee: a foreign-born individual that arrived in a year
that his or her country of origin sent refugees as a fraction of refugees and economic immigrants exceeding
0.1. Moving to the right, the cutoffs increase by 0.1. On the second y axis, the relationship between the
sample used and the fraction of the sample with college education is plotted. The figure shows a potential
correlation between the size of the positive effect and the fraction of the sample that is college educated,
which is not surprising given that college educated refugees see the largest effects of TANF generosity. All
regressions exclude refugees with 0 earnings. The regressions also include controls for marital status, sex,
age and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in the year of arrival and
the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14 sending countries, defined as in Table A2. All
specifications control for year of arrival, year of interview, and state fixed effects as well as state time trends.
All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Figure 1.8: Robustness Check: Effect of TANF Generosity on Wages, Dropping Top States
from Sample
Note: This figure contains results from my main estimating equation on the sample of refugees arriving
since 1996, dropping each of the 15 states with the largest refugee populations individually. The red circles
represent point estimates, and the blue bars show 90 percent confidence intervals. The regressions exclude
refugees with 0 earnings. The regressions also include controls for marital status, sex, age and its square,
number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in the year of arrival and the year of interview,
and dummy variables for each of 14 sending countries. The regressions include year of arrival fixed effects,
year of interview and state fixed effects, and state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at the state
level.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: Refugees 25 and Over by Region
Soviet	Union Yugoslavia Southeast	Asia Middle	East Cuba Africa
Age 49.443 44.521 40.514 42.058 46.854 40.04
Marital	Status 0.658 0.711 0.791 0.689 0.509 0.554
Share	Female 0.568 0.499 0.495 0.478 0.509 0.503
Real	Annual	Wage 37,966.468 30,475.114 14,734.741 15,074.886 17,492.129 18,788.522
Number	of	own	children	 0.91 1.084 1.723 1.519 0.774 1.764
Years	in	the	United	States 17.04 15.246 4.203 5.649 8.718 9.828
English	Ability 0.738 0.768 0.347 0.628 0.383 0.743
Employed 0.668 0.757 0.593 0.474 0.653 0.658
Labor	Force	Status 0.704 0.795 0.637 0.562 0.711 0.741
Urban	Status 0.953 0.968 0.942 0.977 0.974 0.948
Enrolled	in	School 0.053 0.047 0.046 0.115 0.047 0.146
Years	of	Education 14.938 12.299 7.283 12.045 12.377 10.879
Migrated	between	States	in	Prior	Year 0.014 0.007 0.04 0.028 0.015 0.044
Observations 4,864 2,905 3,285 3,471 16,860 3,182
Source: 2000 Census; 2012-2016 American Community Survey. A list of sending countries that comprise
each sending region and their respective sample sizes is available in Table A2.
Note: This table gives the means of major control variables by sending region for the sample of refugees
aged 25 and older.
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Table 1.2: Balance Table: Refugee Characteristics Largely Do Not Predict TANF Maximum
Benefit Levels
Dependent	Variable (1) (2)
Marital	Status -0.010 0.007
(0.010) (0.010)
Female 0.018 0.009
(0.015) (0.009)
Age -0.311 -0.150
(0.765) (0.443)
Number	of	Own	Children 0.053 0.069**
(0.048) (0.029)
<	High	School 0.023* 0.017*
(0.011) (0.010)
High	School -0.017 -0.021*
(0.026) (0.011)
Some	College -0.002 -0.006
(0.009) (0.006)
College	and	Above -0.004 0.010
(0.027) (0.011)
English	Ability -0.011 -0.005
(0.019) (0.008)
Soviet	Union -0.103 -0.007
(0.110) (0.023)
Yugoslavia -0.008 0.012
(0.062) (0.016)
Southeast	Asia 0.050*** 0.001
(0.015) (0.020)
Middle	East 0.007 -0.019**
(0.026) (0.008)
Cuba 0.020 0.002
(0.032) (0.010)
Africa 0.035 0.012
(0.041) (0.033)
Observations 78,129 104,227
Sample >60% >40%
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
TANF	Maximum	Benefit
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1, run without controls, on the sample of refugees arriving
since 1996. The outcome variables are refugee characteristics. In column 1, refugees are defined as individuals
from country-years where refugees made up at least 60 percent of new arrivals from their country of origin.
In column 2, I use a cutoff of 40 percent to expand the sample. All specifications control for year of arrival,
year of interview, and state fixed effects, as well as state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at
the state level.
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Table 1.3: Main Results: Effects of TANF Generosity on Wages
Dependent	variable: Log	Wage Log	Wage Log	Wage Log	Wage
(4) (4) (4) (4)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.029 0.045 0.052*** 0.077***
(0.029) (0.036) (0.019) (0.026)
<	High	School -0.392*** -0.468***
(0.025) (0.033)
High	School -0.334*** -0.389***
(0.030) (0.032)
Some	College -0.291*** -0.333***
(0.050) (0.052)
English	Ability 0.233*** 0.220***
(0.015) (0.014)
Observations 50,878 34,479 50,878 34,479
Controls No No Yes Yes
Sample All In	U.S.	>4	Years All In	U.S.	>4	Years
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of refugees arriving since 1996, excluding
those with 0 earnings. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 also include controls for marital status, sex, age
and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in the year of arrival and the
year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14 sending countries, defined as in Table 1.1. Columns 2
and 4 exclude refugees who have been in the U.S. for fewer than five years, as they may still receive TANF
benefits. All specifications control for year of arrival, year of interview, and state fixed effects, as well as
state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 1.4: Effects of TANF Generosity on Wages for Men and Women
Dependent	variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.038* 0.117** 0.079*** 0.033
(0.021) (0.055) (0.027) (0.033)
<	High	School -0.378*** -0.456*** -0.405*** -0.475***
(0.038) (0.042) (0.030) (0.030)
High	School -0.329*** -0.373*** -0.339*** -0.411***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.025) (0.029)
Some	College -0.293*** -0.332*** -0.288*** -0.336***
(0.059) (0.054) (0.041) (0.050)
English	Ability 0.226*** 0.196*** 0.244*** 0.250***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.029) (0.034)
Observations 28,074 18,426 22,804 16,053
Sex Men Men Women Women
Sample All In	U.S.	>4	Years All In	U.S.	>4	Years
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Log	Wage
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of refugees arriving since 1996 run
separately on men (columns 1 and 2) and women (columns 3 and 4), excluding those with 0 earnings. The
regressions also include controls for marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the
household, unemployment rate in the year of arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables for
each of 14 sending countries, defined as in Table 1.1. Columns 2 and 4 exclude refugees who have been in
the U.S. for fewer than five years, as they may still receive TANF benefits. All specifications control for
year of arrival, year of interview, and state fixed effects, as well as state time trends. All standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
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Table 1.5: Main Results by Education: Interaction Between TANF Generosity and Education
Dependent	Variable:
	 (2) (3) (4)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.083*** 0.105*** 0.097*** 0.110***
(0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.029)
<	High	School -0.132*** -0.193*** -0.117** -0.192***
(0.044) (0.054) (0.049) (0.071)
High	School -0.113* -0.166*** -0.12 -0.168**
(0.061) (0.059) (0.077) (0.074)
Some	College -0.039 -0.106 -0.078 -0.187*
(0.077) (0.098) (0.072) (0.097)
TANF*<HS -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.047*** -0.046***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
TANF*HS -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.037** -0.037**
(0.014) (0.011) (0.018) (0.015)
TANF*Some	College -0.046*** -0.041*** -0.033** -0.02
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
English	Ability 0.232*** 0.221*** 0.239*** 0.222***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)
Observations 50,878 34,479 39,621 24,788
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample All In	U.S.	>4	Years All In	U.S.	>4	Years
Age Full	Sample Full	Sample Over	24 Over	24
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Log	Wage
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of refugees arriving since 1996, allowing
for interaction effects between TANF generosity and each of the educational categories. Columns and 2
include the full sample of refugees above the age of 24, while columns 3 and 4 exclude those arriving prior
to the age of 25. All regressions exclude refugees with 0 earnings. The regressions also include controls for
marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in the
year of arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14 sending countries, defined as
in Table A2. Columns 2 and 4 exclude refugees who have been in the U.S. for fewer than five years, as they
may still receive TANF benefits. All specifications control for year of arrival, year of interview, and state
fixed effects, as well as state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 1.6: Mechanisms: Effects of TANF Generosity on Occupational Characteristics
Dependent	variable:
Occ	1990	
Avg	Educ
Occ	2000	
Avg	Educ
Occ	1990	
Avg	Wage
Occ	2000	
Avg	Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.176*** 0.141** 0.025* 0.019
(0.048) (0.058) (0.013) (0.015)
<	High	School -2.008*** -2.061*** -0.343*** -0.357***
(0.111) (0.106) (0.030) (0.028)
High	School -1.821*** -1.867*** -0.321*** -0.340***
(0.144) (0.145) (0.031) (0.031)
Some	College -1.335*** -1.389*** -0.257*** -0.274***
(0.127) (0.129) (0.031) (0.030)
English	Ability 0.635*** 0.646*** 0.104*** 0.109***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 34,479 34,479 34,479 34,479
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of refugees arriving since 1996, excluding
those with 0 earnings. The regressions in columns 1 and 2 use occupational mean education in years as the
outcome, while columns 3 and 4 use occupational mean wage in 1990 and 2000, respectively, as the outcome
variable. All regressions include controls for marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children
in the household, unemployment rate in the year of arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables
for each of 14 sending countries, defined as in Table A2. All regressions exclude refugees who have been in
the U.S. for fewer than five years, as they may still receive TANF benefits. All specifications control for
year of arrival, year of interview, and state fixed effects, as well as state time trends. All standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
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Table 1.7: Mechanisms: Effects of TANF Generosity on Alternative Outcomes
Employed Food	Stamp	Use Moved	States English	Ability Employed Food	Stamp	Use Moved	States English	Ability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.008 0.001 0.006* -0.01 0 -0.012 -0.001 -0.019
(0.017) (0.010) (0.003) (0.018) (0.015) (0.012) (0.004) (0.037)
<	High	School -0.164*** 0.137*** -0.010*** -0.371*** -0.194*** 0.158*** -0.009*** -0.380***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.004) (0.029) (0.007) (0.012) (0.003) (0.017)
High	School -0.068*** 0.062*** -0.008*** -0.238*** -0.083*** 0.070*** -0.008*** -0.241***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.022)
Some	College -0.038*** 0.042*** -0.008*** -0.100*** -0.051*** 0.050*** -0.007*** -0.098***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007)
English	Ability 0.098*** -0.103*** 0.002** 0.098*** -0.101*** 0.002
(0.017) (0.011) (0.001) (0.019) (0.013) (0.001)
Observations 78,129 67,977 67,977 78,129 51,072 51,072 51,072 51,072
Sample All All All All In	U.S.	>4	Years In	U.S.	>4	Years In	U.S.	>4	Years In	U.S.	>4	Years
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of refugees arriving since 1996, using
various alternative outcome variables. The regressions in the first four columns are run on the entire sample,
including refugees with 0 earnings, while those in columns 5-8 also exclude refugees who have been in the
U.S. for fewer than five years. The regressions also include controls for marital status, age and its square,
number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in the year of arrival and the year of interview,
and dummy variables for each of 14 sending countries, defined as in Table A2. The specifications control for
year of arrival, year of interview, and state fixed effects, as well as state time trends. All standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneity in Employment Effects of Cash Generosity
Dependent	Variable:
(1) (2) (4)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.006 -0.013 -0.005
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
<	High	School -0.143*** -0.195*** -0.194***
(0.018) (0.007) (0.007)
High	School -0.029** -0.082*** -0.083***
(0.013) (0.005) (0.006)
Some	College -0.018 -0.049*** -0.051***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.007)
TANF*<HS -0.009***
(0.002)
TANF*HS -0.010***
(0.003)
TANF*Some	College -0.006**
(0.003)
English	Ability 0.098*** -0.011 0.098***
(0.019) (0.014) (0.019)
TANF*English 0.021***
(0.002)
Female -0.148*** -0.149*** -0.190***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014)
TANF*Female 0.008**
(0.003)
Observations 51,072 51,072 51,072
Interaction Education English	Ability Female
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Employment
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of refugees arriving since 1996, using
employment as the outcome variable of interest. Each column shows the results with the generosity measure
interacted with a refugee characteristic: column 1 shows interactions with the education categories, column
2 shows interactions with English ability, and column 3 shows interactions with sex. The regressions include
controls for marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment
rate in the year of arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14 sending countries,
defined as in Table A2. All specifications control for year of arrival, year of interview, and state fixed effects,
as well as state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 1.9: Robustness Checks: Effects of TANF Generosity with Sample Exclusions
Dependent	Variable: Log	Wage
(1) (2) (3)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.054* 0.055 0.071**
(0.031) (0.036) (0.027)
<	High	School -0.469*** -0.524*** -0.470***
(0.038) (0.034) (0.034)
High	School -0.391*** -0.447*** -0.391***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.033)
Some	College -0.324*** -0.413*** -0.335***
(0.058) (0.029) (0.054)
English	Ability 0.220*** 0.194*** 0.220***
(0.015) (0.030) (0.014)
Observations 29,161 19,721 33,583
Publicly	Administered	Only Yes No No
Excl.	Cubans No Yes No
Excl.	States	with	Time	Limit	Changes No No Yes
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on various subsamples of refugees arriving since 1996.
Column 1 excludes refugees not resettled in a state using a publicly administered program for RCA. Column
2 excludes Cubans. Column 3 excludes refugees resettled in states that experienced a change in TANF time
limit policy during the sample period. All regressions exclude refugees with 0 earnings. The regressions
also include controls for marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household,
unemployment rate in the year of arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14
sending countries, defined as in Table A2. All specifications control for year of arrival, year of interview, and
state fixed effects as well as state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 1.10: Effects of TANF Generosity on Non-Refugee Immigrants
Dependent	Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TANF	Max	Benefit -0.027*** -0.022*** -0.009** -0.011***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
<	High	School -0.700*** -0.733***
(0.024) (0.022)
High	School -0.605*** -0.646***
(0.020) (0.018)
Some	College -0.511*** -0.541***
(0.020) (0.019)
English	Ability 0.260*** 0.246***
(0.011) (0.011)
Observations 945,297 656,011 945,297 656,011
Controls No No Yes Yes
Sample All In	U.S.	>4	Years All In	U.S.	>4	Years
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Log	Wage
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of non-refugee foreign born arriving
since 1996, excluding those with 0 earnings. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 also include controls for
marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in the
year of arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 11 sending regions. These regions
are Mexico, Canada, Latin America (excluding Mexico), Northern and Western Europe, Eastern Europe,
East Asia, Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Oceania. Columns 2 and 4 exclude
refugees who have been in the U.S. for fewer than five years. All specifications control for year of arrival,
year of interview, and state fixed effects, as well as state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at
the state level.
59
Chapter 2
Temperature, Worker Productivity, and Adaptation:
Evidence from Survey Data Production
2.1 Introduction
How environmental factors impact economic outcomes is an open question that has
drawn significant interest in the economics literature (Melissa Dell, Benjamin F. Jones and
Benjamin A. Olken, 2014). While a growing body of work documents negative effects of high
temperature on aggregate outcome variables such as GDP and labor income,1 less is known
about the role of temperature in individual worker productivity and behavior. Understand-
ing the margins of adjustment for productivity impacts on hot days and how they fit in with
incentives may uncover welfare implications of temperature that are not captured in aggre-
gate productivity measures (Geoffrey Heal and Jisung Park, 2016). However, few datasets
are well suited for these analyses, especially in climate-vulnerable developing countries.
This paper overcomes data constraints by using household survey datasets to examine
the behavior of the interviewer rather than the respondent. I examine how temperature and
humidity on the day of interview impact the collection of household survey data by Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (DHS) interviewers from 46 developing countries. In developing
1See, for example: Melissa Dell, Benjamin F. Jones and Benjamin A. Olken (2012), Solomon M. Hsiang
(2010), Marshall Burke, Solomon M. Hsiang and Edward Miguel (2015), Geoffrey Heal and Jisung Park
(2014), Tatyana Deryugina and Solomon M. Hsiang (2014).
60
countries, interviewers’ jobs require them to walk significant distances between households
and conduct interviews face-to-face in non climate-controlled settings, making them mem-
bers of the group of workers in poor countries significantly exposed to outdoor temperatures.
Each interview in the DHS contains the interviewer’s unique identifier, a start time and an
end time in minutes, and a host of rich information on the quality of data collected in the
field, allowing me to reconstruct the daily work schedules of over 9,000 interviewers.
Temperature has well-known negative impacts on human physiology. Experiments
in laboratory and single-firm settings have found that heat has significant impacts on both
physical and cognitive task performance (see Olli Seppanen, William J Fisk and QH Lei
(2006), for example) and may cause a “slowing-down” of work (Tord Kjellstrom, Ingvar
Holmer and Bruno Lemke, 2009). Temperature may affect the disutility of effort, which is
potentially important in principal-agent scenarios with limited monitoring. The rich data
on the timing of interviewer activities, the quantity and quality of interviewer output, and
the workers’ incentives make it possible to study the margins of adjustment on hot days and
how workers minimize utility loss from high temperatures.
The DHS provides a useful setting for examining the impacts of temperature on pro-
ductivity due to its enormous spatial and temporal coverage, but also due to the fact that
the process for hiring interviewers, conducting interviews, and processing data is consistent
across contexts. The DHS produces and publishes regular guidelines for field supervisors and
editors for both managing fieldwork and evaluating interviewer performance. Interviewers
are paid a fixed amount per day in most cases rather than a per hour or piece-rate wage. The
documentation suggests that it is the number of completed interviews that is the measure
of productivity most observable to the interviewers’ supervision teams, while data quality is
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arguably more difficult for the supervisors to observe. I exploit the multidimensional nature
of interviewer jobs combined with differential ease of monitoring to test the prediction that
worker productivity responds especially strongly to temperature fluctuations on dimensions
with less intensive monitoring. Furthermore, the fact that the dataset contains dozens of
countries allows me to compare standardized measures of worker productivity across insti-
tutional contexts and examine differences in the impacts of temperature across settings.
Using a semi-parametric specification to allow for nonlinearities in the effects of tem-
perature, I find that the total quantity of production is insensitive to temperature, but that
the pace of production slows by approximately 20 percent in the hottest and most humid
days. The results suggest that interviewers work longer days in order to achieve the same
daily output of interviews, potentially because the incentives to do so are strong due to
supervisor monitoring of that task. I use wet bulb temperature, a heat index that combines
temperature and humidity, as the independent variable of interest, and I identify impacts off
of variation in weather within a region of a country and accounting for average local weather
in the month of interview to isolate the causal effect of temperature.
I find that data quality problems, such as missing responses and flags for data quality
added in the data processing stage, become more frequent on hot days. Interviews contain
0.3-0.4 more missing responses on hot days, a large increase relative to an average of one total
per interview. The fact that the number of completed interviews does not decrease while data
quality suffers suggests that workers reallocate their effort to sustain productivity on more
observable dimensions. I also find suggestive evidence that impacts on productivity vary
significantly with the quality of public sector management in the implementing country.
Quality of public sector management may proxy for overall quality of implementation or
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monitoring, since most surveys are implemented by public agencies in the country being
surveyed. In countries with poor public sector management, as measured by the World
Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, interviewers complete fewer interviews
on hot days and work fewer hours, implying that the impacts of temperature vary significantly
by institutional setting and that worse overall management may weaken incentives around
number of completed interviews.
I find that interviewers’ days start earlier as average temperature increases, both in
the cross section and using the regression framework. However, the association is smaller
once region fixed effects and local climate controls are accounted for (an effect of 30 minutes
as opposed to two hours). This suggests that workers in places that are warmer on average
start their days earlier on average, not just on days that are surprisingly hot, providing
evidence that some forms of adaptation to local climates exacerbate rather than alleviate
the impacts of temperature on productivity in terms of output per time worked. I also find
that workers spend more time on each interview and that more interviews start in the early
morning and late afternoon hours on hot days. This suggests that interviewers allocate their
work effort to hours with more pleasant temperatures. However, workers have fewer hours
in a day for leisure if they are working more hours and must work longer to achieve the same
output. This implies that adaptation behavior may not be uniformly costless: as climates
change, individuals may adopt behaviors that, while reducing utility costs of temperature
changes on net, have costs in other ways. On the other hand, I find that workers are less
likely to conduct interviews at all on hot days, a form of adaptation that likely ameliorates
the productivity effects of high temperature.
The interviewers’ jobs require them to interact productively with another person who
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is also potentially exposed to the same variation in temperature: the respondent. It is
therefore possible the interviewer’s job becomes more difficult on hot days. The main result
of this paper treats the impact of temperature on number of interviews per hour as inclusive
of effects on the respondent and the interviewer; however, this paper aims to give a picture of
the impacts of temperature on interviewer effort. Therefore, in Section 2.6 I discuss in depth
the evidence on the role of the respondent, finding suggestive evidence that respondents do
not drive the main results.2
While data production is a unique context due, in part, to the role of the respondent,
anecdotal evidence from the developing world suggests that lessons learned from household
survey interviewers may generalize to other sectors.3 Due to factors such as a lack of indoor
climate control and poverty, heat exposure in the workplace in developing countries is not
restricted to primary sector occupations such as agriculture: service sector workers in areas
such as community services, transportation, and tourism are significantly affected (Tord
Kjellstrom, David Briggs, Chris Freyberg, Bruno Lemke, Matthias Otto and Olivia Hyatt,
2016a). Furthermore, a recent report suggests that many workers in the developing world are
subject to daily production targets and non-climate controlled workplaces, which may yield
similar results (Tord Kjellstrom, Matthias Otto, Bruno Lemke, Olivia Hyatt, Dave Briggs,
Chris Freyberg and Lauren Lines, 2016b).4 All told, the findings suggest that about 5 percent
2 The respondent could impact the results either through an effect on nonresponse, leading to selection
into the sample or to more unsuccessful interview attempts, or by behaving differently during the interview.
In Section 2.6, I show that there is little evidence of selection on observable characteristics driving the
main results of this paper. Furthermore, there is evidence that interviewers’ incentives are an important
component of the results, suggesting respondent behavior is unlikely to be driving my estimates.
3Furthermore, as I discuss in Section 2.3, interviewer productivity is correlated with aggregate produc-
tivity, and the measures I use evolve with experience in a manner consistent with usual measures of task
productivity.
4The report says that “Heat stress and the same daily production targets in all parts of the year means
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more interviewer hours in the field were required under actual weather distributions than
would have been required if each interviewing day had a mild average temperature.
This paper contributes to the previous literature on temperature, productivity, and
worker effort along several dimensions. First, this paper ties into the literature on tem-
perature and economic outcomes (see Heal and Park (2016) for a review) by estimating a
reduced-form impact of temperature on the productivity of outdoor workers in 46 countries.
This provides the broadest estimate yet of the relationship between temperature and produc-
tivity at the individual level, particularly in climate-vulnerable developing countries. This
estimate focuses on a set of workers whose job requires significant exposure to the outdoors
in addition to successful interaction with respondents, making them a significantly different
sample of workers from those in a manufacturing job, as have been previously studied in
developing country contexts.
Second, the paper examines margins of adjustment on hot days, adding to the growing
literature on temperature and adaptive behavior in economics.5 Graff Zivin and Neidell
(2014) find that workers in climate-exposed industries in the U.S. work fewer hours on hot
days and that individuals spend less time on outdoor leisure. That paper conjectures that
the impacts of temperature on labor supply may be larger in developing countries, where
more workers are exposed to outdoor temperatures, which are also higher in developing
that the workers have to work longer each day in the hot season than in cool seasons, but the salaries
typically remain the same”
5Typically, as Joshua Graff Zivin and Matthew Neidell (2014) note, the literature has used the word
“adaptation” to describe the long-term process by which regions with warmer climates are able to attenuate
the negative effects of temperature on economic outcomes through the adoption of technology such as air
conditioning or through physical acclimation. Their evidence suggests that individuals may adopt short-term
behavior to avoid some of the utility losses of extreme temperature as well.
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countries on average. I examine impacts on hours worked directly and find the opposite
response in this setting. Heal and Park (2016) predict that working hours decrease under
high temperatures given a piece-rate wage contract; in my setting, which features a fixed
wage contract, working hours instead increase, shedding light on the importance of incentives
in determining the impacts of temperature. Understanding the margins of adjustment as
well as how they fit in with incentives is crucial for examining the welfare impacts of these
extreme temperatures, especially from the standpoint of worker utility.
Finally, the paper links to the literature on worker effort and monitoring. Standard
principal agent models predict a decrease in effort if personal costs of effort increase, and
task-based models predict that worker effort will be focused on tasks that are especially
closely monitored or highly rewarded (Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom, 1991a). This
paper examines whether an increase in costs of effort (caused by extreme temperature)
will differentially affect tasks with different levels of monitoring, providing evidence on the
relationship between disutility of effort, monitoring, and provision of effort in a real-world
context.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides background on tem-
perature and economic outcomes as well as the DHS interviewers, exploring the incentives
that interviewers face in the field. Section 2.3 describes the dataset, which merges data from
over 9,000 DHS interviewers between 1990 and 2010 with gridded global weather informa-
tion. Section 2.4 describes the empirical strategy, which compares data production outcomes
within a region of a country on hot and cold days versus mild days. Section 2.5 presents
the main results of the paper, describing both the main effect of temperature on data pro-
duction as well as evidence on margins of adjustment. Section 2.6 discusses the potential
66
contribution of the respondent to the observed effects on production. Section 2.7 explores
heterogeneity in the main results. Section 2.8 shows robustness of the main results to other
specifications of temperature and the control variables. Section 2.9 puts the results into the
context of the broader literature and discusses the generalizability of these findings. Section
2.10 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Temperature and Worker Productivity
The fact that temperature has significant effects on human activity and welfare is well
established and has a strong basis in human physiology. To survive, humans must main-
tain a body temperature within a relatively narrow range. The body has several strategies
for maintaining a healthy body temperature when exposed to hot and cold temperatures;
however, the more extreme the outdoor temperature, the greater stress it puts on the body.
Experiments in laboratories and individual workplaces have found that heat has sig-
nificant impacts on performance on physical and cognitive tasks (see Seppanen, Fisk and
Lei (2006) for a review) and may cause a “slowing-down” of work (Kjellstrom, Holmer and
Lemke, 2009). Building on a solid foundation of laboratory and workplace studies, a bur-
geoning literature in economics has examined the impacts of fluctuations in temperature on
economically-relevant outcomes such as test scores and human capital formation (Jisung Park
(2018); Joshua S. Graff Zivin, Yingquan Song, Qu Tang and Peng Zhang (2018)), mortality
(Olivier Descheˆnes and Michael Greenstone, 2009), workplace accidents (Marcus Dillender,
2017), violence (Solomon M. Hsiang, Marshall Burke and Edward Miguel, 2013), and sev-
eral others. Previous studies on productivity have found negative, nonlinear effects of high
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outdoor temperature on the productivity of manufacturing workers in India ((Achyuta Ad-
hvaryu, Namrata Kala and Anant Nyshadham, 2018); Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom
(1991b)) and on total factor productivity and output in Chinese manufacturing firms (Peng
Zhang, Olivier Deschenes, Kyle C. Meng and Junjie Zhang (2018); Xiaoguang Chen and Lu
Yang (2017)).6 Literature on the effect of wages on productivity has also found that this
relationship depends on environmental factors such as temperature for agricultural workers
in the U.S. (Andrew Stevens, 2016). Building on the foundation of these studies, this paper
extends the analysis of the impacts of temperature on workers to a broader geographical
context and examines the mechanisms for the effects on workers.
In addition, recent papers emphasize the role of humidity in the impacts of high
temperatures on human health. As the ambient temperature becomes hotter, the human
body becomes more reliant on sweating as a mechanism for cooling itself. Humidity impairs
the body’s ability to cool itself through sweating, multiplying the effects of heat stress.
These papers show that humidity significantly amplifies the effects of heat on mortality in
the United States and in developing countries (Alan Barreca (2012); Michael Geruso and
Dean Spears (2018a)) and, given humidity levels in developing countries, may also play
a large role in occupational health and productivity (Tord Kjellstrom and Jennifer Crowe
(2013); John P. Dunne, Ronald J. Stouffer and Jasmin G. John (2013)). The role of humidity
has implications for the distribution of climate damages as well as for the magnitudes, as the
world regions that experience hot and humid weather are distinct from those that experience
hot and dry weather. With this in mind, I focus on wet bulb temperature, which accounts for
6See Heal and Park (2016) for an excellent review of the literature on both micro- and macroeconomic
impacts.
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relative humidity, as the main weather variable of interest in this analysis, following recent
papers in the economics literature (Adhvaryu, Kala and Nyshadham (2018); Geruso and
Spears (2018a)).7 This measure is described in more detail below.
2.2.2 DHS Interviewers: Contracts and Incentives
This section describes the process of hiring DHS interviewers and conducting surveys,
examining the sources of workplace incentives and describing the tasks the workers complete.
The DHS program has facilitated the administration of over 300 nationally and regionally
representative surveys of reproductive and health behaviors in developing countries since the
1980s. The surveys are administered by local implementing agencies with technical support
from the DHS program, which is funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development.
The implementing agencies are most often governmental organizations such as National
Statistical Offices or the Ministry of Health, but can also be non-governmental or private.
The DHS program sets standard guidelines for the implementation of the surveys: manuals
are publicly available for interviewers and supervisors and editors for the processes of training
field staff and sampling, among other topics. The questionnaires used in the DHS are also
standard within phases of the survey, although optional modules (e.g. domestic violence,
HIV, and anemia) are implemented in some places but not others. These standardized
procedures are put into place to ensure comparability of the data across countries. This
means that interviewers’ tasks are standardized across contexts, though their employers
vary.
7In Section 2.5 I show direct evidence of a significant interaction effect between temperature and humidity
in determining worker productivity.
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The focus of the surveys is on the collection of accurate reproductive histories and
information on the health status of women and children in developing countries. Therefore,
the majority of respondents are prime-aged women (between the ages of 15 and 49), although
in many survey rounds some males are interviewed in the households as well. In the majority
of the more recent DHS surveys, DHS teams have also been collecting GPS coordinates for
each survey cluster (e.g. a village in a rural area or a city block in an urban area) in the
sample.8 Most of these are accurate to within 15 meters.9
Recruitment of fieldworkers is conducted locally by implementing agencies, but the
practices for recruitment and required qualifications are standard across contexts. In most
cases, interviewers are temporary employees of the survey implementing organization for
the duration of the survey, although sometimes the implementing agencies use their own
permanent staff.10 Interviewers must be available to work full time for the duration of the
survey, including nights and weekends, and they must have sufficient physical fitness to
walk long distances and carry questionnaires as required. There is a strong preference for
interviewers to interview respondents of their own gender, and they must speak at least one
of the languages used for training (and thus prominent in that local context). Interviewers
are recruited within a region of a country as much as possible so that the interviewer does not
seem too foreign to the respondent, and there is a preference for candidates with at least a
secondary education. This means that in most cases, interviewers are a more highly-educated
population than the average residents of their countries.11
8Clusters, or enumeration areas, are generally chosen with probability proportional to population size
from a recent census.
91% of rural clusters are displaced between 0 and 10 kilometers to protect the privacy of the respondents.
10This is not observable in this data sample.
11Information on interviewer characteristics beyond the unique identifier is not available in most rounds of
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The contracts in each survey round are determined by the survey implementing
agency, which has freedom in designing pay structure. However, conversations with technical
staff at ICF, which implements the DHS, indicate that the standard practice in the DHS is
to pay interviewers a fixed amount per day plus a per diem for food/lodging/etc. Anecdo-
tally, piece-rate wages are problematic in this context because some interviews naturally take
longer than others, so piece rates would introduce significant risk into interviewers’ wages,
and furthermore, piece rates incentivize quantity of production over quality. The fact that
interviewers are not paid piece rate, however, means that their incentive to perform well
comes from any risk of termination, or from wanting to maintain a good reputation (many
interviewers have previous experience and will go on to work for other surveys). There is no
direct information on how many workers are fired during the average survey, but the imple-
menting organizations are recommended to hire 10 percent more interviewers than needed
to serve as reserve interviewers to fill gaps in case of separations.12
the DHS. In a few recent surveys, the DHS has included a questionnaire on interviewer characteristics.The
surveys are: Afghanistan, 2015-2016; Armenia, 2015-2016; Nepal, 2016; Zimbabwe, 2015. These surveys took
place after 2010, so they cannot be linked with the weather data. However, I summarize the information
on interviewer education and age in Figure B9. The data reveal that levels of education actually vary by
context in the DHS; interviewers in Africa have few years of education while interviewers in Afghanistan and
Nepal are quite well educated. The interviewers are very young on average, and the data also reveal that
almost half had worked on a prior DHS survey and nearly 75 percent had worked on another survey of some
kind.
12In Table B1, I examine whether interviewers are more likely to “leave” the survey round before the rest
of their team if they have worse average measures of productivity. I am unable to observe whether these
separations occur because the interviewer, quit, was fired, or was simply finished with his or her interviews,
but I document a significant correlation between interviewer productivity and having a final interviewing
date before the rest of the interviewer’s team.
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2.2.2.1 Interviewer Tasks and Performance Evaluation
Data are collected by interviewing teams usually comprised of a supervisor, a female
field editor, several female interviewers, and one to two male interviewers if men will be
included in the survey. Supervisors and field editors often share responsibilities, but super-
visors in general are responsible for organizing fieldwork (arranging transportation, lodging,
etc.), delegating interviews to interviewers, and conducting spot check re-interviews. The
focus of field editors is on data quality: field editors observe at least one interview per day
and edit completed questionnaires while in the field, sending interviewers back to correct
problems if necessary.13 Each interviewing team generally is assigned its own car.
Data collection in each household begins with a household survey, in which basic
information on each member of the household is recorded along with descriptive information
on the household such as building materials and water sources. In selected households, all
women aged 15-49 are then eligible to be interviewed using the individual questionnaire. In
many survey rounds, men are also interviewed, usually in every second or third household.
Reproductive history is gathered from both men and women, but only women answer de-
tailed questions about child health and other outcomes. In interviews with women, detailed
questions are asked about all children under an age cutoff, usually five. The DHS also in-
cludes anthropometric measurements of children under five and women, such as height and
weight and often country-specific biomarkers such as tests for anemia, malaria, or HIV. In
cases where either an individual or an entire household is not available for interview on
the first visit, DHS rules stipulate that interviewers must make at least 3 visits at separate
13It is not observable in the DHS data which interviews were observed by a field editor.
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times/days to make every effort to interview eligible individuals. In the data, the DHS iden-
tifies the interviews that required more than one attempt, although there is no information
on when the unsuccessful attempts took place. As I discuss in Section 2.6, any effect of
temperature on the probability of nonresponse could affect the main results on quantity and
quality of data production. I investigate this empirically below.
The schedules of DHS interviewers are set at the beginning of each day by the team’s
field supervisor. Guidelines indicate that the supervisors give assignments in the form of
lists of households that each interviewer is meant to visit, but that assignments are often
updated throughout the day, as some households take longer or shorter amounts of time
than expected to interview. Performance is evaluated continuously throughout the survey
round using an “interviewer progress sheet,” shown in Figure 2.1. The supervisors keep
one progress sheet per interviewer throughout the fieldwork process and update the sheet
after each cluster to ensure that each member of their team is keeping up with the assigned
workloads. I therefore examine number of completed interviews as a very highly-monitored
measure of interviewer productivity.
The DHS has several other mechanisms in place for monitoring interviewer perfor-
mance. As mentioned previously, field editors regularly observe individual interviews (they
are responsible for one observation session per day). Supervisors conduct one reinterview per
cluster to ensure that interviewers are not engaging in common practices meant to lighten
workloads, such as interviewing smaller households that were not selected or classifying el-
igible individuals as ineligible for individual interviews by misreporting their ages. Finally,
field editors check questionnaires in the field, providing an additional check on the quality
of data produced by each interviewer. The data quality problems observed in the final data
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are flagged in secondary processing after fieldwork is complete; they are issues that were not
caught during fieldwork. These flags for incomplete, inconsistent, or missing data comprise
the outcome variables used to study production quality below.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 DHS Datasets
The dataset merges information on over 1.2 million individual DHS interviews with
daily gridded global weather data from the Princeton Meteorological Forcing Dataset. I
use data from all DHS survey rounds that took place before the end of 2010 that collected
GPS information on survey clusters. This creates a dataset with 46 countries and 92 survey
rounds.14 Figure B1 shows the location of the countries in the sample. The dataset spans
Africa, Asia, Latin America, and a few Eastern European countries. By and large, data
collection takes place in countries that are warm on average (the average interview takes
place on a 74 degree day), though the dataset includes a few cold, mountainous regions
(in the Andes, Himalayas, etc.). Each DHS interview contains information on start time
and end time in minutes, the interviewer’s unique identifier, the supervisor and field editor’s
unique identifiers, a host of information on the respondent, and data quality information. As
mentioned previously, the data quality indicators are added after fieldwork during the data
processing stage, not by the field editor or supervisor. Many countries are surveyed more
than once during the sample period of this study (that is, they have more than one DHS
survey round in the dataset). The region of country fixed effects and interviewer identifiers
are coded specific to certain survey round in the DHS.
14Table B6 gives detailed descriptions of each survey round included in the analysis.
74
The interviewers’ unique identifiers and the interview start and end times are used to
reconstruct the daily work schedules of each interviewer. The number of working hours in
a day is calculated as the time between the start time of the first individual interview and
the end time of the last individual interview conducted by the interviewer that day. This
means that working hours exclude time spent commuting to and from the survey cluster,
time spent locating the first household, and time spent conducting the first survey of house-
hold characteristics. It is possible that these activities are also affected by temperature, so
estimated effects on working hours may be biased towards zero.
Table 3.1 contains summary statistics on the DHS data. The top panel contains
individual-level information on female DHS respondents in the entire sample. The average
age of female respondents is about 30, and over a third of respondents are illiterate. Under
half have electricity and just over half live in houses constructed of formal materials (defined
as a home with a formal wall, roof, and floor). About half of female respondents work,
whether inside or outside of the home. An important aspect of this context is that very, very
few households in developing countries in this time period would have had air conditioning.
For example, only around 2 percent of households in India have air conditioning today, and
the interviews in this sample took place between 1990 and 2010.
Key interview quality outcome variables are summarized in the bottom panel of Table
3.1. Summary statistics on counts of missing responses are shown in the first row. These are
instances where the question should have been answered, but no response was present. I use
this as a major outcome variable due to the possible implication of interviewer error (although
this category also contains respondent refusals); these occur about once per interview on
average, with a large standard deviation.
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The DHS also creates data processing flags on certain key variables, mainly important
dates. These variables flag instances where a major date, such as a birth date, is incomplete
or inconsistent with another date given. Instances of body measurements that are flagged
for falling outside of the expected distribution are also included, as are flags on duration
variables, such as duration of breastfeeding, that are flagged for being inconsistent with
another date given. The second data quality outcome variable is a count of these data
quality flags in each interview: the second row of Table 3.1 summarizes this variable.15
The third data quality outcome variable is labelled “valid skips” and is defined as
variables that are left blank due to the skip or flow pattern of the questionnaire. These are
the “not applicable” or “not in universe” responses. The interview-level mean of this variable
is very large, at over 6,300. This is due to the existence of many country-specific variables
in the DHS, meaning that the majority of variables do not apply to any specific survey. All
comparisons of data quality on days with different temperature are made within a survey
round, meaning that survey-specific variation in which questions are asked is netted out.
Figure B3 displays a section of the standard questionnaire for DHS Wave 7 that illustrates
the difference between missing responses and valid skips. The section begins with instructions
to check a previous question to verify whether the respondent is pregnant. If the respondent
is pregnant, then the interviewer should move to question 312, and questions 303-311 will be
marked as valid skips. If the respondent is not pregnant, then the interviewer should move
on to question 303. If the respondent is marked not pregnant or unsure but question 303
is left blank, then question 303 is a missing (or invalid missing) response. Due to the skip
patterns built into the questionnaire, interviewers may have an incentive over the answers
15More details on the construction of this variable can be found in Appendix B.1.
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to questions that determine the total number of questions to be asked in the survey. For
example, if they would prefer to ask fewer questions, they may erroneously write that the
respondent is pregnant to avoid the contraception module. To the extent that this incentive
is impacted by temperature, we would expect to observe an increase in the number of valid
skips rather than invalid missing responses.
Finally, summary statistics on responses that were either inconsistent with another
response or where the respondent did not know the answer to the question are shown in the
fourth row of the outcome variable panel. These instances are coded separately from the
invalid missing responses summarized in the first row, and they are coded mostly consis-
tently in the DHS. However, there are some exceptions, as detailed in Appendix B.1. These
exceptions are removed to the best of my ability. The average interview contains about 5 of
these types of responses.
The final three rows contain interviewer-day level outcome variables. The average
interviewer-day consists of 3 individual interviews over 4.5 hours. The interviewers complete
about one interview per hour on average. In the main analysis, I also examine the the start
times and end times of interviewers’ days and the distribution of interview times throughout
the day.
To validate the main outcome variables utilized in this study as measures of inter-
viewer productivity, Figure 2.2 shows summary statistics on quantity and quality outcomes
as they evolve throughout the survey round. The figure shows the results of regressions
that examine the impacts of each additional day of interviewer experience, measured as the
number of days between the day of interview and the first day of the survey wave, on the
average number of interviews completed per hour by interviewers and missing responses per
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interview. The regressions include region of country fixed effects, and the magnitudes are in-
terpretable as the effect relative to the first day in the round. The results show that there are
significant returns to experience in both measures. For the number of interviews per hour
measure, the returns are diminishing over time, as would be predicted by standard labor
models. For number of missing responses, productivity increases over time at the beginning
of the survey round, but then begins to deteriorate again towards the end of a survey round,
consistent with DHS supervisor guidelines that caution team leaders that data quality often
begins to slip at the end of a survey round, as the teams become tired and bored. Since the
jobs are temporary, the continuation value of the job to the interviewer decreases towards
the end of the survey round, which also potentially contributes to this result.
As a final note, interviewer productivity as measured by number of interviews com-
pleted per hour worked is correlated in the cross section with aggregate measures of labor
productivity. Each additional $1,000 of GDP per person employed, as measured in the
Penn World Tables, is associated with 0.012 additional interviews per hour on average, for
example. The relationship is statistically significant.
2.3.2 Daily Weather Data
I merge information from each interview with the Princeton Meteorological Forcing
Dataset, henceforth the Princeton Data. The Princeton Data is a reanalysis dataset, mean-
ing that it combines a host of observational weather data from sources such as weather
balloons, weather stations, and satellite images with a physics-based weather model. The
model allows coverage to extend to areas with sparse observational data such as developing
78
countries.16 These data are available through 2010 every three hours for each 0.25 degree
latitude/longitude increment. The dataset includes information on temperature, specific hu-
midity, and pressure, which I use to calculate relative humidity and wet bulb temperature
using standard meteorological formulas.17
Wet bulb temperature is a nonlinear function of dry bulb temperature (dry bulb tem-
perature is the temperature reading usually displayed on daily weather forecasts) and relative
humidity. A wet bulb reading corresponds to the temperature reading of a thermometer that
has been wrapped in a wet cloth: the faster the moisture in the cloth evaporates, the lower
the reading. To help the reader visualize the relationship between wet bulb temperature, dry
bulb temperature, and relative humidity, Figure B2 displays the relationship between the
three variables along with a few illustrative examples. The figure displays isometric dry bulb
lines, with each line representing a fixed dry bulb temperature at varying relative humidities,
represented by the horizontal axis. The combination of these two variables can be read on
the vertical axis as a wet bulb temperature. Wet bulb temperature is always lower than dry
bulb temperature, except at 100% relative humidity where the two readings are equal. The
difference between wet bulb and dry bulb temperature is larger at higher temperatures.
The red points in the figure plot two examples of the differences between wet and
dry bulb temperature. The August, 2017 average of daily average weather conditions are
plotted for Las Vegas, NV and Houston, TX. The desert heat of Las Vegas manifests as
a relatively high dry bulb temperature (over 90 degrees Fahrenheit), but, due to the low
relative humidity, a comparatively low wet bulb temperature. The more muggy heat in
16Appendix B.1 gives more detail on the construction of this dataset.
17See Appendix B.1 for more details.
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Houston creates a higher wet bulb temperature than Las Vegas despite the fact that the
dry bulb reading is lower. The emphasis on relative humidity means that the ranking of
temperatures in wet bulb and dry bulb temperatures are very different, with humid hot days
in places like South Asia rated as more severe than the desert heat of places like the Arabian
Peninsula or Sub-Saharan Africa by wet bulb temperature, but as less severe using dry bulb
temperature. As I show in Section 2.5, wet bulb temperature is more predictive of worker
productivity, which means that the effects of weather on productivity may be concentrated
in more humid areas of the world.
I merge weather data to DHS interviews by locating the four grid points in the
Princeton Data surrounding each DHS cluster (each cluster in this sample has 20 selected
households on average and is represented in the DHS data by a single latitude and longitude)
and then creating an average of the four grid points weighted by inverse distance between the
cluster and each grid point. The weather variables are then specific to a day of interview/DHS
cluster. For the main analysis, I collapse the eight daily readings into a daily average wet bulb
temperature, but in Section 2.8 I show the results for alternative specifications of weather
exposure. To more thoroughly control for local average climate, I also create 10-year averages
of wet bulb temperature in a given month in a given cluster (2000-2010 averages).
Figure 2.3 displays summary statistics on the weather data merged with the DHS
data. Panel A shows the average wet bulb temperature in each survey cluster sampled in the
DHS surveys in the analysis, where the wet bulb temperature is divided into the same bins as
in the main regression specification. The average is of daily average wet bulb temperatures
during the interviews in the sample. The variation used in the analysis is within a region
of the country, so identification comes from areas where there was more variation in wet
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bulb temperature across interviewing days within a geographical area in the main regression
specifications.
Panel B presents this graphically; it shows the regional distribution of interviewer
work days in each wet bulb bin used for the main analysis. As the figures make clear, a
bit over half of all observations are in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). SSA’s climate is often
quite hot, but in most places it is a dry heat, which means that the wet bulb distribution
in Africa is largely compressed to the middle bins. The days in the highest wet bulb bins
are concentrated in humid locations of the world, such as South Asia and Latin America.
Days in the highest wet bulb bin are quite rare, accounting for less than 0.1 percent of days
in the sample, and these occur only in South Asia and Latin America in this sample. These
days are projected to become more common with climate change, particularly in areas such
as South Asia (Steven C. Sherwood and Matthew Huber, 2010).
2.4 Empirical Strategy
As is standard in the literature, I estimate the impact of temperature allowing for
nonlinearities in the impacts of weather on productivity outcomes. More specifically, I
estimate the effect of daily average wet bulb temperature falling into a certain bin on my
outcome variable of interest, relative to an excluded bin of 50-60 degrees Fahrenheit.18 I
18Recent work on temperature and economic outcomes has also begun to think more carefully about
biases introduced by both short and long-term adaptation in panel estimates with fixed effects. These
estimates, though they identify off of high-frequency weather variation, may be biased by the effects of
expectations since weather is serially correlated and at least partially forecastable (Derek Lemoine, 2017).
A significant body of recent work also uses higher order functional forms of temperature in regressions,
allowing cross-sectional variation to re-enter the econometric models and therefore allowing the effects of
temperature to vary with climate (see, for example Burke, Hsiang and Miguel (2015)). These regressions
account for cross-sectional differences especially in cases where more of the identifying variation is across
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control for a 10 year average wet bulb temperature in the survey cluster of the interview in
the month of interview. Therefore, the thought experiment is to replace a 50-60 degree day
with a day in the bin of interest, holding constant usual monthly place-specific temperature.
For my main productivity results, I run regressions at the level of the interviewer-day.
The estimating equation takes the form:
yicprd =
∑
j
βj · Exposurecpd(Tj) + αExpectedTempcpm + θp + ρDaylightcpd+
νXrcpd + γDayinRoundpd + icprd (2.1)
where yicprd is the outcome variable (e.g. interviews per hour) of interviewer i in
survey cluster c in country-region p interviewing a set of respondents r on day of interview
d. βj is the coefficient of interest and gives the effect of daily average wet bulb temperature
falling in bin j on the day of interview on productivity, relative to the reference bin of 50-60
degrees Fahrenheit. I estimate the impact of 7 bins of wet bulb temperature: ¡30 degrees,
30-40 degrees, 40-50 degrees, 50-60 degrees, 60-70 degrees, 70-80 degrees, and ¿85 degrees.19
As mentioned previously, I also control for a 10-year average of wet bulb temperature in the
cluster of interview in that month. I control for region of country fixed effects: there are
space rather than over time (Pierre Merel and Matthew Gammans, 2017), although this means that omitted
variables may also be a concern in these models (Marshall Burke and Kyle Emerick, 2016). Rather than
allowing group means to enter identification through a higher-order term in the regression, this paper uses
linear regressors and examines the potential for short and long-term adaptation by comparing the main
results using detailed controls for place-specific seasonality, which isolate “surprising weather days” and
those comparing productivity on hot and cold days in the cross section, which includes the effects of usual
local climate.
19Temperature is defined specific to a survey cluster, and in certain cases, interviewing teams visit more
than one survey cluster in a day (15 percent of interviewer-days). In these cases, I use the average temperature
for the survey clusters, weighted by the number of interviews in each cluster.
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nearly 800 regions in the sample, and regions are specific to a country and a survey round
due to lack of consistency in coding of the region variable over time in the DHS.20
I also control for the number of daylight hours in the survey cluster on the day of
interview.21 Many of the main results examine hours worked and start time and end time of
the day. Since daylight hours are correlated with temperature, this could be an important
control, although in practice the results are nearly identical with or without it.
In addition, I include a series of respondent controls. Since the regression is run at
the interviewer-day level, these are characteristics of the set of the respondents. I control
for whether the respondent is illiterate, the number of own children under the age of five,
household electrification, whether the house is constructed of formal materials, whether the
respondent works, age, marital status, and whether the survey cluster is rural or urban. The
main analysis is restricted to the sample of women: many control variables are only available
for women, and the work of male interviewers is inherently different, since in many cases they
don’t conduct interviews in every household. Since it is possible that the set of respondents
on hot days is endogenously chosen (if say, interviewers chose easier-to-interview households
on hot days), there is a potential for these results to be contaminated by the “bad control”
problem. That is, respondent characteristics may be outcome variables in themselves, so
controlling for them may bias the results. However, as I show in Section 2.6, the results are
very similar with or without respondent controls.
20In rare cases, interviewing teams cross region borders within a given day. In these cases, I assign them
to the first region they visited, but the results look similar if I drop them altogether, as this occurs in less
than one percent of interviewer-days.
21I use the sunrise/sunset calculations from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, avail-
able at: https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/grad/solcalc/calcdetails.html
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The main specifications also include a control for the number of days elapsed between
the start of the survey round and the date of the interview. Interviewing teams tend to begin
the survey round in a central location, such as the country capital, and then spread through-
out the country, which means that respondent characteristics are nonrandom with respect to
date within the survey round. Furthermore, survey rounds start at nonrandom times of the
calendar year: for example, the documentation for several survey rounds mentions planning
the survey round to avoid a rainy season.22 Finally, the standard errors are clustered at the
region of country level.
For some of the main outcome variables in this study, such as counts of data quality
problems and respondent characteristics, the regressions are run at the level of the individual
interview. In this case, the estimation equation is similar to the interviewer-day regression.
However, the respondent controls are for individual characteristics, rather than for the set
of respondents.
Figure 2.4 maps the survey round in Nepal in 2006 in order to help the reader better
visualize the regression strategy. In the figure, the interior boundaries represent the five
regions for which the regression has fixed effects, while the different colors/shapes of the
points on the map represent each of the 12 interviewing teams (defined by team supervisors)
in the survey round. It is clear from the figure that each team is seen in multiple regions, with
each individual survey cluster covered by a single team. In the dataset, the teams spend
2.7 days in an individual survey cluster, on average. There are on average 35 individual
22 In practice, as I show in Table B2, hot days tend to occur later in the survey round on average, when
interviewing teams are more experienced. Including the control for day of round magnifies my estimated
effects, as I show in Section 2.8, implying that any remaining bias may work against finding any effect of
temperature on productivity.
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interviews in a survey cluster (36 in rural areas, 33 in urban areas), coming from 19.5
households.
2.4.1 Identification Assumption
This analysis estimates the impacts of temperature fluctuations on data production
conditional on average local climate and other region-specific factors. The key identification
assumption is that factors associated with data production are not correlated with within-
region fluctuations in weather conditional on climate. Potential omitted variables could
occur either at the level of the respondent or survey cluster or at the level of the interviewer
or survey team. At the level of the respondent, the assumption is that the set of respondent
households and associated characteristics (such as distance between households) is compa-
rable on hot, mild, and cold days within a region of a country and conditional on climate.
This assumption would not be violated, therefore, by respondents being less available during
certain seasons due to the usual seasonality of agricultural activities, for example, but it
would be violated by respondents being less likely to be home on an unseasonably hot day.
At the level of the interviewer/team, the assumption is that the composition of inter-
viewer characteristics is comparable within a region on hot, mild, and cold days conditional
on climate. This would not be violated by survey progression being scheduled to avoid hot
months of the year, but it would be violated by certain types of interviewers being less likely
to show up to work on surprisingly hot days.
I investigate the identification assumptions empirically in Section 2.6 and Section 2.8,
showing robustness to using interviewer fixed effects and controlling or not controlling for
interviewer experience as well as demonstrating that selection on observable characteristics
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of respondents does not appear to drive the results.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Effects of Temperature on Productivity
Results from Equation 2.1 are shown in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.5. Table 2.2 displays
the results using several specifications for contemporaneous weather. The outcome variable
throughout the table is the number of interviews completed per hour worked, where an
observation is an interviewer-day. Column 1 examines the impacts of average dry bulb
temperature in the day of interview, where each coefficient demonstrates the impact of
replacing a day with an average temperature between 50 and 60 degrees with a day in the bin
of interest. The results suggest a negative impact of high heat, but they are not statistically
significant.23 Columns 2 and 3 display the results from a single regression investigating the
impact of dry bulb temperature interacted with an indicator for high humidity, defined as
humidity on the day of interview falling above the 75th percentile of the 10-year average
of humidity in the survey cluster in the month of interview. These regressions also include
estimates for the effects of dry bulb temperature on low-humidity days as well as for the
main effect of humidity. The results are highly significant for high humidity days but not low
humidity days, suggesting that humidity plays an important role in the effect of temperature
on productivity per hour. Finally, column 4 examines the impact of wet bulb temperature.
The table also displays F statistics jointly testing the statistical significance of the dry bulb
temperature bins, dry bulb X humidity bins, and wet bulb bins, respectively. The F statistics
are highest in the specification with wet bulb temperature, despite the fact that there are
23However, the results are statistically significant and larger if climate controls are not included.
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fewer coefficients, suggesting that wet bulb temperature has the most predictive power for
this measure of productivity. Therefore, I examine the impacts of wet bulb temperature
throughout the rest of the paper.
Figure 2.5 shows the effects of wet bulb temperature on number of interviews com-
pleted per hour in figure form, corresponding to column 4 in Table 2.2. Each point in the
figure gives the impact of replacing a day with an average wet bulb temperature between 50
and 60 degrees Fahrenheit with a day in the degree bin specified on the horizontal axis. In
this figure, days colder than 50-60 degrees seem to improve productivity per hour worked,
especially in the 30-40 and 40-50 degree bins. In contrast, high temperatures, in particular
the ¿85 degree bin, are detrimental to productivity, with interviewers experiencing a 20%
loss in interviews per hour on these exceptionally hot and humid days. Figure 2.5 provides
strong evidence of harmful effects of high temperatures on data production as well as evi-
dence of beneficial effects of cooler temperatures. The effect appears to be quite linear in
temperature until the highest bin, where there is a trend break as productivity drops off
sharply.
2.5.2 Temperature, Data Quality, and Interviewer Incentives
Given the strong evidence that temperature affects data production, I now turn to in-
terviewer incentives to examine whether interviewers respond to temperature in a predictable
manner. As mentioned in Section 2.2, DHS supervisor and field editor guidelines suggest
that the quantity of data produced, especially in terms of number of interviews completed,
is more easily observable to supervision than quality. Given that temperature may increase
the disutility of effort or decrease the marginal benefit of effort in terms of productivity,
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we may expect temperature to produce a differential change in productivity for quality vs.
quantity of data production.24
I first examine the impact of temperature on the measure of productivity most ob-
servable to supervisors: the number of completed interviews. Figure 2.6 gives the results
from Equation 2.1 where the outcome variable is number of interviews completed in a day.
Interviewers do not seem to perform worse on this measure on very hot days; the coefficient
on 85 degree wet bulb days is actually positive, though statistically insignificant. Given that
interviewers are not paid by the hour, this suggests that from the employer’s perspective,
productivity (at least, in terms of quantity of data produced) per dollar of wages does not
decline on hot days. However, productivity per hour of the interviewer’s time declines, as
shown in Figure 2.5, suggesting that interviewer welfare may be negatively affected by high
heat through a loss of leisure hours. This is explored further in Section 2.5.3.
To further probe into whether productivity declines on less observable tasks, I use a
framework similar to Equation 2.1 to examine whether measures of data quality respond to
high temperatures. These regressions are run at the level of the individual interview. Figure
2.7 shows the results of regressions using counts of data quality flags and missing responses,
respectively, as outcome variables. For both measures, the coefficients on the hottest wet
bulb bins are positive and statistically significant, indicating these types of mistakes are
more common on hot days. These two pieces of evidence together suggest that performance
suffers more on hot days on measures that are less easily scrutinized by the supervisor.
24In Appendix B.2, I show a simple model that produces this prediction in the case where interviewers’
probability of job retention depends more on quantity of production than quality and temperature increases
the disutility of effort.
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Table B3 shows the results for the missing responses and quality flags variables shown
in Figure 2.7, but also for counts of valid skips and counts of inconsistent or “I don’t know”
responses. The results on valid skips, displayed in Column 2, suggest a positive effect of both
very cold and very hot temperatures on number of blank questions, although the impacts of
hot temperatures are not statistically significant. The counts of don’t know and inconsistent
responses do not show a clear pattern according to temperature on the day of interview,
suggesting that respondents’ ability to respond correctly may not be significantly affected
by wet bulb temperature.25
Another feature of the interviewers’ incentive scheme that may affect the results is the
fact that their main incentive to perform well, due to the fixed wage contract, comes from
any risk of losing the job and the continuation value associated with it.26 Interviewer jobs
are temporary, so the continuation value of the job (i.e. the quantity of wages that would
be lost if the interviewer were fired) should decrease as the survey round progresses, which
could amplify any negative effects of heat on productivity. On the other hand, experience
may be protective or may lead workers to learn to take more adaptive actions. Figure 2.8
examines how experience interacts with temperature by interacting each wet bulb bin with
a measure of how many days the interviewer has worked on the survey round. The outcome
variable is number of interviews completed per hour worked. In fact, the effect of hot weather
significantly increases with experience.27 As shown in Figure B6, the impact of experience
25However, examining the impact of dry bulb temperature on this outcome variable yields a positive and
significant effect. This could be driven either by interviewers or respondents, since interviewers may have
an incentive to write that the respondent said “I don’t know” in response to a question in order to lighten
their workloads.
26 The model in Appendix B.2 additionally predicts that an increase in the continuation value of the job
should be associated with a reduction in the negative effect of temperature on interviewer effort.
27There may be selection into levels of experience, if, for example, less experienced workers are more likely
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at high temperatures is driven by working hours: more experienced interviewers are in the
field for more hours on hot days. This could be consistent with a learning effect: more
experienced interviewing teams learn to cope with the slowing pace of worker activity by
working longer hours. Or, it could be that workers with lower continuation value of the job
differentially allow themselves to slow down on hot days due to weaker incentives to perform
well. On the other hand, the impact of experience on reactions to cold temperature are
driven by the numerator: experienced interviewers conduct fewer interviews on cold days.
2.5.3 Temperature, Labor Supply, and Time Allocation
The fact that number of interviews completed per hour declines on hot days with little
change in the numerator suggests a lengthening in working hours. As mentioned previously,
the opposite phenomenon has been observed in the U.S., where workers appear to work fewer
hours on hot days (Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014). Given these differences in results, in this
section, I examine the types of adjustments workers are making to their workdays on hot
days in developing countries. I first examine summary statistics on the starting times and
ending times of interviewer days in my sample by wet bulb bin. The results, displayed in
Panel A of Figure 2.9, show that interviewers’ days begin monotonically earlier as the wet
bulb temperature rises, while end times appear to be less responsive. The result is that
interviewers work more hours on hot days on average, and the difference between the hottest
and the coldest bin is quite stark: work days are about four hours shorter on days with
wet bulb temperatures less than 30 degrees than for days over 85 degrees wet bulb. This is
to be workers who were brought in later in the survey round to replace those who were fired. Figure B5
examines the same relationship but using interviewer fixed effects. The results are very similar, suggesting
that selection into experience does not drive these results.
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consistent with anecdotal evidence from developing countries suggesting that workers may
have to work longer hours in order to hit daily production targets (Kjellstrom et al., 2016b).
To more closely investigate this pattern, Panel B of Figure 2.9 gives kernel density
plots of individual interview start times throughout the day for each wet bulb bin. The
figure shows the same pattern as the previous one, where interviewers start their morning
interviews earlier but don’t end their afternoons significantly earlier. From this figure, it also
becomes clear that the interviewers take longer mid-day breaks on hotter days. Therefore, it
appears that interviews are allocated towards times of day with more pleasant temperatures:
in the morning and later afternoon on hot days and mid-day on cold days.
These figures draw from summary statistics, so there are many possible explanations
for the patterns shown in the average interviewer schedules. One such explanation could
be the relationship between daylight hours and temperature: if the sun rises earlier on
warmer days on average, then this could account for the earlier start times, rather than
temperature itself. However, as Table B5 shows, this does not appear to be the case. The
table shows correlations from regressions without controls or fixed effects; daylight hours
have the expected negative correlation with start time: interviewing days start earlier on
days with more daylight. However, when added as a control, daylight hours do not appear
to mediate the relationship between temperature and start time.
To separate the causal effect of temperature on working hours from other place-specific
factors, in Figure 2.10, I investigate the relationship between wet bulb temperature and start
time using multiple specifications. The dark blue line gives the cross sectional relationship
between temperature and start time; this is the same relationship displayed in Figure 2.9,
except in regression form with clustered standard errors and non climate-related controls
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added. The red line adds controls for usual wet bulb temperature in the month of interview
for that cluster (this is the 10-year average used in the main specification). The slope is
significantly shallower in this specification, implying that much of the relationship between
temperature and start time is due to a relationship between climate and start time; that is,
places that are hotter on average start work days earlier on average (at least in times of year
that are hot). The light blue line gives the results of the full specification, with survey round
by region of country fixed effects and other controls. The coefficient on the hottest wet bulb
bin remains negative and statistically significant in this specification, but the relationship
across the rest of the distribution has disappeared. Again, these results suggest that most of
the response along this margin is to usual seasonality, rather than “surprise” weather days.
This suggests that a lengthening in the work day may be a form of long-term adaptation
in these settings: workers accommodate the slowing pace of production by starting earlier.
An implication of this is that in the longer run leisure hours and productivity may be more
negatively affected by high temperatures than in the shorter run. In addition, workers may
start earlier on days they expect to be hot; this ability to forecast may be factored out in
specifications that narrow in on surprising weather days.
Finally, in Figure 2.11, I examine the contribution of increases in interviewing du-
ration to the increase in overall time in the field. I find that even in the main regression
specification, with region of country fixed effects and climate controls, time spent through-
out the day conducting interviews increases significantly on hot days relative to mild days.
Therefore, interviewers are both spending more time in the field on hot days and more time
actively conducting interviews.
The previous results show that workers increase labor supply along the intensive
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margin on hot days, but another way they could respond is through adjustments along the
extensive margin. That is, they could not conduct interviews at all on days with extreme
temperatures. In Figure 2.12 I investigate this possibility by running a version of Equation
2.1 using a dummy variable for whether an interviewer was observed conducting interviews
on a given day. I include in the sample all days between the interviewer’s first and last
interviewing date in the survey round.28 The results of this exercise show that interviewers
are significantly less likely to work on hot days relative to mild days and more likely to
work on colder days. The magnitudes are large, hovering around 20 percentage points at the
highest temperatures. There are several potential channels for these effects. Interviewing
teams may schedule travel days (between survey clusters) to coincide with unpleasantly warm
temperature days in order to avoid the effects on interviewing performance. Interviewing
teams also generally take regular breaks so that the interviewing teams can return home
and visit their families; it may be that these are also strategically scheduled. Or, it may
simply be that individual interviewers are less likely to show up for work on hot days. In any
case, it appears that adjustments in labor supply on the extensive margin are one manner
in which interviewing teams avoid some productivity and utility consequences of extreme
temperature.
28This exercise is complicated by the fact that interviewers are observed in many different places throughout
the survey round. I assign each non-working day the weather from the most recent survey cluster visited by
the interviewer. To minimize the possibility that they have travelled large distances since their last observed
interview, I limit the sample to interviewers observed working within the last 2 days, though the results look
similar if that period is extended.
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2.6 The Role of the Respondent
In this section, I discuss the potential impact of respondent behavior on the results.
Household survey interviews are a unique type of economic production: the respondent plays
a key role in the production outcome, but they are in a sense doing the interviewer a favor
by participating. That is, they are not participating in the interviews in order to garner
economic gains for themselves. This means that, from a generalizability standpoint, the
interviewer’s response to temperature is most interesting. With that in mind, I discuss the
specific mechanisms through which respondent behavior could influence the results in this
section and investigate those mechanisms to the degree possible using the data.
The respondent could influence the results in three ways. First, if fewer respondents
are readily available for interviews, the interviewers may spend more time walking between
respondent households looking for respondents, resulting in fewer completed interviews per
time worked. In about 10 percent of cases, interviews in the DHS take more than one attempt
to complete, and while DHS overall response rates are very high (usually over 90 percent)
not all interviews are completed. As shown previously in Figure 2.11, the increase in working
hours is mainly driven by lengthening interviews, suggesting that the results are not driven
by an increase in the time spent looking for respondents.29
Secondly, an effect on nonresponse could manifest itself as a selection effect. If cer-
tain types of respondents are less likely to be available on hot days, then there could be
selection into the sample of respondents on hot days. This could drive the results if the pool
29Unfortunately, my ability to observe nonresponse directly in the data is limited. As mentioned previously,
the data has a variable that specifies how many visits were necessary to complete the interview, but I am
unable to observe when the previous attempts took place; it is possible that the unsuccessful attempts are
on a different day from the successful one. Therefore, I don’t investigate nonresponse as an outcome directly.
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of respondents observed on less hot days is comprised of people that are easier to interview
efficiently than the pool of respondents observed on hot days. While I’m unable to fully
observe which respondents are “easy” to interview, I can investigate whether the sample of
respondents on hot days looks different from the sample on mild days based on observable
characteristics. I conduct this exercise with a number of observable characteristics in Table
2.3. This table contains the results of regressions, run without respondent controls, using in-
dividual respondent characteristics as the outcome variable of interest.30 Few characteristics
show a statistically significant response to temperature. There is some evidence that on hot
days, respondents who work may be more likely to be interviewed, as are respondents with
more children under the age of five, but the signs are inconsistent across bins. Respondents
on very hot and cold days appear to be older, on average. On cold days, I also see respon-
dents with more children, as well as fewer respondents with a formally constructed house.
For all of the variables except for sex, the regressions are run only on the sample of female
respondents. Since interviewers specialize, in general, in either female or male respondents,
using respondent sex as the outcome variable is more of a check on the relative productivity
of female and male interviewers on days with different temperature. The evidence suggests
that more male respondents are seen on cold days.
Given the presence of some selection into the sample based on observable character-
istics, one way to test the impact on the results is to compare the results with and without
controls for the same observable characteristics. If selection into the sample based on these
observable characteristics were impacting the results, then we would expect the results to
30The asset index is a count of ownership of several household assets. These are: a radio, a car, a
motorcycle, a bicycle, electricity, a television, a refrigerator, and piped water.
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look different if the controls were removed. However, as I show in Figure B4, removing these
controls does not affect the results. While it is impossible to investigate empirically whether
selection on unobservable characteristics occurs or impacts the main results, this evidence is
consistent with the results not being driven by selection on respondent characteristics.
The final way that respondents could have an impact on the results is more difficult to
investigate empirically. Respondents, being also exposed to temperature conditions during
interviews, may simply behave differently during the interview. They may be less able to
remember important details of their lives due to the cognitive impacts of high heat, for
example. Or, they may be less cooperative with the interviewer. Either of these effects
would mean that obtaining correct answers in a timely manner would become more difficult
on a hot day, even without any direct effect on the productivity of the interviewer. Because
every respondent is only interviewed once in this dataset, it is impossible to disentangle the
relative impacts of temperature on interviewer and respondent behavior.
One possible way to look for suggestive evidence on the effect of temperature on
respondent behavior is to look for interaction effects between respondent characteristics and
temperature. If the effects of temperature varied with respondent characteristics, it may
indicate that respondents do have significant impacts on the results through their behavior
(and that this varies by type of respondent), although it’s also possible that interviewers’
productivity varies with type of respondent. I investigate interactions between temperature
and respondent characteristics in Figure B7, using the main outcome variable of number
of interviews completed per hour. There is little evidence of heterogeneity, although a few
interaction terms are statistically significant. Overall, however, the effect on number of
interviews per hour persists regardless of the makeup of the set of respondents.
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2.7 Heterogeneity in Main Results
The main results of this paper examine the impact of temperature on the productivity
of survey interviewers across 46 developing countries over two decades. One major advantage
of using this dataset is the comparability in the productivity measures used in this analysis
across a huge variety of geographic contexts. This section investigates whether the response
of DHS interviewing teams to weather conditions varies by area of the world or institutional
context.
Supervisors and field editors in the DHS have specific instructions on how to monitor
and evaluate interviewer performance, so these procedures are quite constant across the
contexts of the countries in this analysis. However, the surveys are implemented in a huge
variety of institutional settings. Factors such as generosity of pay, overall quality of survey
oversight, and the desirability of interviewer jobs, to name a few, likely vary by survey round.
These factors may provide additional variation in the strength of interviewer incentives, but
they are difficult to observe, given lack of DHS records on pay levels among other things.
One candidate proxy for strength of interviewer incentives is the quality of public sector
management in the implementing country. In Figure 2.13 I examine interactions between
daily average wet bulb temperature and the quality of public management as measured by
the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).31
While these results should be viewed as suggestive, there are significant interaction
effects.32 Figure 2.13 plots interaction effects for number of interviews completed in a day
31More information on this index is available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.PADM.XQ?view=chart.
The index is available from 2005-2010 for 28 out of the 46 countries in the main sample.
32Interaction effects with other indicators of institutional quality, such as the Transparency International
97
(Panel A) and minutes spent working (Panel B), respectively. Interviewers complete fewer
interviews on hot days in countries with lower quality public sector management, in contrast
to countries with high quality public sector management, where there is no discernible impact
on this measure of productivity. This is consistent with the previous evidence suggesting
that the strength of incentives for this particular measure of productivity is important in
determining the impacts of temperature. Interviewers in countries with high quality public
sector management work for more time on hot days in order to complete the same number of
interviews, whereas interviewers in settings with low quality management work fewer minutes
on hot days, consistent with the impact on quantity of data production.
Table B4 examines the effects of wet bulb temperature on number of interviews com-
pleted per hour for each of 6 world regions; each column of the table represents a separate
regression.33 Interestingly, in regions where maximum wet bulb temperatures are lower, the
negative effects of temperature appear lower in the distribution. It appears that the negative
impacts of wet bulb temperature in the 70-80 and 80-85 degree bins are driven by regions
such as Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and East Asia Pacific, where wet bulb
temperatures never exceed 85 degrees in this sample. This may suggest long-term adapta-
tion to place-specific normal weather conditions, where productivity falls at the upper end
of the temperature distribution, at whatever temperature that may be. Finally, the overall
results from Figure 2.5 suggest a strikingly linear relationship between productivity and wet
bulb temperature until 85 degrees wet bulb, when efficiency falls sharply. Figure B4 suggests
Corruption Index, have yielded noisier results. Additionally, there are well-documented correlations between
institutional quality and other factors that may significantly affect the results, such as long-term climate
(Dell, Jones and Olken, 2014).
33These regions are Africa, East Asia Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean,
the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia.
98
that that shape may be place specific. The positive effects of cold temperatures appear to
be driven by Europe and Central Asia, while cold days in regions like the Middle East and
North Africa and South Asia appear to have negative productivity effects, leading to more
of an inverse-U-shaped relationship between temperature and productivity.
The final three columns of Table B4 split the sample into thirds based on annual
average wet bulb temperature to examine heterogeneity by usual climate. The temperature
distributions of the three groups do not fully overlap, but there is some indication that the
effects for 70-80 degree days are largest in the coolest third of clusters. This is consistent
with evidence from Patrick Behrer and Jisung Park (2017), who find that the impacts of
heat on labor income are largest for cooler climates. Cold days do not occur in the warmest
third of clusters, so examining the effect of cold days in warm clusters is not possible in this
sample.
2.8 Robustness and Alternative Specifications
I next examine the robustness of my main results, on the number of interviews com-
pleted per hour, to the choice of specification. In Section 2.6, I showed that the main results
are robust to using or not using controls for respondent characteristics. In Figure 2.14, I
show the robustness of the main results to other variations on the control variables. First, as
discussed in Section 2.4, there is a correlation in the sample between the occurrence of hot
days, even after controlling for expected temperature, and how far into the survey round the
interviews occur, since survey rounds tend to begin during milder seasons. Figure 2.14 shows
that this relationship biases the results towards zero: when I remove the control for the day
of the round, the results become smaller, as shown by the dark blue line. The red line in
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Figure 2.14 shows the results of a specification that replaces region of country fixed effects
with interviewer fixed effects. If it is the case that more productive interviewers are more
likely to be absent on hot days or that more productive teams are less likely to go to the
field on hot days, selection on the sample of interviewers may drive the results. The results
become smaller and marginally lose statistical significance for a few of the bins (the standard
errors also grow substantially); however, the result suggests that overall, it is unlikely that
the results can be explained by factors such as selection into the interviewer sample on hot
days.
The weather data used for this analysis are available every 3 hours, or 8 times daily;
in the main analysis I reduce the 8-daily observations to a daily average wet or dry bulb
temperature as the independent variable of interest. Whether daily average temperature
is the most relevant measure of weather for the outcome variables I study is an empirical
question. Therefore, in Figure B8, I examine the main results using maximum wet bulb
temperature, defined as the highest of the eight daily readings. While the coefficient on the
hottest maximum wet bulb bin is negative, it is not statistically significant. The difference
in responses to the two measures is driven by a lack of response in working hours to max-
imum wet bulb temperature, suggesting that scheduling is more responsive to the overall
temperature conditions of the full day than to the maximum wet bulb temperature. The
results look more similar to the results derived using daily average wet bulb temperature
when 10-year average climate controls are not included, so another possible explanation for
the disparity is that surprisingly hot maximum wet bulb temperatures are more difficult to
forecast in these contexts.34
34An alternative could be to assign temperature based on the times when interviews took place. However,
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2.9 Discussion
The main results of this paper find that DHS data production is negatively impacted
on very hot and humid days relative to mild days. The number of interviews completed per
hour worked declines, driven by an increase in working hours with no corresponding increase
in output, and data quality issues increase in frequency. This section first puts this evidence
in the context of existing literature and then discusses the generalizability and implications
of the new evidence presented here.
The main results of this paper align with previous anecdotal, laboratory, and cross-
sectional work finding that workers become slower to complete tasks on hot days. Previous
work on panel data in a factory setting found that productivity dropped off at wet bulb
temperatures higher than 66 degrees (Adhvaryu, Kala and Nyshadham, 2018). This paper
suggests a more muted response once local climate is taken into account until 85 degrees wet
bulb, after which production falls precipitously.
The mechanism behind this effect is a longer schedule to hit the same production
target, consistent with anecdotal evidence that workers in developing countries work longer
days when it is hot, sometimes with no change in pay (Kjellstrom et al., 2016b). It contrasts,
however, with evidence from the U.S. that suggests that outdoor labor supply decreases in
response to high temperatures. The contrast may be due to worker incentives in this setting:
workers work longer hours in order to finish the same number of interviews, potentially
because that is how their performance is evaluated by supervisors. Furthermore, there is
the interviewing schedules are endogenous and are in fact the major margin of adjustment for number of
interviews completed per hour worked. With this in mind, I focus on weather specifications that do not take
into account when in the day the interviews took place.
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heterogeneity in that response in this setting: interviewers complete fewer interviews on hot
days in countries with lower quality public sector management, consistent with the idea that
the strength of incentives is important in determining the supply of effort.
The lengthening in schedule in the DHS dataset is more pronounced when local
climate is not controlled for, suggesting that working longer days may be a form of adaptation
in developing countries, as workers may avoid the hottest hours at the expense of spending
more time on the job. This is a form of adaptation that may come at significant cost, both
in terms of worker utility and in terms of productivity. Workers may be maximizing utility
by allocating work time towards more pleasant hours, but there is presumably some utility
cost of staying in the field for more hours. The duration of each individual interview also
increases on hot days. Furthermore, this lengthening of the work schedule drives a decrease
in production per hour worked.
To contextualize the size of these effects, Figure 2.15 visualizes the number of addi-
tional interviewer hours in the field that were required to complete the most recent DHS
survey round in each country, relative to a counterfactual scenario in which all interviewing
days had an average wet bulb temperature of 50-60 degrees. I calculate the actual number of
interviews completed per hour worked by each interviewer on each day of the survey round
and then calculate what the number of interviews completed per hour would have been under
the counterfactual scenario. I then calculate the implied difference in working time and add
this measure up for each interviewer-day in the survey round. The calculation thus assumes
that no interviews are re-shuﬄed between days in this counterfactual scenario. The results
suggest that the average DHS survey required almost 5 percent more interviewer hours than
under the counterfactual scenario of mild weather throughout the round.
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The results of this paper also suggest that production quality may be another margin
of adjustment on hot days. Quality is, in this setting as in many others, more difficult to
observe than quantity of output. Temperature may act as a source of variation in disutility
of effort, causing effort to decline on hot days, especially on tasks that are less easily observed
by the supervisor. To my knowledge, this is the first study to find an impact on production
quality, and the results suggests that contracts and incentives in workplaces with incomplete
monitoring may be less effective as climates warm.35
This evidence is derived from an unusual setting: data production is not a major
sector of any economy.36 Furthermore, workers with a secondary education who also work
outdoors are a relatively small group in developing countries. However, workplace settings
that involve daily production targets, exposure to non-climate controlled settings, and in-
complete monitoring are commonplace. In addition, this setting, due to the standardization
in interview questions and procedures across contexts and over time makes it possible to ex-
amine the impacts of temperature on labor productivity with a geographical breadth difficult
to reach with other data sources.
2.10 Conclusion
In this paper, I provide estimates of the impacts of temperature on individual-level
worker productivity and effort allocation, examining the effects of wet bulb temperature in
35However, James Archsmith, Anthony Heyes and Soodeh Saberian (2018) find a significant impact of air
pollution on the quantity of umpire errors in baseball.
36However, workers with experience as interviewers are not uncommon in some developing countries.
According to data collected by (Jobiba Chinkhumba, Susan Godlonton and Rebecca Thornton, 2014), one
in ten men overall and one in four men with a secondary education ages 18-40 in Lilongwe, the capital of
Malawi, had ever worked as an interviewer.
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46 developing countries. I exploit a unique setting in which worker productivity data are
available for a job that is standardized across a diverse set of contexts: DHS interviewers. I
find that data production is significantly impacted by hot and humid weather: the number
of interviews completed per hour worked declines by 20 percent of the mean on the hottest
days, driven by an increase in working hours. In addition, quality of the data deteriorates
on hot days, suggesting that workers, under the strain of high temperatures, allocate their
effort to tasks that are more observable by their supervisors. While data production is a
unique context, these results suggest that certain types of adaptation to heat and to disu-
tility of effort more generally, may magnify the consequences for productivity. In addition,
the results build on a recent literature showing the importance of humidity in the impacts
of temperature, suggesting that hot and humid areas of the world may bear the largest
productivity impacts of climate change.
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Figure 2.1: Sheet for Evaluating Interviewer Performance
a.
pop
Note: This figure contains the sheet used in the DHS by supervisors to evaluate interviewer performance
throughout the survey round. The sheet is intended to help the supervisor ensure that each member of his
or her team is keeping up in terms of interviewing workload.
Source: DHS Program Supervisor’s and Editor’s Manual, July 2015.
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Figure 2.2: Outcome Variable Validation: Productivity Measures Show Returns to Experi-
ence
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Note: This figure shows summary statistics on the average of number of interviews completed per hour
and counts of missing responses as the survey rounds progress and interviewers gain experience, relative to
the first day of the survey round. The horizontal axis is the number of days completed in the survey round
(days between the day of interview and the first day in the survey wave). The figure shows the results of
regressions that additionally control for region of country by survey round fixed effects.
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Figure 2.3: Average Wet Bulb Temperature of Interviews in Each Cluster
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(b) Distribution of Interviewer Days by Region and Wet Bulb Bin
Note: Panel A shows the average of daily average wet bulb temperatures experienced in interviews in
each cluster in the analysis. The shades of blue denote the bin this average falls into, with lighter shades
representing cooler temperatures and darker shades warmer temperatures. In a few cases (3 percent), clusters
with the same longitude and latitude were interviewed in multiple survey waves. In these cases, averages
from the most recent round are given. Panel B shows the regional distribution of interviewer days in each
wet bulb bin used in the main analysis. Each bar shows the number of interviewer/days in each world region
taking place in a specific wet bulb bin, in thousands.
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Figure 2.4: Summary Statistics: Visualization of the 2006 Nepal Survey Round
Note: This map gives a visual depiction of the 2006 Nepal survey round. The 5 regions depicted in the map
are the regions used as place fixed effects in the analysis. Each color/shape indicates a different interviewing
team, and the points on the map show where in Nepal the interviews took place.
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Figure 2.5: Main Result: Number of Interviews Completed Per Hour Worked Declines on
Hot Days
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Wet Bulb Temperature Bin on Day of Interview
Note: This figure shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using the number of interviews
completed per hour worked as the outcome variable of interest, where hours worked is defined as the time
between the start time of the first individual interview and the end time of the last individual interview
in that day. The independent variables of interest are indicators for whether the daily average wet bulb
temperature in the day of interview fell into the given bin. The regressions also include fixed effects for
the survey round by region of country as well as controls for the characteristics of the set of respondents,
the 10 year average of wet bulb temperature in the survey cluster in the month of interview, number of
daylight hours, and the number of completed days in the survey round. Standard errors are clustered at the
region-of-country level. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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Figure 2.6: Total Number of Interviews Completed in a Full Day Does Not Respond to
Temperature
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Note: This figure shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using the number of interviews
completed in a day as the outcome variable of interest. The independent variables of interest are indicators
for whether the daily average wet bulb temperature in the day of interview fell into the given bin. The
regressions also include fixed effects for the survey round by region of country as well as controls for the
characteristics of the set of respondents, the 10 year average of wet bulb temperature in the survey cluster in
the month of interview, number of daylight hours, and the number of completed days in the survey round.
Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals
are shown.
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Figure 2.7: More Data Quality Problems Arise on Hot Days
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Note: This figure shows the results of interview-level regressions using counts of data quality problems as
the outcome variables of interest. The independent variables of interest are indicators for whether the daily
average wet bulb temperature in the day of interview fell into the given bin. The regressions also include
fixed effects for the survey round by region of country as well as controls for respondent characteristics,
the 10 year average of wet bulb temperature in the survey cluster in the month of interview, number of
daylight hours, and the number of completed days in the survey round. Standard errors are clustered at the
region-of-country level. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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Figure 2.8: Heterogeneity: The Effect of Heat on Number of Interviews Per Hour Increases
with Experience
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Note: This figure shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using the number of interviews
completed per hour worked as the outcome variable of interest, where hours worked is defined as the time
between the start time of the first individual interview and the end time of the last individual interview
in that day. The independent variables of interest are indicators for whether the daily average wet bulb
temperature in the day of interview fell into the given bin. Each wet bulb bin is interacted with a measure
of how many days the interviewer has worked on that survey round. The blue line shows the effect for
an interviewer on his/her first day, and the red line shows the effect for the interviewer’s 75th day. The
interaction effects are statistically significant for each bin above 70 degrees, as well as for the ¡30 degree bin.
The regressions also include fixed effects for the survey round by region of country as well as controls for the
characteristics of the set of respondents, the 10 year average of wet bulb temperature in the survey cluster in
the month of interview, number of daylight hours, and the number of completed days in the survey round.
Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals
are shown.
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Figure 2.9: Mechanisms: Interviewers Begin Earlier on Warmer Days
(a) Working Hours
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(b) Distribution of Start Times
Note: Panel A shows summary statistics on the average start time of first individual interviews and end
time of last individual interviews of interviewer-days in the sample by wet bulb temperature bins. Panel B
shows the distribution of all interview start times throughout the day in the raw sample, broken into wet
bulb bins.
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Figure 2.10: Mechanisms: Change in Working Hours is Larger in Response to Usual Climate
than to Surprise Weather Days
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Note: This figure shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using the start time of the interviewer-
day as the outcome variable of interest. The independent variables of interest are indicators for whether
the daily average wet bulb temperature in the day of interview fell into the given bin. Each line represents
a different specification: the light blue line is the full specification with region of country by survey round
fixed effects and controls for the 10-year average of wet bulb temperature in the month of interview in the
survey cluster of interview. The red line removes the place fixed effects, and the dark blue line additionally
removes the 10-year climate controls. All regressions include controls for the characteristics of the set of
respondents, number of daylight hours, and the number of completed days in the survey round. Standard
errors are clustered at the region-of-country level. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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Figure 2.11: Increase in Working Time Mainly Driven by Increase in Interviewing Time
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Note: This figure shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using total interviewing time and
total time between interviews, respectively, as the outcome variables of interest. The independent variables
of interest are indicators for whether the daily average wet bulb temperature in the day of interview fell into
the given bin. The regressions include region of country by survey round fixed effects, controls for the 10-year
average of wet bulb temperature in the month of interview in the survey cluster of interview, controls for
the characteristics of the set of respondents, number of daylight hours, and the number of completed days
in the survey round. Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level. Point estimates and 95%
confidence intervals are shown.
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Figure 2.12: Effect on Labor Supply: Interviewers Less Likely to Conduct Interviews on Hot
Days
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Note: This figure shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using a dummy variable for whether
the interviewer was observed conducting interviews that day as the outcome of interest. The independent
variables of interest are indicators for whether the daily average wet bulb temperature in the most recent
survey cluster visited by the interviewer on the day of interview fell into the given bin. The red line includes
fixed effects for the unique interviewer while the blue line includes fixed effects for the region of country by
survey round. Each regression additionally includes controls for the 10-year average of wet bulb temperature
in the month of interview in the survey cluster of interview, the number of daylight hours, and the number
of completed days in the survey round. Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level. Point
estimates and 95% confidence intervals are shown.
116
Figure 2.13: Heterogeneity: Interviewers Conduct Fewer Interviews, Work Fewer Hours on
Hot Days in Countries with Low Quality Public Sector Management
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(a) Number of Interviews
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(b) Working Time
Note: This figure shows the result of regressions where the independent variables of interest are indicators
for whether the daily average wet bulb temperature in the day of interview fell into a certain bin, interacted
with a continuous measure of quality of public sector management from the World Bank Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment. The regression is run at the level of the interviewer-day; Panel A shows number
of interviews completed in a day as the outcome variable and Panel B shows the impact on minutes worked.
The two figures plot the interaction effects, interpretable as the change in the outcome variable for a one unit
increase in the public sector management index (a larger index value indicates better quality management).
The regression also includes fixed effects for the survey round by region of country as well as controls for the
characteristics of the set of respondents, the 10 year average of wet bulb temperature in the survey cluster in
the month of interview, number of daylight hours, and the number of completed days in the survey round.
Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals
are shown.
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Figure 2.14: Robustness: Results Robust to Alternative Controls, Fixed Effects
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Note: This figure shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using the number of interviews
completed per hour worked as the outcome variable of interest, where hours worked is defined as the time
between the start time of the first individual interview and the end time of the last individual interview in that
day. The independent variables of interest are indicators for whether the daily average wet bulb temperature
in the day of interview fell into the given bin. The light blue line gives the main specification, with fixed
effects for the survey round by region of country and control variables for respondent characteristics, the 10
year average of wet bulb temperature in the survey cluster in the month of interview, number of daylight
hours, and the number of completed days in the survey round. The red line replaces region of country fixed
effects with interviewer fixed effects, while the dark blue line removes the day of round control variable.
Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals
are shown.
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Figure 2.15: Implications: Median DHS Survey Would Require 5% Fewer Interviewer Hours
with Mild Weather
>8.3% 7.6-8.3% 5.7-7.6%
1.3-5.7% <1.3%
Note: This figure visualizes the number of additional interviewer hours in the field that were required to
complete the most recent DHS survey round in each country, relative to a counterfactual scenario in which
all interviewing days had an average wet bulb temperature of 50-60 degrees. I calculate the actual number
of interviews completed per hour worked by each interviewer on each day of the survey rounds, and then
calculate what the number of interviews completed per hour would have been under the counterfactual
scenario according to the estimates from Figure 2.5. I then calculate the implied difference in working time
and add this measure up for each interviewer-day in the survey round before calculating this difference as a
percent of actual time worked.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Interview and Respondent Characteristics
Mean Standard	Deviation
Respondent	variables
Age 29.258 9.716
Illiterate 0.347 0.476
Has	Electricity 0.451 0.498
House	Made	of	Formal	Materials 0.549 0.498
Works 0.516 0.500
Data	Should	Exist,	But	Doesn't 0.972 4.289
Data	Quality	Flags 0.899 1.548
Interviewer/day	variables
Number	of	Interviews/Day 2.945 2.053
Hours	Worked 4.497 3.357
Number	of	Interviews/hour 1.016 0.994
Note: This table contains summary statistics on major respondent control variables and outcome variables
in the dataset. Observations are individual interviews for all except the last three outcome variables (number
of interviews/day, hours worked, interviews/hour), where the observations are interviewer-days.
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Table 2.2: Number of Interviews Completed Per Hour Worked Declines on Hot and Humid
Days
Dependent	variable:
Dry	Bulb Wet	Bulb
High	Hum. Low	Hum.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
>95 -0.090 -0.139** -0.048
(0.105) (0.062) (0.097)
90-95 -0.018 -0.101*** 0.013
(0.035) (0.039) (0.033)
85-90 -0.03 -0.091*** -0.005 -0.200***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.034)
80-85 -0.017 -0.063*** 0 -0.046
(0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.030)
70-80 -0.035 -0.068*** -0.016 -0.048**
(0.022) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024)
60-70 -0.017 -0.02 -0.011 -0.036**
(0.018) (0.026) (0.018) (0.016)
40-50 -0.009 -0.073** 0.006 0.035*
(0.020) (0.034) (0.019) (0.018)
30-40 -0.022 -0.05 -0.012 0.046
(0.042) (0.049) (0.043) (0.032)
<30 -0.024 -0.291*** -0.003 0.083*
(0.045) (0.051) (0.047) (0.047)
High	Humidity
F-Stat:	Weather 1.19 5.98
Observations 314,723 314,723
Region	of	country	FE X X
Climate	Controls X X
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Number	of	Interviews	Completed	Per	Hour	Worked
Dry	Bulb	X	Humidity
3.71
314,723
0.058***
(0.021)
X
X
Note: This table shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using the number of interviews
completed per hour worked as the outcome variable of interest, where hours worked is defined as the time
between the start time of the first individual interview and the end time of the last individual interview
in that day. Column 1 investigates the impact of dry bulb temperature, while columns 2 and 3 display
the results from a single regression investigating effects of dry bulb temperature bins interacted with an
indicator for high humidity, defined as the 75th percentile of humidity in the cluster of interview in the
month of interview over 10 years. Finally, column 4 displays the effect of wet bulb temperature on the day
of interview. The table also displays F-statistics for the coefficients on all contemporaneous temperature,
temperature X humidity, and wet bulb bins. All regressions include controls for the set of respondents, the
number of completed days in the survey round, number of daylight hours, the 10-year average of wet or dry
bulb temperature in the survey cluster in the month of interview, and fixed effects for the survey round by
region of country. Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level.
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Table 2.3: Role of the Respondent: Some Selection on Respondent Characteristics
Age Works
Number	of	
Children	Aged	
<5	 Formal	House Illiterate Electricity Married Asset	Index Sex
Wet	Bulb	Bin
<30	Degrees 0.411* 0.012 0.011 -0.011 -0.012 0.016 -0.002 0.034 -0.025*
(0.249) (0.028) (0.041) (0.027) (0.022) (0.025) (0.016) (0.121) (0.015)
30-40	Degrees 0.065 -0.010 0.097** -0.0529* 0.014 0.003 -0.005 -0.084 -0.006
(0.163) (0.017) (0.049) (0.030) (0.019) (0.027) (0.010) (0.134) (0.007)
40-50	Degrees 0.009 -0.001 0.018 -0.033*** 0.025*** 0.006 -0.002 -0.012 -0.002
(0.071) (0.008) (0.017) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) (0.051) (0.004)
60-70	Degrees 0.043 -0.002 -0.0257* 0.003 0.003 0.008 -0.001 -0.004 0.002
(0.059) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.039) (0.004)
70-80	Degrees 0.078 0.010 -0.010 0.000 -0.002 0.009 -0.001 0.011 0.002
(0.095) (0.010) (0.021) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.055) (0.006)
80-85	Degrees 0.026 0.012 0.013 -0.015 -0.001 0.005 0.003 0.017 0.010
(0.120) (0.012) (0.029) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018) (0.009) (0.081) (0.007)
>85	Degrees 0.500* -0.0848* 0.103 0.003 -0.009 0.063 0.039 0.421 -0.019
(0.282) (0.051) (0.071) (0.098) (0.088) (0.093) (0.026) (0.327) (0.032)
Observations 962,620 962,620 962,620 962,620 962,620 962,620 962,620 962,620 1,221,676
R-squared 0.036 0.173 0.165 0.394 0.413 0.503 0.242 0.434 0.160
Clustered	standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Note: This figure shows the results of interview-level regressions using respondent characteristics as the
outcome variables of interest. The independent variables of interest are indicators for whether the daily
average wet bulb temperature in the day of interview fell into the given bin. The regressions also include
fixed effects for the survey round by region of country as well as controls for the 10 year average of wet bulb
temperature in the survey cluster in the month of interview, number of daylight hours, and the number of
completed days in the survey round. Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level.
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Chapter 3
The Consequences of Social Inequality for the Health
and Development of India’s Children: The Case of
Caste, Sanitation, and Child Height1
3.1 Introduction
The relationship between socio-economic status and health is well established: across
many societies, more advantaged groups are healthier, on average. White people in the
United States can expect to live over three years longer than Black Americans, for example.
Throughout the world, indigenous people have large gaps in life expectancy relative to other
citizens: the gap is 20 years in Australia, 20 in Nepal, and 13 in Guatemala (UN, 2010).
These differences in life expectancy and health status have been documented and studied
extensively in the sociology and economics literatures. Beyond life expectancy, gaps in
levels of diverse health outcomes, such as obesity (David W Johnston and Wang-Sheng Lee,
2011), and inputs, such as smoking (JY Ho and IT Elo, 2013), exist between racial groups.
These gaps are present even in infancy: mortality rates among black infants are more than
double those among white infants in the US. Racial gaps in infant mortality have persisted
1This paper was published in Social Justice Research, as Melissa LoPalo, Diane Coffey and Dean Spears
(2019). This paper implemented a novel empirical test of a theory developed in prior work by Coffey and
Spears. My contribution was to finalize the empirical analysis for this paper, conduct the literature review,
write the main draft, develop the final empirical exhibits, and incorporate comments by referees in the
publication process.
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even in the context of declining overall risks of infant death (W Parker Frisbie, Robert A
Hummer, Daniel A Powers, Seung-Eun Song and Starling G Pullum, 2010). Gaps in actual
and perceived safety may also contribute to health inequities, both through direct effects
of violence and through indirect effects on emotional well-being (Anne Case and Ta-Nehisi
Coates, 2017).
The mechanisms behind these disparities are difficult to understand, as the effects
of social rank and of economic deprivation are closely linked. Social group and income
are highly correlated, so reasons for disparities between rich and poor people or people of
different races can encompass both explanations. Similarly, places with high inequality are
often places where many people are poor, so what appears to be an effect of inequality may
actually simply reflect poverty. Finally, poor health can cause poverty, and variables such as
education affect health as well as socioeconomic status. The many levels of causation and
feedback loops inherent in the relationships among economic standing, poverty, and social
standing make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the causal role of social status
in health outcomes (David M. Cutler, Adriana Lleras-Muney and Tom Vogl, 2011).
Despite these difficulties, there has been substantial effort to examine the relative
contributions of poverty and inequality to observed gaps. Research on occupational rank,
social status, and health has sought to establish a substantial role of relative social standing
or economic status. One classic example of the difficulty is the Whitehall Studies of British
civil servants. Participants with lower status jobs had higher mortality rates, higher obesity
rates, and less healthy behaviors, a fact which has been interpreted as evidence of an effect of
status on health (Michael G Marmot, Geoffrey Rose, Martin Shipley and Peter J Hamilton
(1978); Michael G Marmot, Stephen Stansfeld, Chandra Patel, Fiona North, Jenny Head,
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Ian White, Eric Brunner, Amanda Feeney and G Davey Smith (1991)). Yet, when Anne
Case and Christina Paxson (2008) re-analyzed the Whitehall data with attention to effects
over the life course, they found evidence that these correlations in important part reflect an
effect of health—especially early-life health—on economic outcomes.
The mechanisms that these studies examine are direct in that they constitute an
impact of individual-level characteristics on a person’s health outcomes. But what if so-
cial inequality affects the health outcomes of all members of society? If so, such a finding
about social inequality may escape the common threat that apparent evidence of economic
inequality may simply reflect poverty (Diane Coffey and Dean Spears, 2017). In economics,
cases where one person’s decisions affect another person’s outcomes are called externalities.
One classic example of a negative externality is pollution, where a firm’s production deci-
sions create a byproduct that harms people living nearby. Externalities can also stem from
individual decisions, such as the decision to vaccinate one’s children, which protects not only
that child, but also other children interacting with him or her. Vaccination is an example
of a positive externality. A recent literature in development economics finds that in certain
contexts, the social mechanisms that perpetuate and result from inequalities among groups
can also cause health behaviors harmful to everyone, rather than just the disadvantaged
group.
This paper introduces the reader to this literature, particularly in the context of
India, where health outcomes, compared with other developing countries, are worse than
would be predicted based on average income. Children in India are shorter and more likely
to die at the beginning of life than children in other countries with similar levels of economic
development. Because one in five births this year will be in India, understanding early-life
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health in India is important for everyone concerned with the global distribution of human
well-being in our times.
Several recent studies have attempted to explain India’s disadvantages in early-life
health, finding that various dimensions of India’s hierarchical social systems offer potential
explanations for its relatively poor health outcomes. For example, in India, women are at
their lowest social position within the household at the same time that they are most likely
to have children. This low social status is associated with restricted food intake and heavy
manual labor. Diane Coffey (2015) uses data from 2005 to find that 42.2 percent of women
are underweight prior to becoming pregnant; this is a much higher level of pre-pregnancy
underweight than in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region which is poorer. Because underweight
mothers often give birth to low-birth weight babies, this research suggests that not only does
the low social status ascribed to young women in India affect the health of that group; it also
affects the birth outcomes of their children. This is of particular importance given the recent
research linking child health with adult outcomes such as wages and educational attainment.
In this paper, we examine the effects of another source of social inequality in India
on health outcomes: the caste system. We present new observational evidence on the role
of casteism in the stunted growth of Indian children. The empirical exercise is based on a
novel question asked in the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) in 2012, which asks
whether respondents’ households practice untouchability; that is, whether they enforce the
caste hierarchy in their interactions with people from the lowest castes (Amit Thorat and
Omkar Joshi, 2015). Substantial proportions of respondents answered in the affirmative, but
there is large variation across regions and villages in the share of respondents who report that
someone in their household practices untouchability. We examine the relationship between
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local casteism and child height, finding that children in households that practice untoucha-
bility are taller, on average, than children in households that do not practice untouchability,
but that children living in villages with a larger share of residents practicing untouchability
are shorter, on average.
The latter association is explained in large part by a third variable: open defecation.
Our analysis provides evidence of an effect of local open defecation externalities on child
height that derives from variation in the practice of untouchability in India. This exercise
builds upon previous work by Coffey and Spears (2017), who explore the relationships be-
tween the norms of ritual purity and pollution that enforce caste boundaries and the practice
of open defecation, as well as Dean Spears and Amit Thorat (2017), who show empirically
that local levels of casteism predict open defecation behavior, even controlling for possible
confounding variables. Finally, we discuss how this case sheds light on the overall relationship
between social inequality and health outcomes.
3.2 Open Defecation, Health, and Height in India
This paper examines the link between the caste system, sanitation behavior, and
population health in India. Sanitation in India is poor: about 55 percent of rural households
defecate in the open (Diane Coffey and Dean Spears, 2018), and declines in open defecation
have happened much more slowly in rural India than in the neighboring countries of Nepal
and Bangladesh (Arabinda Ghosh, Aashish Gupta and Dean Spears, 2014). Furthermore,
55% is likely an underestimate of the true proportion of people who defecate in the open: the
data come from the 2015-2016 National Family Health Survey, which asks about sanitation
at the household level. Diane Coffey, Aashish Gupta, Payal Hathi, Nidhi Khurana, Dean
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Spears, Nikhil Srivastav and Sangita Vyas (2014) find that in many households with la-
trines, some members use the latrine while others defecate in the open. Therefore, estimates
of open defecation derived from household-level data will miss individuals who practice open
defecation living in households in which others use a latrine. As in the case of maternal mal-
nutrition, India is an outlier in sanitation: many countries that are much poorer than India
have lower rates of open defecation. In fact, according to the World Health Organization
and the United Nations Children’s Fund Joint Monitoring Report (2017), rural Indian open
defecation accounts for over half of the world’s open defecation.
A large literature links the practice of open defecation to a plethora of health threats,
especially for children. Unsafe disposal of feces spreads disease, and the consequences are
not limited to those who practice open defecation themselves. Open defecation creates an
infectious disease environment that threatens to harm the health and net nutrition of children
during the critical early-life years. Previous research has tied local open defecation rates to
infant mortality rates. Leveraging the fact that Hindus in India are more likely to defecate in
the open than Muslims in India, Michael Geruso and Dean Spears (2018b) show that infant
mortality rates are higher in villages with a larger fraction of Hindus (relative to Muslims),
but that a household’s own religion does not predict infant mortality, once neighborhood
open defecation rates are accounted for. The overall Muslim survival advantage is striking
because it exists despite the fact that on average, Muslims are disadvantaged in India relative
to Hindus.
Children past infancy remain vulnerable during the critical early years in which their
bodies and brains are developing: there are several potential pathways through which ex-
posure to fecal germs can harm the health and proper growth of children. Most obviously,
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feces harbor germs that contribute to diarrheal episodes. Diarrhea itself can be dangerous,
but even if it is only a temporary problem, it prevents the body from absorbing nutrition
from food. Recent research has also suggested that long-term exposure to contaminated food
and water may contribute to a condition called environmental enteric dysfunction, an illness
that causes chronic intestinal inflammation. The inflammation over time causes a flattening
in the folds of the intestine and prevents the proper absorption of food, which in turn has
been hypothesized to stunt growth and cause other health problems (Jean H Humphrey,
2009). Feces also harbor parasites such as hookworms, which grow in children’s intestines
and siphon nutritional resources from the child, stunting growth.
These consequences for health carry far into the future; failure to grow to one’s full
height potential is correlated with failure to grow to one’s full cognitive potential (Case and
Paxson, 2008). This has consequences for economic outcomes such as educational attainment
and earnings (Nicholas Lawson and Dean Spears, 2016). Given the correlations among height,
overall health status, and cognitive ability, average population-level height is an important
outcome to understand.
3.3 Open Defecation and the Caste System
This section briefly summarizes Coffey and Spears’ (2017) recent book on the contri-
bution of India’s social systems to its unique open defecation problem. The caste system,
historically and today, divides Indian society into many subgroups, called jatis. One’s oc-
cupation, marriage prospects, and level of education are often related to one’s caste, which
is determined at birth. The caste system is particularly associated with Hinduism in India,
although it is found among other religious groups as well.
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The caste system is maintained and enforced in part through norms surrounding
purity and pollution. The ideas of ritual purity and pollution are distinct from physical
cleanliness and dirtiness. Under the norms of purity and pollution, both objects and people
can be considered polluted and polluting to others or pure and purifying to others, irrespec-
tive of physical dirtiness. For example, cow dung and urine are considered purifying, while
newborn babies and postpartum mothers are considered temporarily polluting.
The logic of purity and pollution reinforces the hierarchies of the caste system. People
from the lowest-ranking castes are considered “untouchable” to other members of society.
Higher-caste individuals have traditionally avoided physical contact with people from un-
touchable castes and refused to share food and water with them in order to avoid becoming
polluted by them. People from untouchable castes are expected to do the dirtiest jobs,
including disposing of animal carcasses, cleaning human feces, and de-blocking sewers and
drains.
Initial improvements in sanitation, away from open defecation, have been achieved
elsewhere in the developing world not through the installment of flush toilets but through
the use of pit latrines, which are less expensive and simpler to install than sewers. These
latrines, however, have pits that must eventually be emptied by hand, a job that, in India,
is considered exceptionally polluting and thus only fit to be undertaken by people from
untouchable castes. In recent years, people from these disadvantaged castes have protested
the social injustices that they face in part by refusing to perform these types of jobs.
One consequence of these slow but ongoing social changes is that high-caste house-
holds considering whether or not to install a pit latrine are concerned that it will be difficult
or expensive to find someone who is willing to empty the pit. As a result, many households
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forego the use of latrines altogether—even when the government distributes them for free.
In these ways the forces of social inequality in India have prevented the progress
towards improved sanitation that have been achieved elsewhere in the developing world,
including in much poorer places. Neighboring Bangladesh, for example, is poorer than
India, on average, but has a culturally and religiously distinct society, which contributes to
the fact that the use of inexpensive latrines is widespread and open defecation has essentially
been eliminated there.
In this paper, we use quantitative data inspired by this qualitative evidence. The data
are introduced in detail in the next section. A key variable in our analysis is the fraction of
households in a village who report practicing untouchability—meaning, who report enforcing
the rules of casteism. We use this variable as a proxy for the local importance of Hinduism-
related casteism, purity, and pollution. Figure 1 shows that it is highly predictive of local
open defecation. Therefore, our hypothesis is that local Hinduism-related social inequality,
as proxied by reported practice of untouchability, causes children to be exposed to more
open defecation, on average, which translates into reduced child height-for-age, a key marker
of early-life health. The next section details the data, variables, and empirical methods by
which we investigate this hypothesis.
3.4 Data and Methods
Building upon Coffey and Spears (2017), we pursue a novel empirical quantification
of the impact of casteism on child health in India through the mechanism of open defecation.
Because open defecation creates a disease environment that impacts entire localities, casteism
could create substantial negative externalities through this pathway. We use the 2012 India
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Human Development Survey (IHDS), which measured children’s heights and asked about
sanitation and casteism in a nationally representative sample of about 40,000 households.
The IHDS is a panel survey implemented by the University of Maryland and the National
Council of Applied Economic Research.
3.4.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable in our analysis is a child’s height-for-age z-score. We use the
2006 World Health Organization’s child growth reference standards for healthy children to
compute height-for-age z-scores. The z-score can be interpreted as the number of standard
deviations away from the age-specific mean that a child’s height falls.
Although the IHDS measured the height of some children over the age of 5, we
restrict our sample to children under age 5 for comparability to studies using data from
the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). We also follow the DHS recommendation of
restricting the analysis to children with recorded height-for-age z-scores between -6 and 6.
We highlight that the measurement of height in the IHDS is not as high quality as in the
DHS: for Indian children in a similar time period, the variance of height in the IHDS is larger,
and age-in-months is not available for all children. The calculation of height-for-age z score
using WHO standards requires age in months. As a result, we approximate age-in-months
as the midpoint based on age-in-years (so, a one-year-old would be coded as 18 months);
this will introduce significant measurement error into the dependent variable. Therefore,
we do not interpret any result in this section as a quantitatively precise estimate of India’s
true average effect of neighborhood open defection; rather, this section provides supporting
evidence that suggests that such an effect exists and is large.
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3.4.2 Explanatory variables
For the main explanatory variable of interest, we take advantage of new questions
introduced in the 2012 wave of the IHDS. The survey sought to elicit attitudes regarding
members of lower castes through a set of two questions. The first question was: “In your
household do some members practice untouchability?” If the respondent answered in the
negative, they were then asked “Would there be a problem if someone who is scheduled
caste were to enter your kitchen or share utensils?” The enforcement of untouchability un-
fortunately remains common: about a quarter of households in rural India responded in the
affirmative to the first question and 31 percent answered yes to the first or second question
(Spears and Thorat, 2017). We follow Spears and Thorat in defining the variable of interest
as an indicator for whether the respondent said yes to either question (see Figure 1 above).
The IHDS asks whether the household owns a toilet; the question also asks respon-
dents specifically what type of latrine/toilet they own. The last option is “No facility belong-
ing to household (or open fields).” Spears and Thorat (2017) use this answer as an indication
of open defecation, and we follow that use. It is important to note, however, that Coffey
et al. (2014) find that a substantial fraction of people living in households that own latrines
do not use them, so this variable is likely to yield an undercount of actual open defecation.
The two independent variables of interest (casteism and open defecation) are constructed as
averages of the responses given by households living in the child’s primary sampling units
(PSU). These local averages estimate the fraction of a child’s neighbors who practice open
defecation and who practice untouchability; the child’s own household is excluded from the
local averages is both cases. PSUs in the IHDS are villages or urban blocks (IHDS 2011).
To test alternative mechanisms for the relationship between child height and PSU-
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level untouchability, we also include controls for levels of conflict in the village using two
measures. The first gives a PSU-level average of respondent’s opinion of the level of conflict
in the village, on a scale from 1 to 3 (where 3 is the least conflict). The second gives a
PSU-level average of whether respondents report that their community bonds together to
solve local problem, as opposed to each family solving their problems individually.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the full sample of children, and for subsamples
of children exposed to different levels of local untouchability. Many important covariates,
such as household consumption per capita, maternal education, markers for women’s status
(men eat first as opposed to household eating together or women eating first, a count of
decisions that the mother reports having a say over out of eight total types of decisions),
whether the household is urban, whether the household owns land, and number of children,
are non-monotonically related to the prevalence of untouchability among a child’s neighbors.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
Our observational empirical strategy builds upon Spears and Thorat (2017), who
relate local levels of casteism to local open defecation. We use the same variable for casteism
as they use as their independent variable—namely, the fraction of households in a survey
cluster or primary sampling unit (PSU) who report practicing untouchability—to examine
the links between casteism, open defecation, and child height. Spears and Thorat show
that there is substantial variation in local practices of both open defecation and casteism
across India. They then demonstrate that these two practices are correlated, with households
that admit to enforcing untouchability being more likely to defecate in the open themselves
and areas where more people practice untouchability having a larger fraction of people who
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practice open defecation. Although their estimates are not intended to uncover a causal
effect of casteism on open defecation, they rule out several alternative explanations, such as
associations between practicing untouchability and broader economic disadvantage as well
as associations between the practice of untouchability and incorrect health beliefs. Their
econometric analysis shows that this relationship is robust to a wide range of regression
controls. Therefore, this study will use local practices of untouchability as measured by the
2012 IHDS question as a source of variation in open defecation to examine the consequences
for population health. We build on Spears and Thorat, who do not study health or height,
by taking the relationship that they document as the first stage for the full chain that we
investigate in this paper.
This paper empirically investigates the link between casteism, open defecation, and
height. We show that, although children living in households that report practicing untouch-
ability are slightly taller than other Indian children, on average, children living in localities
where more neighbors practice untouchability are shorter on average, whether or not a wide
set of household socioeconomic observables are accounted for. The main analysis investi-
gates the relationship between PSU untouchability, open defecation, and individual-level
child height using reduced-form OLS regressions. Specifically, we investigate these relation-
ships by first estimating equations of the following form:
HFAihv = β1practiceuntouchabilityhv+β2practiceuntouchability
−i
v +β3opendefecation
−i
v +Xihv+ihv
(3.1)
where i indexes individual children, h indexes households and v indexes PSU’s (vil-
lages). practiceuntouchability−iv and opendefecation
−i
v +Xihv are PSU averages of the indi-
cators of household-level untouchability and open defecation, respectively, calculated without
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household h. Xihv is a vector of child and household-level controls. This includes vectors of
fully interacted age and sex controls, log consumption per capita of the household, whether
the child was measured lying down or standing, whether the household owns land, indica-
tor variables for the number of children in the house, and indicators for caste and religion
categories. The standard errors are clustered at the level of the PSUs.
We examine the relationship between our independent variables of interest and height
by building up to Equation 1 in stages. We first examine the relationship between a house-
hold’s practice of untouchability and the height of children living in the household. We
then successively add other independent variables, examining how the effect of village-level
untouchability impacts height relative to own household untouchability, and finally exam-
ining whether measures of village-level open defecation mediate the relationship between
village-level casteism and height outcomes.
This analysis shows that children living in localities where more neighbors report
practicing untouchability are shorter, on average, but not after accounting for differences
in exposure to open defecation. The quantitative, descriptive results from this exercise are
consistent with open defecation having a large effect of child height in India, but we make
no claim that these estimates reflect quasi-randomized causal effects.
3.6 Results
Table 2 shows the results of regressions examining the relationship between measures
of untouchability at the household and PSU levels and child height-for-age. Column 1 shows
the association between own household untouchability and height-for-age, with the full set
of age-by-sex and measuring position controls. The relationship is small and statistically
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insignificant. Column 2 adds PSU-level untouchability to the regression and shows that
children living among more neighbors who practice untouchability are shorter, on average,
but those whose own households practice untouchability are taller. Column 3 adds a vec-
tor of controls for other predictors of child height, and the negative relationship between
PSU untouchability and height remains. Note that controlling for PSU conflict and PSU
bonding together could plausibly be over-controlling, because these could reflect common
variation with untouchability; we nevertheless include column 3 for a more complete inves-
tigation of robustness. The positive relationship between own household untouchability and
height shrinks with the inclusion of household observable characteristics, suggesting that
this effect may be compositional rather than causal. Overall, these results demonstrate that
the association between child height and untouchability are driven by neighbors’ practice of
untouchability, not the child’s own household. This suggests that the negative overall rela-
tionship between the practice of untouchability and height partially reflects an externality
of that practice on other households in the neighborhood.
Table 3 builds on Table 2 by investigating open defecation as a mediator of the
relationships displayed in Table 2. The table presents three pairs of OLS results, each pair
with and without a control for PSU-level open defecation included among the independent
variables. All regressions control for age (in years) interacted with sex and whether the
height measurement was taken standing or lying down. The first pair of estimates shows
the results of a regression of height on PSU untouchability with and without the control
for PSU-level open defecation. The second pair adds a control for urban status of the PSU
and other PSU-level characteristics, and the third adds household-level controls for other
predictors of child height.
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The pairing exercise is useful because it helps us verify that open defecation is a
major mechanism behind the relationship between untouchability and child height. There
are various reasons why local casteism might predict child height (such as availability of
public goods, or consequences of mothers’ stress); by reporting each regression with and
without the open defecation control, we demonstrate that the association between the PSU-
level untouchability variable and open defecation explains a major portion of the negative
relationship between untouchability and height. The evidence from Table 2 suggested that
the effects of untouchability on height occurred through an effect on the neighbors of house-
holds that practice untouchability, rather than through an association with own-household
discriminatory behavior. This evidence strengthens that argument by testing several alter-
native hypotheses.
In columns 3 and 4, we add in controls for several other PSU-level characteristics:
urban status and controls for the level of conflict in the PSU. These controls account for
PSU-level characteristics that may be correlated with both practices of untouchability and
open defecation behaviors. For instance, it may be the case that untouchability is correlated
with an overall lack of social cooperation or capital in the village, which could also be
correlated with open defecation behavior. However, the overall pattern from columns 1 and
2 holds with these additional controls. Finally, in columns 5 and 6, we control for several
socioeconomic and other variables of the child’s household, including maternal education
and women’s status, which may be correlated with practices of untouchability and with
child height.2
2In results not shown here but available upon request, we exclude Dalit respondents from the computation
of each PSU’s fraction of households reporting untouchability. We include this as a robustness check because
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Although the negative relationship between untouchability and height is statistically
insignificant in the specification without the open defecation control, accounting for open
defecation dramatically decreases the magnitude of the relationship. The controls verify that
this pattern of results is not merely due to differences between rural and urban India, nor to
the socioeconomic status of the child’s household, nor to the child’s family’s caste or religion
category.
These results are a useful addition to the literature on the effects of open defecation on
child height because household-level omitted variables are implausible: children in India who
live in households that report practicing untouchability are taller on average, than children
who live in households who do not. Therefore, the fact that children living among more local
neighbors who report practicing untouchability are shorter on average, suggests a mechanism
rooted in externalities and context effects.
The confidence intervals in this analysis are wide, and these quantifications should
not be taken as more than qualitatively indicative of the importance of open defecation for
child height. However, in each case the null hypothesis of no association between sanitation
and child height can be rejected, and in each case the confidence interval includes the effect
sizes large enough to explain 100% of the height gap between children in India and sub-
Saharan Africa, as quantified by Dean Spears (2018). This is true with or without a wide
set of controls.
a small, but positive number of respondents from untouchable castes report that they practice untouchability,
which is difficult to interpret. The regression results are qualitatively unchanged, although this necessarily
drops from the sample children living in segregated, all-untouchable caste PSUs.
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3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has illustrated a link among social hierarchies, health behaviors, and
health outcomes in India. In this case, the norms dividing people from untouchable castes
from non-untouchables create health hazards that harm everyone, not just the socially and
economically disadvantaged. Ideas about ritual purity and pollution have prevented progress
towards improved sanitation in India, which would save lives and help people have healthy
childhoods and reach their full economic potential. Open defecation in rural India contributes
to an infectious disease environment that plagues Indian children with diarrhea, parasites,
and other health problems. We find an association between PSU shares of people practicing
untouchability and child height. This is despite the fact that, controlling for PSU untouch-
ability, own household untouchability predicts improvements in child height. This suggests
that the mechanism at play is a consequence of casteism that affects an entire neighborhood,
rather than just the household practicing untouchability. We show that a major mechanism
is open defecation: once PSU-level open defecation is controlled for, PSU untouchability no
longer predicts child height.
Despite our results, important uncertainties and limitations remain. One limit is
that, although the IHDS is a large survey, our statistical power is limited by the fact that
not all households have children, and that we are studying village-level variation and must
therefore cluster standard errors. The most notable limit is that this is an observational
study of existing variation. The advantage is that we are able to study the full range of
exposure to open defecation and casteism that exists throughout rural India. However, we
do not have the benefits for causal inference of a randomized controlled trial. As a result, we
cannot fully rule out all possible confounding factors that may have influenced our results.
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A large literature in economics has debated whether economic inequality causes poor
health, or whether the apparent correlation reflects omitted variables and spurious factors
(Anne Case and Christina Paxson (2011); Angus Deaton (2013)). Our analysis differs from
this debate because we study a case of social inequality: we show novel evidence of a case
where social inequality leads to worse health outcomes throughout society. Previous litera-
ture in psychology, sociology, and economics has suggested that social inequality may have a
substantial impact on health through mechanisms such as feelings of relative deprivation and
restricted access to health care. However, these mechanisms are difficult to disentangle from
the direct impact of absolute poverty on health as well as from third variables associated
with both relative deprivation and health. The results of this paper suggest that—without
necessarily offering evidence for or against channels of causation between one’s own rank
and one’s own health—in certain important contexts, social inequality can create health
externalities that affect whole populations, rather than only the marginalized themselves.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics from IHDS analysis
Note: Child-level sample of n=12,922 children, matching child-level height analysis from the IHDS. No un-
touchability and all untouchability are subsamples for which PSU untouchability equals 0 and 1, respectively,
with intermediate the remaining observations. The no untouchability, intermediate, and all untouchability
subsamples account for 19.18 percent, 79.47 percent, and 1.35 percent of the full sample, respectively..
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Table 3.2: IHDS results are driven by local untouchability context, not own-household’s
practice of untouchability
Note: Note: Child-level sample, matching child-level height analysis from IHDS.
***, **, *, and + denote statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels. Standard errors are
in parentheses.
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Table 3.3: Evidence from the association between child height and the practice of untouch-
ability, IHDS
Note: Note: Child-level sample from the India Human Development Survey 2012; children under 5 years
old with height-for-age between -6 and 6. The dependent variable is height-for-age z-score. PSU open
defecation is the fraction of interviewed households in the child’s survey PSU that report defecating in the
open, while “PSU untouch.” is the fraction of households that report practicing untouchability. See the Data
and Methods section for further details.
***, **, *, and + denote statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels. Standard errors are
in parentheses.
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Figure 3.1: A proxy of Hinduism-related casteism, purity, and pollution practices predicts
local-area exposure to open defecation among children
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Note: Child-level sample of n=12,922 children, matching child-level height analysis from the IHDS. The
horizontal axis displays the PSU average of our measure of untouchability and the horizontal axis displays
the PSU average of open defecation.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
Figure A1: Event Study: Employed Native Wages Before and After Large TANF Increase
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Note: This figure displays the results of a version of 1.1, where the independent variables of interest are
indicator variables for whether a native was interviewed in the year of a large increase in TANF maximum
benefit levels (at least 3 percent) as well as whether they were interviewed up to 4 years before or after such
an increase. The dependent variable is log wages for native workers, excluding those with 0 wages. The
categories of ”4+” and ”-4” also include natives who were interviewed greater than 4 years away from the
increase in either direction. Natives in states that never experienced a large increase in TANF benefits are
omitted in this sample. The regression also includes controls for marital status, sex, age and its square,
number of own children in the household, and unemployment rate in the the year of interview. There are
also controls for year of interview, and state fixed effects as well as state time trends. The standard errors
are clustered at the state level.
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Figure A2: Event Study: Non-Refugee Foreign Born Wages Before and After Large TANF
Increase
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Note: This figure displays the results of a version of Equation 1.1, where the independent variables of
interest are indicator variables for whether an immigrant arrived in the year of a large increase in TANF
maximum benefit levels (at least 3 percent) as well as whether they arrived up to 4 years before or after such
an increase. The regression is run on the sample of non-refugee foreign-born individuals, excluding those
with 0 earnings. The categories of ”4+” and ”-4” also include refugees who arrived greater than 4 years
away from the increase in either direction. Immigrants in states that never experienced a large increase in
TANF benefits are omitted in this sample. The regression also includes controls for marital status, sex, age
and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in the year of arrival and the
year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 11 sending regions. These regions are Mexico, Canada,
Latin America (excluding Mexico), Northern and Western Europe, Eastern Europe, East Asia, Southeast
Asia, Southwest Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Oceania. There are also controls for year of arrival, year
of interview, and state fixed effects as well as state time trends. The standard errors are clustered at the
state level.
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Figure A3: Event Study: Refugee Wages Before and After Large TANF Increase
-.1
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
Ef
fe
ct 
of
 C
ha
ng
e 
in 
TA
NF
 o
n 
W
ag
es
<-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 >+4
Year of Arrival Relative to TANF change
Note: This figure displays the results of a version of Equation 1.1, where the independent variables of interest
are indicator variables for whether a refugee arrived in the year of a large increase in TANF maximum benefit
levels (at least 3 percent) as well as whether they arrived up to 4 years before or after such an increase. The
categories of ”4+” and ”-4” also include refugees who arrived greater than 4 years away from the increase in
either direction. Refugees in states that never experienced a large increase in TANF benefits are included in
this sample, in the omitted category of “-1.” The regression excludes refugees with 0 earnings. The regression
also includes controls for marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household,
unemployment rate in the year of arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14
sending countries, defined as in Table A2. There are also controls for year of arrival, year of interview, and
state fixed effects as well as state time trends. The standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table A1: Summary Statistics: Refugees and Economic Immigrants
Non-Refugee	FB Refugees Non-Refugee	FB Refugees
Age 36.771 41.061 40.895 45.042
Marital	Status 0.663 0.74 0.644 0.594
Share	Female 0.493 0.504 0.518 0.51
Real	Annual	Wage 26,295.956 19,498.897 29,047.746 20,435.785
Number	of	own	children 0.843 1.092 1.158 1.101
Years	in	the	United	States 2.155 2.564 10.094 9.514
English	Ability 0.632 0.449 0.641 0.516
Employed 0.572 0.547 0.684 0.639
Labor	Force	Status 0.616 0.607 0.729 0.697
Urban	Status 0.935 0.972 0.935 0.965
Enrolled	in	School 0.144 0.137 0.073 0.066
Years	of	Education 13.189 13.297 12.31 11.931
Migrated	between	States,	Prior	Year 0.025 0.021
Observations 114,051 9,419 628,085 34,567
2000 2012-2016
Source: 2000 Census; 2012-2016 American Community Survey. A list of sending countries that comprise
each sending region and their respective sample sizes is available in Table A2.
Note: This table gives the means of major control variables by refugee status and time period for the sample
of refugees aged 25 and older.
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Table A2: Refugee Sending Populations
Country Average	Refugee	Share Years	in	Sample Total	Sample	Size
Former	Soviet	Union 0.732 1996-1998 17,017
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina 0.933 1996-2003 9,016
Croatia 0.648 2000-2002 388
Bhutan 0.940 2008-2016 1,237
Burma 0.893 2006-2016 2,502
Laos 0.744 2005-2006 271
Afghanistan 0.732 2001-2006;	2012-2016 938
Iraq 0.803 1996-1999;	2008-2016 5,043
Cuba 0.821 Full	Sample 34,485
Congo 0.640 2006;	2008-2009;	2015-2016 100
Eritrea 0.675 2009-2016 372
Liberia 0.699 1999-2006 1,789
Somalia 0.877 Full	Sample 3,522
Sudan 0.695 1999-2006 1,449
	
Note: This table shows which countries and years of arrival were coded as refugees in my sample. I made
the selections based on Yearbook of Immigration Statistics data, coding a country as a refugee country if the
fraction of refugee arrivals to immigrant visas issued plus refugee arrivals in the year the immigrant arrived
exceeded 60 percent. The sample size column gives the number of refugees aged 25 and older observed in my
sample. The rightmost column gives the average number of refugee arrivals over the years that the country
is in the sample and the average number of immigrant visas issued to immigrants from the same country
(this includes immediate relatives, family preference, employment preference, and diversity visas). The visa
statistics come from the Annual Report of the Visa Office. Cuban Entrants as well as Special Immigrant
Visa recipients are included as refugees, as they are eligible for ORR benefits. The refugee share from Bhutan
exceeds 60 percent from 2008-2014, but the ACS does not begin identifying Bhutan as an origin country
until 2012. The horizontal lines designate regions of origin.
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Table A3: Instrumental Variables Results: Effects of TANF Generosity on Wages
Dependent	Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.07 0.149*** 0.094** 0.133***
(0.046) (0.031) (0.040) (0.025)
<	High	School -0.380*** -0.453*** -0.380*** -0.453***
(0.020) (0.031) (0.021) (0.032)
Marital	Status -0.302*** -0.361*** -0.302*** -0.361***
(0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.022)
Female -0.249*** -0.295*** -0.249*** -0.295***
(0.039) (0.046) (0.039) (0.047)
Age 0.227*** 0.216*** 0.227*** 0.215***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
Observations 39,764 26,816 39,764 26,816
Specification IV IV OLS OLS
Sample All In	U.S.	>4	Years All In	U.S.	>4	Years
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Log	Wage
Note: This table contains results from specifications that drop states that do not adjust their nominal benefit
levels over time according to stated rules. Columns 1 and 2 use an instrumental variables specification,
instrumenting for TANF maximum benefit levels with benefit levels calculated using stated rules. Columns
3 and 4 show results from Equation 1.1 with the same sample exclusions. The regressions include controls
for marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in
the year of arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14 sending countries, defined
as in Table A2. Columns 2 and 4 exclude refugees who have been in the U.S. for fewer than five years, as
they may still receive TANF benefits. All specifications control for year of arrival, year of interview, and
state fixed effects, as well as state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table A4: Mechanisms: Effects of TANF Generosity, Removing Controls
(1) (2)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.069*** 0.096***
(0.022) (0.026)
<	High	School -0.560***
(0.035)
High	School -0.441***
(0.029)
Some	College -0.353***
(0.052)
English	Ability 0.324***
(0.018)
Observations 34,479 34,479
Controls	Excluded English Education
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Log	Wage
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of refugees arriving since 1996, excluding
those with 0 earnings. Column 1 excludes the control for English ability from the baseline specification, and
column 2 excludes controls for educational attainment. The regressions include controls for marital status,
age and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in the year of arrival and
the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14 sending countries, defined as in Table A2. The
specifications control for year of arrival, year of interview, and state fixed effects, as well as state time trends.
All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table A5: Heterogeneity in Wage Effects of Cash Generosity
Dependent	Variable:
(1) (2) (3)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.062** 0.053* 0.085***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.026)
<	High	School -0.467*** -0.467*** -0.466***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
High	School -0.388*** -0.390*** -0.388***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Some	College -0.332*** -0.333*** -0.332***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
English	Ability 0.119** 0.220*** 0.220***
(0.053) (0.014) (0.014)
TANF*English 0.020**
(0.010)
Age 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.055***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
TANF*Age 0.001**
0.000
#	of	Children -0.019** -0.019** 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.018)
TANF*#	of	Children -0.005*
(0.003)
Observations 34,479 34,479 34,479
Interaction English	Ability Age #	of	Children
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Log	Wage
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of refugees arriving since 1996, excluding
those with 0 earnings. Each column shows the results with the generosity measure interacted with a refugee
characteristic: column 1 shows interactions with English ability, column 2 shows an interaction with age,
and column 3 shows an interaction with number of children. The regressions include controls for marital
status, age and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in the year of arrival
and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14 sending countries, defined as in Table A2.
The specifications control for year of arrival, year of interview, and state fixed effects, as well as state time
trends. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table A6: Effect of TANF Generosity on Wages, Adjusting for Regional Price Differences
Dependent	Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adjusted	TANF	Max	Benefit 0.037 0.07 0.059** 0.096***
(0.037) (0.046) (0.022) (0.032)
<	High	School -0.392*** -0.467***
(0.025) (0.033)
High	School -0.334*** -0.389***
(0.030) (0.032)
Some	College -0.291*** -0.333***
(0.050) (0.052)
English	Ability 0.233*** 0.220***
(0.015) (0.014)
Observations 50,878 34,479 50,878 34,479
Controls No No Yes Yes
State	Time	Trends All In	U.S.	>4	Years All In	U.S.	>4	Years
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
27
Log	Wage
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of refugees arriving since 1996, excluding
those with 0 earnings. In these specifications, I adjust my measure of TANF generosity using the BEA’s
Implicit Regional Price Deflator Series to reflect regional price differences. The regressions in columns 3 and
4 also include controls for marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household,
unemployment rate in the year of arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14
sending countries. Columns 2 and 4 exclude refugees who have been in the U.S. for fewer than five years,
as they may still receive TANF benefits. All specifications control for year of arrival, year of interview, and
state fixed effects, as well as state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table A7: Effects of TANF Maximum Benefit for a Family of Four on Wages
Dependent	Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TANF	Max	Benefit	(Family	of	4) 0.023 0.027 0.040*** 0.053**
(0.022) (0.027) (0.014) (0.021)
<	High	School -0.392*** -0.468***
(0.025) (0.033)
High	School -0.334*** -0.389***
(0.030) (0.032)
Some	College -0.291*** -0.333***
(0.051) (0.052)
English	Ability 0.232*** 0.219***
(0.015) (0.014)
Observations 50,733 34,369 50,733 34,369
Controls No No Yes Yes
Sample All In	U.S.	>4	Years All In	U.S.	>4	Years
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Log	Wage
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of refugees arriving since 1996, using
maximum benefit levels for a family of four rather than a family of three in the refugees’ year of arrival. The
regressions exclude refugees with 0 earnings. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 also include controls for
marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in the
year of arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14 sending countries. Columns 2
and 4 exclude refugees who have been in the U.S. for fewer than five years, as they may still receive TANF
benefits. All specifications control for year of arrival, year of interview, and state fixed effects, as well as
state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table A8: Effects of TANF Generosity on Wages, Using Cutoff of 40 Percent
Dependent	variable:
(4) (4) (4) (4)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.031 0.045** 0.017 0.036*
(0.024) (0.022) (0.015) (0.020)
<	High	School -0.429*** -0.504***
(0.033) (0.041)
High	School -0.379*** -0.438***
(0.041) (0.043)
Some	College -0.335*** -0.379***
(0.052) (0.052)
English	Ability 0.244*** 0.231***
(0.017) (0.018)
Observations 67,331 47,579 67,331 47,579
Controls No No Yes Yes
Sample All In	U.S.	>4	Years All In	U.S.	>4	Years
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Log	Wage
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of refugees arriving since 1996, excluding
those with 0 earnings. These specifications use a cutoff of 40 percent for the definition of likely refugees,
rather than 60 percent as in the rest of the analysis. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 also include controls
for marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in
the year of arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14 sending countries, defined
as in Table A2. Columns 2 and 4 exclude refugees who have been in the U.S. for fewer than five years, as
they may still receive TANF benefits. All specifications control for year of arrival, year of interview, and
state fixed effects, as well as state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table A9: Balance Table: Immigrant Characteristics Significantly Associated with TANF
Generosity
TANF	Maximum	Benefit
Dependent	Variable (1)
Marital	Status -0.004
(0.003)
Female -0.001
(0.002)
Age -0.025
(0.079)
Number	of	Own	Children 0.0189***
(0.006)
<	High	School 0.0126***
(0.003)
High	School 0.000
(0.002)
Some	College -0.00223**
(0.001)
College	and	Above -0.0103***
(0.004)
English	Ability -0.0143***
(0.004)
Mexico 0.0125***
(0.004)
Canada 0.000
(0.002)
Latin	America 0.002
(0.003)
N.	&	W.	Europe -0.001
(0.001)
East	Europe -0.00902**
(0.004)
East	Asia -0.00966**
(0.004)
Southeast	Asia 0.00644**
(0.003)
Southwest	Asia 0.000
(0.002)
Middle	East -0.001
(0.001)
Africa 0.001
(0.001)
Oceania -0.001
(0.001)
Observations 1,411,003
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1, run without controls, on the sample of non-refugee
immigrants arriving since 1996. The outcome variables are immigrant characteristics. All specifications
control for year of arrival, year of interview, and state fixed effects, as well as state time trends. All standard
errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table A10: Effects of TANF Generosity on Wages, Controlling for Years in U.S.
Dependent	Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.03 0.047 0.054*** 0.078***
(0.028) (0.035) (0.018) (0.025)
Years	in	the	U.S. 0.037*** 0.017*** 0.034*** 0.014***
-0.001 -0.002 (0.001) (0.002)
<	High	School -0.397*** -0.468***
(0.025) (0.033)
High	School -0.337*** -0.390***
(0.030) (0.031)
Some	College -0.291*** -0.333***
(0.050) (0.052)
English	Ability 0.235*** 0.220***
0 0
Observations 50,878 34,479 50,878 34,479
Controls No No Yes Yes
Sample All In	U.S.	>4	Years All In	U.S.	>4	Years
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Log	Wage
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of refugees arriving since 1996, excluding
those with 0 earnings. These specifications exclude controls for year of interview and instead control for a
linear measure of years since arrival to the U.S. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 also include controls
for years in the U.S., marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household,
unemployment rate in the year of arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 14
sending countries, defined as in Table A2. Columns 2 and 4 exclude refugees who have been in the U.S. for
fewer than five years, as they may still receive TANF benefits. All specifications control for year of arrival
and state fixed effects, as well as state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table A11: Effects of TANF Generosity on Wages, Triple Difference Model
Dependent	Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TANF	Max	Benefit -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.009** -0.011***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
Refugee	*	TANF	Max	Benefit 0.047* 0.064* 0.059*** 0.082***
(0.023) (0.036) (0.016) (0.030)
High	School 0.095*** 0.087***
(0.008) (0.008)
Refugee	*	High	School -0.008 -0.007
(0.019) (0.019)
Some	College 0.189*** 0.192***
(0.012) (0.012)
Refugee	*	Some	College -0.055** -0.054**
(0.025) (0.025)
College 0.700*** 0.733***
(0.024) (0.022)
Refugee	*	College -0.268*** -0.265***
(0.025) (0.025)
English	Ability 0.260*** 0.246***
(0.011) (0.011)
Refugee	*	English	Ability -0.025*** -0.023**
(0.009) (0.009)
Observations 996,175 690,490 995,220 689,828
Individual	Controls No No Yes Yes
Sample All In	U.S.	>4	Years All In	U.S.	>4	Years
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Log	Wage
Note: This table contains results from a variant of Equation 1.1 using non-refugee immigrants as a control
in a triple difference specification. The regression is run on the sample of immigrants arriving since 1996,
excluding those with 0 earnings. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 also include controls for marital status,
sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in the year of arrival
and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 11 sending regions. These regions are: Mexico,
Canada, Latin America (excluding Mexico), Northern and Western Europe, Eastern Europe, East Asia,
Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Oceania. All controls are fully interacted with
refugee status. Columns 2 and 4 exclude immigrants who have been in the U.S. for fewer than five years.
All specifications control for year of arrival and state fixed effects, as well as state time trends, all of which
are interacted with refugee status. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table A12: Heterogeneity in Effects of TANF Generosity on Non-Refugee Immigrants
Dependent	Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TANF	Max	Benefit -0.023*** 0.003 0.002 0.003**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
<	High	School -0.732*** -0.570*** -0.105*** -0.101***
(0.022) (0.072) (0.004) (0.005)
High	School -0.645*** -0.533*** -0.071*** -0.063***
(0.018) (0.060) (0.003) (0.007)
Some	College -0.541*** -0.449*** -0.052*** -0.042***
(0.019) (0.059) (0.004) (0.010)
English	Ability 0.132*** 0.245*** 0.057*** 0.064***
(0.047) (0.010) (0.008) (0.004)
TANF*English 0.019*** 0.001
(0.007) (0.001)
TANF*<	High	School -0.027*** -0.001
(0.010) (0.001)
TANF*	High	School -0.018** -0.001
(0.008) (0.001)
TANF*	Some	College -0.015* -0.002
(0.008) (0.002)
Observations 656,011 656,011 938,872 938,872
Interaction English	Ability Education English	Ability Education
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Log	Wage Employment
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of non-refugee foreign born arriving since
1996, excluding those with 0 earnings in columns 1 and 2. The outcome variable in columns 1 and 2 is log
wage, whereas in columns 3 and 4 a dummy for employment status is the outcome variable. Columns 1 and
3 also present an interaction between the measure of welfare generosity and English ability, while columns
2 and 4 show an interaction with educational attainment. The regressions also include controls for marital
status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household, unemployment rate in the year of
arrival and the year of interview, and dummy variables for each of 11 sending regions. These regions are
Mexico, Canada, Latin America (excluding Mexico), Northern and Western Europe, Eastern Europe, East
Asia, Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Oceania. Columns 2 and 4 exclude
refugees who have been in the U.S. for fewer than five years. All specifications control for year of arrival,
year of interview, and state fixed effects, as well as state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at
the state level.
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Table A13: Effects of TANF Generosity on Low-Skilled Native Workers
Dependent	Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.015 0.011 0.001 0
(0.011) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001)
<	High	School -0.640*** -0.199***
-0.015 (0.005)
Marital	Status 0.202*** 0.043***
-0.005 (0.002)
Female -0.486*** -0.078***
-0.009 (0.002)
Age 0.113*** 0.015***
-0.001 0.000
Observations 19,638,249 19,638,249 32,394,690 32,394,690
Controls No Yes No Yes
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Log	Wage Employment
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of low-skilled natives, excluding those
with 0 earnings in columns 1 and 2. The regressions show the effect of cash assistance in the year of interview
on wages and the probability of employment. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 also include controls for
marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the household, and unemployment rate in
the year of interview. All specifications control for year of interview fixed effects and state fixed effects, as
well as state time trends (trend is in year of interview in this case). All standard errors are clustered at the
state level.
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Table A14: Effects of TANF Generosity Using Alternative Sample Definitions
Dependent	Variable:
(1) (2)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.077*** 0.084***
(0.03) (0.02)
<	High	School -0.468*** -0.470***
(0.03) (0.04)
High	School -0.389*** -0.392***
(0.03) (0.03)
Some	College -0.333*** -0.335***
(0.05) (0.05)
English	Ability 0.220*** 0.222***
(0.01) (0.01)
Observations 34,479 35,419
Sample Smoothed,	Cutoff Unsmoothed,	Cutoff
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Log	Wage
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1 on the sample of refugees arriving since 1996, excluding
those with 0 earnings. Column 1 shows results using the baseline definition for refugee, while column 2
shows results where the fraction of refugees arriving in a year used for the sample cutoff is not smoothed.
The regressions include controls for marital status, sex, age and its square, number of own children in the
household, unemployment rate in the year of interview and year of arrival, and dummy variables for each of
14 sending countries, defined as in Table A2. All specifications control for year of interview fixed effects and
state fixed effects, as well as state time trends. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table A15: Test for Selection: TANF Maximum Benefit Levels Largely Do Not Predict
Employed Refugee Characteristics
Dependent	Variable (1) (2)
Marital	Status -0.012 0.007
(0.011) (0.021)
Female 0.010 0.032**
(0.010) (0.015)
Age 0.247 0.399
(0.261) (0.384)
Number	of	Own	Children -0.010 0.113**
(0.053) (0.045)
<	High	School 0.020** 0.018
(0.009) (0.012)
High	School -0.026 -0.041
(0.033) (0.046)
Some	College 0.012 0.008
(0.013) (0.016)
College	and	Above -0.005 0.016
(0.030) (0.038)
English	Ability -0.028*** -0.041
(0.010) (0.030)
Soviet	Union -0.089 -0.066
(0.113) (0.124)
Yugoslavia -0.013 -0.016
(0.069) (0.100)
Southeast	Asia 0.043 0.030*
(0.017) (0.016)
Middle	East -0.011 0.013
(0.023) (0.027)
Cuba 0.034 0.008
(0.037) (0.031)
Africa 0.036 0.031
(0.043) (0.042)
Observations 50,878 34,479
Sample All In	U.S.	>4	Years
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
TANF	Maximum	Benefit
Note: This table contains results from Equation 1.1, run without controls, on the sample of employed
refugees arriving since 1996. The outcome variables are refugee characteristics. In column 1, all employed
refugees are included in the sample, while in column 2, I exclude refugees that arrived in the last 5 years
before the interview. All specifications control for year of interview fixed effects and state fixed effects, as
well as state time trends (trend is in year of interview in this case). All standard errors are clustered at the
state level.
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Table A16: Heckman Selection Model
Dependent	variable: Log	Wage Selection
(1) (2)
TANF	Max	Benefit 0.042** 0.005
(0.015) (0.027)
<	High	School -0.399*** -0.572***
(0.023) (0.027)
High	School -0.336*** -0.284***
(0.029) (0.018)
Some	College -0.292*** -0.151***
(0.050) (0.017)
English	Ability 0.234*** 0.284***
(0.015) (0.029)
Observations 50,878 78,129
ρ 0.023*
(0.013)
λ 0.02*
(0.011)
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Note: This table contains results from a Heckman two step procedure, where I specify the availability of
wage information to depend on cash assistance generosity, along with the usual set of controls. ρ gives
an estimate of the correlation of the error terms of the wage and employment equations, while λ gives an
estimate of ρ multiplied by the variance of the distribution of errors in the wage regression. All specifications
control for year of arrival, year of interview, and state fixed effects, was well as state time trends. All
standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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A.0.1 Theoretical Appendix
This section presents a model of human capital investment for refugees that receive
temporary cash assistance upon arrival to the U.S. For simplicity, and following Cortes
(2004), suppose that the agents live for two periods after arrival in the U.S. Let utility be
strictly increasing and concave in earnings (wage plus benefits). Assume that in the first pe-
riod the refugees receive a cash benefit, whose level is determined exogenously. The refugees
also spend a share θ of their time acquiring U.S.-specific human capital and the remainder
of their time working in a job earning a wage w, with total wage earnings depending on
initial human capital, H0.
1 In the second period, the benefits expire, so that the refugees
consume only what they earn in wages. However, the wage earnings in the second period are
a function of the refugees’ cumulative human capital, which depends on H0 and the human
capital they accumulated in the first period according to a strictly concave human capital
production function f . The refugees maximize intertemporal utility in the two periods with
a discount factor of 0 < β < 1:
max
θ
u(y1) + βu(y2) (A.1)
where y1 = wH0(1− θ) + b and y2 = w(H0 + f(H0, θ))
The first order condition for maximization is:
− wH0u′(y1) + βu′(y2)∂f(H0, θ)
∂θ
w = 0 (A.2)
1Intuitively, and similar to Cortes (2004), this represents the fact that human capital acquired abroad is
not fully valued by U.S. employers, leading to underemployment among skilled refugees and other immigrants.
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From which we can determine the effect of b on the optimal choice of investment θ:
∂θ∗
∂b
=
wH0u
′′(y1)
w2H0
2u′′(y1) + βu′(y2)
∂2f(H0,θ)
∂θ2
w + βu′′(y2)(
∂f(H0,θ)
∂θ
)2w2
> 0 (A.3)
by the Implicit Function Theorem. The sign of the effect of b follows from the strict
concavity of the utility and human capital production functions and from the fact that they
are strictly increasing. Therefore, from this simplified model we obtain the result that an
exogenous increase in cash benefits should result in an increase in human capital investment,
resulting in increased wage earnings, an implication that can be tested empirically. This
model also predicts by construction that refugees increase human capital investment by
reducing labor supply, either on the intensive or extensive margin.
The unambiguous prediction of positive effects on wages relies on the fact that there
is no impact of wages on receipt of benefits in this model. This is an abstraction from
reality; earning high wages after resettlement results in reduced or terminated cash benefits.
I argue that this assumption is reasonable in this context, since most refugees are no longer
using cash assistance (excluding SSI) by three years after resettlement and human capital
investment is a long-term consideration.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
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Figure B1: DHS Countries in Sample
Note: This figure shows the geographic location of countries where the DHS interviews were conducted.
The shade of blue denotes the number of survey waves in the analysis.
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Figure B2: Wet Bulb Temperature, Dry Bulb Temperature, and Humidity
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Note: This figure displays the relationship between wet bulb temperature, dry bulb temperature, and
relative humidity. In this figure, each line is an isometric line representing a fixed dry bulb temperature.
The horizontal axis gives relative humidity, and the vertical axis gives wet bulb temperature. The two red
points give August averages of daily average wet bulb temperatures in August, 2017 for Houston, TX and
Las Vegas, NV, respectively, as illustrative examples.
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Figure B3: Questionnaire Example: Valid vs. Invalid Skips
Note: This figure displays an illustrative example of the skip patterns in the DHS Wave 7 Individual
Questionnaire. The section begins with instructions to check whether the respondent is pregnant from a
previous question. If the respondent is pregnant, then questions 303-311 will be marked as valid skips. If
the respondent is not pregnant, then the interviewer should move onto question 303. If the respondent is
marked not pregnant or unsure but question 303 is left blank, then question 303 is a missing (or invalid
missing) response.
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Figure B4: Role of the Respondent: Respondent Controls Do Not Affect Main Results
Note: This figure shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using the number of interviews
completed per hour worked as the outcome variable of interest, where hours worked is defined as the time
between the start time of the first individual interview and the end time of the last individual interview in that
day. The independent variables of interest are indicators for whether the daily average wet bulb temperature
in the day of interview fell into the given bin. The blue line gives the full specification, including respondent
control variables, while the red line omits respondent controls. The regressions also include fixed effects for
the survey round by region of country as well as controls for the 10 year average of wet bulb temperature in
the survey cluster in the month of interview, number of daylight hours, and the number of completed days
in the survey round. Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level. Point estimates and 95%
confidence intervals are shown.
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Figure B5: Heterogeneity: The Effect of Heat on Number of Interviews Per Hour Increases
with Experience (Interviewer FE)
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Note: This figure shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using the number of interviews
completed per hour worked as the outcome variable of interest, where hours worked is defined as the time
between the start time of the first individual interview and the end time of the last individual interview in that
day. The independent variables of interest are indicators for whether the daily average wet bulb temperature
in the day of interview fell into the given bin. Each wet bulb bin is interacted with a measure of how many
days the interviewer has worked on that survey round. The blue line shows the effect for an interviewer on
his/her first day, and the red line shows the effect for the interviewer’s 75th day. The regressions also include
interviewer fixed effects as well as controls for the characteristics of the set of respondents, the 10 year average
of wet bulb temperature in the survey cluster in the month of interview, number of daylight hours, and the
number of completed days in the survey round. Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level.
Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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Figure B6: More Experienced Interviewers Work Longer on Hot Days, Conduct Fewer In-
terviews on Cold Days (Interaction Effects)
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Note: This figure shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using the number of interviews
completed in a day (Panel A) and working time (Panel B) as the outcome variables of interest. The
independent variables of interest are indicators for whether the daily average wet bulb temperature in the
day of interview fell into the given bin. Each wet bulb bin is interacted with a measure of how many days
the interviewer has worked on that survey round. The lines displayed show the estimated interaction effect:
each coefficient is interpretable as the impact of a day of experience on the effect of wet bulb temperature
on the outcome variable. The regressions also include region of country by survey round fixed effects as well
as controls for the characteristics of the set of respondents, the 10 year average of wet bulb temperature in
the survey cluster in the month of interview, number of daylight hours, and the number of completed days
in the survey round. Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level. Point estimates and 95%
confidence intervals are shown.
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Figure B7: Role of the Respondent: Little Heterogeneity by Respondent Characteristics
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(b) HH Electricity
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(c) Respondent Illiterate
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Note: This figure shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using the number of interviews
completed per hour worked as the outcome variable of interest, where hours worked is defined as the time
between the start time of the first individual interview and the end time of the last individual interview in that
day. Each panel shows interaction effects with the mix of respondents along one observable characteristic:
these characteristics are whether the respondent works, whether the respondent’s household has electricity,
whether the respondent is illiterate, and whether the house is made of formal materials. The red line gives
the effect of wet bulb temperature if all of the respondents in the interviewer-day have the characteristic,
and the blue line gives the effect if none of the respondents have the characteristic. The regressions include
fixed effects for the survey round by region of country as well as controls for other characteristics of the set
of respondents, the 10 year average of wet bulb temperature in the survey cluster in the month of interview,
number of daylight hours, and the number of completed days in the survey round. Standard errors are
clustered at the region-of-country level. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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Figure B8: Alternative Specifications: Interviewer Productivity Does Not Respond to Intra-
day Maximum Wet Bulb Temperature
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Note: This figure shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using the number of interviews
completed per hour worked as the outcome variable of interest, where hours worked is defined as the time
between the start time of the first individual interview and the end time of the last individual interview
in that day. The independent variables of interest are indicators for whether the daily maximum wet bulb
temperature in the day of interview fell into the given bin, where maximum temperature is defined as the
highest of the eight daily readings in the Princeton Data. The regressions also include fixed effects for
the survey round by region of country as well as controls for the characteristics of the set of respondents,
the 10 year average of wet bulb temperature in the survey cluster in the month of interview, number of
daylight hours, and the number of completed days in the survey round. Standard errors are clustered at the
region-of-country level. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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Figure B9: Interviewer Characteristics in Post-2010 Data
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Note: This figure contains summary statistics on interviewer characteristics from recent DHS surveys outside
of the sample of the main analysis of this paper. These data come from fieldworker surveys included
in the Afghanistan 2015-2016, Armenia 2015-2016, Nepal 2016 and Zimbabwe 2015 survey rounds. The
left subfigure gives a histogram of the age distribution of fieldworkers, while the right subfigure gives the
histogram of years of education.
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Table B1: Interviewer Productivity Correlated with Probability of Leaving Survey Early
Productivity	Measure (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Invalid	Missings 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.171** 0.195***
-0.001 -0.001 -0.07 -0.07
Data	Quality	Flags -0.010** -0.006 -0.134 0.116
-0.004 -0.004 -0.249 -0.247
Number	of	Interviews -0.034*** -0.013*** -2.854*** -1.922***
-0.003 -0.004 -0.153 -0.246
Working	Time	(Min) -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.033*** -0.016***
0 0 -0.002 -0.003
Observations 11,372 11,372 13,927 13,870 11,327 11,372 11,372 13,927 13,870 11,327
Clustered	standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Left	Before	Team Days	Between	Last	Day	and	Supervisor's	Last	Day
Note: This table shows the results of regressions showing the impact of average interviewer productivity on
the probability of early separation from the survey team. Columns 1-5 examine the impact on the probability
that the interviewer is last observed at least one day before the last member of their survey team. Columns
6-10 examine the impact on the number of days between the day that the interviewer is last observed and
the day that the last member of their team is last observed. When data quality measures are included in
the regressions, the number of questions asked in the interview is also included as a control, since longer
interviews may mechanically contain more data quality issues. The regressions do not include other controls.
B.1 Data Appendix
This section details the construction of the weather dataset, as well as several key
outcome variables in the data quality analysis.
B.1.1 Princeton Data
The weather data throughout the analysis come from the Princeton Meteorological
Forcing Dataset, which is a reanalysis dataset that has been bias-corrected using observa-
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Table B2: Wet Bulb Temperature Predicts Day of Survey Round
Day	of	Round
Wet	Bulb	Bin
<30	Degrees -5.940*** 20.59*** 45.61***
(0.930) (6.967) (9.048)
30-40	Degrees -4.913*** -0.403 16.94**
(0.548) (7.350) (7.482)
40-50	Degrees -26.26*** -17.85*** -7.034
(0.248) (5.066) (4.290)
50-60	Degrees -18.17*** -15.31*** -9.384***
(0.157) (3.036) (2.535)
70-80	Degrees 9.939*** 12.72*** 7.174***
(0.132) (3.338) (2.764)
80-85	Degrees 34.21*** 12.21* 2.910
(0.275) (6.429) (4.879)
>85	Degrees 79.08*** 60.18*** 42.96***
(1.993) (6.680) (7.576)
Expected	Temp 0.876**
Place	FE X X
Observations 1,221,516 1,221,516 1,221,516
Note: This table shows the results of interview-level regressions using the day of the survey round (the
number of days between the interview date and the date of the first interview in the survey round) as the
outcome variable. The independent variables of interest are indicators for whether the daily average wet
bulb temperature in the day of interview fell into the given bin. The first column just gives raw correlations,
while the second column adds fixed effects for the survey round by region of country. The third column
includes a control for the 10 year average of wet bulb temperature in the survey cluster in the month of
interview Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level in columns 2 and 3.
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Table B3: Mechanisms: More Data Quality Issues Arise on Hot Days
Dependent	variable: Quality	Flags Valid	Skips Invalid	Missing Don't	Know/Inconsistent
(1) (2) (3)
>85 0.282*** 17.323 0.291 -0.303
(0.084) (15.616) (0.233) (0.211)
80-85 0.04 -2.259 0.436** -0.077
(0.037) (3.298) (0.191) (0.135)
70-80 0.013 -4.575 0.347* 0.04
(0.028) (2.884) (0.188) (0.099)
60-70 -0.01 -2.59 0.292** 0.041
(0.021) (1.872) (0.130) (0.076)
40-50 0.100*** -1.225 0.051 -0.19
(0.035) (1.707) (0.065) (0.183)
30-40 0.081 1.529 0.02 -0.135
(0.063) (3.359) (0.110) (0.186)
<30 0.006 9.234** -0.05 -0.089
(0.078) (3.959) (0.266) (0.238)
10-Yr	Avg	Wet	Bulb 0.002 -0.469*** 0.003 0
(0.002) (0.173) (0.002) (0.007)
Day	of	Survey	Round -0.000** -0.066 -0.000** 0.001
0.000 (0.045) 0.000 (0.001)
Daylight	Hours -0.001*** 0.082*** -0.001*** 0.002
0.000 (0.023) 0.000 (0.001)
Region	of	Country	FE X X X X
Observations 962,240 962,240 962,564 962,276
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Note: This table shows the results of interview-level regressions using counts of data quality problems as
the outcome variables of interest. Column 1 examines total counts of data quality flags as the outcome
variable, column 2 uses counts of valid skips (not applicable or not in universe), and column 3 uses counts
of invalid missing responses. Column 4 uses a count of responses where the respondent did not know the
answer to the question or where the response given was inconsistent with another response. More details
on the construction of the outcome variables are available in Appendix B.1. The independent variables of
interest are indicators for whether the daily average wet bulb temperature in the day of interview fell into
the given bin. All regressions also include fixed effects for the survey round by region of country, controls for
characteristics of the set of respondents, the 10-year average of wet bulb temperature in the survey cluster
in the month of interview, number of daylight hours, and the number completed days in the survey round.
Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level.
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Table B4: Heterogeneity by World Region and Usual Climate
Dependent	variable:
Africa East	Asia	Pacific Europe	&	C.	Asia Latin	America Middle	East	&	N.	Africa South	Asia Coolest	Third Middle	Third Warmest	Third
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
>85 - - - -0.129 - -0.045 -	 - -0.196**
(0.168) (0.040) (0.096)
80-85 -0.065* -0.087** - 0.023 - 0.006 - 0.125** -0.095
(0.038) (0.039) (0.103) (0.025) (0.063) (0.088)
70-80 -0.059* -0.044 -0.053 -0.019 -0.100* 0.036* -0.206*** -0.059 -0.068
(0.033) (0.029) (0.063) (0.060) (0.059) (0.018) (0.014) (0.051) (0.085)
60-70 -0.048*** - -0.014 -0.034 -0.086** 0.038** -0.022 -0.071 -
(0.018) (0.009) (0.045) (0.042) (0.016) (0.014) (0.050)
40-50 0.007 - 0.039 0.009 0.032 -0.056*** 0.034* - -
(0.030) (0.051) (0.035) (0.035) (0.011) (0.020)
30-40 0.008 - 0.08 0.009 -0.157* -0.004 0.042 - -
(0.075) (0.073) (0.058) (0.089) (0.039) (0.039)
<30 - - 0.124 0.004 -0.192*** -0.071** 0.103* - -
(0.101) (0.077) (0.064) (0.031) (0.057)
10-Yr	Avg	Wet	Bulb 0.004* 0.005 0.015 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.004 0.007**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.012) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Day	of	Survey	Round 0.001** 0.000** 0.003** 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Daylight	Hours 0 0.001*** -0.001 0.001*** 0.001 0 0 -0.001** 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 175,394 39,511 7,720 43,428 21,770 26,906 106,861 166,953 94,955
Standard	errors	in	parentheses
*	p<0.10,	**	p<0.05,	***	p<0.01
Number	of	Interviews	Completed	Per	Hour	Worked
Note: The first 6 columns of this table show the results of interviewer-day level regressions using the number
of interviews completed per hour worked as the outcome variable of interest, run separately for six world
regions. Hours worked is defined as the time between the start time of the first individual interview and the
end time of the last individual interview in that day. The independent variables of interest are indicators
for whether the daily average wet bulb temperature in the day of interview fell into the given bin. The
regressions also include fixed effects for the survey round by region of country as well as controls for the
characteristics of the set of respondents, the 10 year average of wet bulb temperature in the survey cluster in
the month of interview, number of daylight hours, and the number of completed days in the survey round.
Standard errors are clustered at the region-of-country level. Table B6 shows the list of countries in each
region. Columns 7 through 9 show the results of similar subsample regressions: these regressions break the
sample into three groups based on annual wet bulb temperature.
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Table B5: Daylight Hours Do Not Mediate Relationship Between Temperature and Start
Time
Start	Time
Wet	Bulb	Bin
<30	Degrees 105.489*** 111.552***
(4.193) (4.298)
30-40	Degrees 59.637*** 63.555***
(2.489) (2.563)
40-50	Degrees 17.653*** 19.935***
(1.252) (1.301)
50-60	Degrees -4.091*** -2.649***
(0.769) (0.801)
70-80	Degrees -14.239*** -14.421***
(0.664) (0.664)
80-85	Degrees -52.843*** -53.644***
(1.407) (1.412)
>85	Degrees -163.049*** -166.374***
(10.657) (10.669)
Daylight -0.099*** 0.042
(0.006) (0.006)
Observations 413,417 413,417 413,417
Note: This table shows the results of interviewer-day level regressions using the starting time of the first
interview of the day as the outcome variable. The independent variables of interest are indicators for whether
the daily average wet bulb temperature in the day of interview fell into the given bin. The first column shows
the correlation between daylight hours and starting time, while the second column gives the correlation
between wet bulb temperature bins and starting time. The third column includes both temperature and
daylight hours, showing that the inclusion of daylight hours into the regression does not significantly change
the coefficients on the wet bulb bins.
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tional data. Reanalysis datasets combine observational data from multiple sources (such as
satellites, weather balloons, ground stations, etc.) with physics-based weather models that
extend the data to observationally sparse geographies. The Princeton Data incorporates
reanalysis data from the National Centers for Environmental Prediction and National Cen-
ter for Atmospheric Research (the NCEP-NCAR Reanalysis Data) with observational data
from the Climactic Research Unit (CRU) and the Global Precipitation Climatology Project
(GPCP). For more details on the Princeton Data, see Justin Sheffield, Gopi Goteti and
Eric F. Wood (2006). I, like Geruso and Spears (2018a), use data on dry bulb temperature,
specific humidity, and pressure for 1990-2010 and calculate relative humidity and wet bulb
temperature using the following calculations:
1. Relative humidity is calculated as follows, combining standard formulas for the mixing
ratio, saturation mixing ratio, and specific humidity from the World Meteorological
Organization:
rh = 0.263 ∗ p ∗ sh ∗
[
exp
(
17.67(t− 273.16)
t− 29.65
)]−1
(B.1)
where rh is relative humidity (%), p is pressure (Pa), sh is specific humidity, and t is
temperature (K).
2. Then, wet bulb temperature is calculated using the Stull Calculation, which is standard
for sea-level pressure and uses temperature in degrees Celsius rather than Kelvin:
wb = t ∗ [atan(0.151977 ∗ (rh+ 8.313658) 12 ] + atan(t+ rh)− atan(rh− 1.676331)+
0.00391838(rh)
3
2 ∗ atan(0.023101rh)− 4.686035 (B.2)
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Once wet bulb temperature is calculated, the weather variables are merged with the
DHS variables in the manner described in the text: the four surrounding grid points for each
DHS survey cluster are located and merged with the weather data, and then the weather
variables are calculated as the averages of the four surrounding grid points, weighted by
inverse distance between each grid point and the survey cluster.
B.1.2 Counts of Data Quality Flags
There are three major types of data quality flags used in the analysis, as follows:
1. Imputed Dates: these are important dates where the information has been imputed,
either because the full date was not recorded or because the date given was inconsistent
with another date (for example, births that are less than 7 months apart).
• Date of birth of the respondent
• Date of first union or marriage
• Date of birth of each child of the respondent
• Date of conception of the current pregnancy
• Date of start of use of current method of contraception
• Date of last terminated pregnancy
2. Flagged body measurements: in the DHS, several body measurements are recorded.
When they are out of the “acceptable” range of that measurement, they are flagged as
such.
• Child height or weight measurement
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• Women’s weight or height
3. Duration variables: the DHS asks for the duration of key reproduction-related activi-
ties, such as breastfeeding, and it includes flag variables for inconsistencies in the data
processing phase.
• Duration of breastfeeding
• Duration of postpartum amenorrhea
• Duration of postpartum abstinence
• Time since last menstrual period
• Time between first marriage and first birth (on a base of ever-married women)
The outcome variable for count of data quality flags gives the total quantity of these variables
that are flagged. Since many respondents have more than one child, such that there is the
potential for flags on important dates or measurements for multiple children, this variable
ranges in practice from 0 to 23 for women. Most of these flags apply only to interviews with
women (this applies to most duration and measurement variables). This variable for men
therefore ranges from 0 to 2.
B.1.3 Missing Data
Missing data in the DHS is coded consistently across variables, and variable names
are consistent within modules of the survey, allowing me to construct a count of total missing
variables in each interview. There are four categories of codes, which are described below.
The descriptions include the relevant information from the DHS Recode Manual.
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1. Missing data: “This question should have been answered by the respondent, but the
questionnaire contained no information for this variable.” Depending on the range of
codes for the variable, this is coded as 9, 99, 999, or 9999.
2. Respondent did not know the answer: “The respondent replied ‘Don’t know’ to this
question. Depending on the range of codes for the variable, this is coded as 8, 98, 998,
or 9998. There are exceptions to this rule, which I accommodate to the best of my
ability. These include the following:
• In the contraception module, the questionnaire asks about knowledge and use
of a range of methods of contraception. Some of these are country specific. If a
method is not mentioned in a certain country’s survey, it is coded as “8.” I remove
these from the count of “I don’t know” answers and add them to the valid skips.
• For several body measurement variables, measurements flagged as outside the
usual range are coded as “9998” or “99998.” I remove these from the count of “I
don’t know” answers and include them as data quality flags.
3. Inconsistent answer: “The answer to this question was inconsistent with other re-
sponses in the questionnaire and it was thought that this response was probably in
error. The response was changed to this code to avoid further problems due to incon-
sistency of information. This usually takes place during the secondary editing stage of
data processing.” Depending on the range of codes for the variable, this is coded as 7,
97, 997, 9997. There are exceptions to this rule, including:
• In the module on basic respondent data, the code 7 often means that the re-
spondent is not a de jure resident of the household. In these cases, I remove the
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response from the count of inconsistent responses and add it to the count of valid
skips.
4. Valid skips: “Variable is not applicable for this respondent either because the question
was not asked in a particular country or because the question was not asked of the
respondent due to the flow or skip pattern of the questionnaire.” This is coded to be
missing.
Most survey modules in the DHS are either used by every survey implementing country or
are optional ones implemented by a substantial fraction of them. However, many countries
also include a multitude of country-specific variables with a variety of names. The count
of missing data instances in this paper encompass only standard variables, as defined by
the names. The included modules are listed below with the relevant variable names. The
variable names are usually built in 2 to 3 components. For three-component variables, the
first component indicates the type of interview (v for women, hv or hc for household, mv for
men), the second component indicates the module, and the third gives the variable number.
For two-component variables, the first component indicates the module and the second the
variable number. The two-component variables usually are for questions about children or
special modules.
1. Respondent’s basic data (v0’s and v1’s)
2. Reproduction (v2’s and b’s)
3. Contraceptive use (v3’s)
4. Maternity (m1-m73)
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5. Maternity and feeding (v4’s)
6. Health history (of children under five) (h1-h22)
7. Height and weight (of children under five) (hw’s)
8. Marriage (v5’s)
9. Fertility preference (v6’s)
10. Partner’s characteristics and women’s work (v71’s through v74’s)
11. AIDS, STI’s, and condom use (v75’s through v77’s; v82’s through v85’s)
12. Interview characteristics (v80’s and v81’s)
13. Maternal mortality (mm’s)
14. Malaria (ml’s)
15. Domestic violence (d’s)
16. Female genital cutting (g’s)
B.1.3.1 Men’s Interviews
1. Respondent’s basic data (mv0’s and mv1’s)
2. Reproduction (mv2’s)
3. Contraceptive use (mv3’s)
4. Tuberculosis and other health issues (mv4’s)
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5. Marriage (mv5’s)
6. Fertility preferences (mv6’s)
7. Occupation and work status (mv71’s through mv74’s)
8. AIDS and condom use (mv75’s through mv77’s; mv82’s through mv85’s)
9. Female genital cutting (g’s)
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Table B6: DHS Survey Rounds in Sample
Country	Name Dates	of	Fieldwork
Number	of	
Interviewers
Number	of	
Regions
Number	of	
Clusters Region
Albania 10/2008-4/2009 61 4 450 Europe	&	Central	Asia
Armenia 10/2010-12/2010 73 11 289 Europe	&	Central	Asia
Bangladesh 11/1999-4/2000 95 6 341 South	Asia
Bangladesh 1/2004-5/2004 115 6 359 South	Asia
Bangladesh 3/2007-8/2007 106 6 361 South	Asia
Burkina	Faso 12/1992-4/1993 85 10 459 Africa
Burkina	Faso 11/1998-3/1999 50 5 208 Africa
Burkina	Faso 6/2003-12/2003 79 14 397 Africa
Burkina	Faso 5/2010-12/2010 113 13 541 Africa
Benin 6/1996-8/1996 54 6 81 Africa
Benin 8/2001-11/2001 65 6 247 Africa
Bolivia 2/2008-6/2008 261 9 996 Latin	America	&	Caribbean
Burundi 8/2010-12/2010 72 5 338 Africa
Central	African	Republic 9/1994-3/1995 43 6 224 Africa
Cote	d'Ivoire 6/1994-11/1994 48 10 246 Africa
Cote	d'Ivoire 9/1998-3/1999 41 3 140 Africa
Cameroon 4/1991-10/1991 72 10 258 Africa
Cameroon 2/2004-9/2004 90 12 464 Africa
Colombia 11/2009-12/2010 91 6 4846 Latin	America	&	Caribbean
Dominican	Republic 3/2007-8/2007 164 32 1425 Latin	America	&	Caribbean
Egypt 11/1992-2/1993 167 5 546 Middle	East	&	North	Africa
Egypt 11/1995-2/1996 69 6 933 Middle	East	&	North	Africa
Egypt 2/2000-5/2000 144 6 998 Middle	East	&	North	Africa
Egypt 3/2008-6/2008 57 6 1243 Middle	East	&	North	Africa
Egypt 4/2005-7/2005 153 6 1298 Middle	East	&	North	Africa
Ethiopia 2/2000-6/2000 230 11 535 Africa
Ethiopia 4/2005-9/2005 178 11 528 Africa
Ethiopia 12/2010-12/2010 186 11 31 Africa
Ghana 10/1993-2/1994 109 20 533 Africa
Ghana 7/2003-11/2003 74 10 410 Africa
Ghana 9/2008-12/2008 111 10 404 Africa
Ghana 11/1998-2/1999 69 10 400 Africa
Guinea 4/1999-8/1999 54 5 293 Africa
Guinea 2/2005-6/2005 51 8 291 Africa
Guyana 3/2009-8/2009 99 10 312 Latin	America	&	Caribbean
Haiti 2/2000-7/2000 65 10 316 Latin	America	&	Caribbean
Haiti 10/2005-5/2006 65 10 332 Latin	America	&	Caribbean
Indonesia 10/2002-4/2003 375 26 1317 East	Asia	Pacific
Jordan 7/2002-10/2002 70 3 495 Middle	East	&	North	Africa
Jordan 6/2007-10/2007 115 3 924 Middle	East	&	North	Africa
Kenya 4/2003-9/2003 98 8 399 Africa
Kenya 11/2008-3/2009 123 8 397 Africa
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Cambodia 1/2000-7/2000 94 23 470 East	Asia	Pacific
Cambodia 9/2005-3/2006 92 19 548 East	Asia	Pacific
Cambodia 7/2010-12/2010 79 19 591 East	Asia	Pacific
Liberia 12/2006-4/2007 99 6 291 Africa
Lesotho 9/2004-2/2005 58 10 381 Africa
Lesotho 10/2009-2/2010 78 10 395 Africa
Morocco 10/2003-2/2004 58 15 479 Middle	East	&	North	Africa
Moldova 6/2005-8/2005 76 4 399 Europe	&	Central	Asia
Madagascar 8/1997-12/1997 46 6 268 Africa
Madagascar 11/2008-7/2009 123 22 585 Africa
Mali 11/1995-5/1996 60 8 300 Africa
Mali 1/2001-6/2001 147 9 399 Africa
Mali 3/2006-12/2006 198 9 405 Africa
Malawi 7/2000-11/2000 168 3 559 Africa
Malawi 1/2004-2/2005 130 3 520 Africa
Malawi 6/2010-10/2010 302 3 827 Africa
Nigeria 4/1990-12/1990 170 4 297 Africa
Nigeria 3/2003-8/2003 77 6 360 Africa
Nigeria 6/2008-11/2008 254 6 886 Africa
Niger 3/1992-6/1992 52 8 235 Africa
Niger 1/1998-7/1998 64 6 268 Africa
Namibia 9/2000-12/2000 109 13 260 Africa
Namibia 11/2006-4/2007 194 13 490 Africa
Nepal 1/2001-7/2001 74 5 251 South	Asia
Nepal 2/2006-8/2006 87 5 260 South	Asia
Peru 7/2000-11/2000 211 24 1408 Latin	America	&	Caribbean
Philippines 6/2003-9/2003 303 17 816 East	Asia	Pacific
Philippines 8/2008-9/2008 277 17 789 East	Asia	Pacific
Pakistan 9/2006-3/2007 130 4 954 South	Asia
Rwanda 2/2005-8/2005 89 12 456 Africa
Rwanda 9/2010-12/2010 112 5 279 Africa
Sierra	Leone 4/2008-9/2008 133 4 350 Africa
Senegal 11/1992-8/1993 51 8 508 Africa
Senegal 1/1997-5/1997 130 8 638 Africa
Senegal 1/2005-6/2005 77 11 366 Africa
Senegal 10/2010-12/2010 64 11 161 Africa
Swaziland 7/2006-3/2007 80 4 269 Africa
Togo 2/1998-5/1998 64 6 287 Africa
Timor-Leste 8/2009-2/2010 149 13 454 East	Asia	Pacific
Tanzania 9/1999-12/1999 78 22 173 Africa
Tanzania 12/2009-5/2010 70 26 458 Africa
Uganda 9/2000-3/2001 72 4 267 Africa
Uganda 5/2006-10/2006 87 9 336 Africa
Zambia 4/2007-10/2007 105 9 319 Africa
Zimbabwe 8/1999-12/1999 83 10 221 Africa
Zimbabwe 8/2005-4/2006 135 10 396 Africa
Zimbabwe 9/2010-12/2010 72 10 219 Africa
Note: This table gives descriptions of each of the 92 survey rounds used in the main analysis of the paper.
Each row of the table represents one survey round; some countries have multiple. The second column gives
the start and end date of the interviews. Column 3 gives the number of unique interviewers observed in the
survey round, column 4 gives the number of regions of that country used in the round (used as fixed effects
in the main analysis), and column 5 gives the number of clusters where interviews were conducted.
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B.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section I present a simple framework for the interviewer’s endogenous choice
of effort allocation on days with varying temperatures. I closely follow the model set forth by
Joshua Graff Zivin and Matthew Neidell (2012) to describe worker responses to air pollution
in assuming that output for an interviewer is a function of effort e and temperature Ω. Here,
a large value of Ω can be thought of a more extreme temperature. The interviewer’s output
has two components: data quality (q) and data quantity (y), and the interviewer chooses
her effort allocation for both components (eq and ey, respectively). The interviewer earns
a fixed wage w¯ for as long as she works on the survey round and has a continuation value
of K associated with keeping her job (not being fired for poor performance). The worker’s
probability of job retention depends linearly on output, for simplicity. The probability of job
retention depends on both the quality and quantity of the data produced; each dimension is
weighted by α and 1− α in the job retention decision, respectively.
Interviewers choose effort levels ey and eq in order to maximize the following:
max
ey ,eq
w¯ + (αy(ey) + (1− α)q(eq))K − c(ey, eq,Ω) (B.3)
The first order conditions are the following:
α
∂y
∂ey
K =
∂c
∂ey
(B.4)
(1− α) ∂q
∂eq
K =
∂c
∂eq
(B.5)
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Taking a total derivative with respect to Ω yields:
αK(
∂2y
∂ey2
)
∂ey
∂Ω
=
∂2c
∂ey2
∂ey
∂Ω
+
∂c
∂ey∂Ω
(B.6)
(1− α)K( ∂
2q
∂eq2
)
∂eq
∂Ω
=
∂c
∂eq2
∂eq
∂Ω
+
∂c
∂eq∂Ω
(B.7)
Solving for ∂eq
∂Ω
and ∂ey
∂Ω
, respectively, yields the following relationships:
∂ey
∂Ω
=
∂c
∂ey∂Ω
αK ∂
2y
∂ey2
− ∂2c
∂ey2
(B.8)
∂eq
∂Ω
=
∂c
∂eq∂Ω
(1− α)K ∂2q
∂eq2
− ∂2c
∂eq2
(B.9)
Assuming that the cost of effort function is convex, production is concave in effort,
and that extreme temperature increases the marginal cost of effort, the effect of temperature
on effort allocation is negative for both tasks. This model also predicts that the effect
of temperature on effort allocation is decreasing in the weight put on the dimension of
productivity in the probability of job retention. Similarly, it is decreasing in the continuation
value of the job, K. The model therefore predicts that the negative effect of temperature on
effort will be stronger on the less observable dimension of productivity, quality.
B.2.1 Alternative Assumptions
In the previous section, the only way in which temperature (Ω) entered the inter-
viewer’s decision was through disutility of effort. It may also be reasonable to assume that
temperature also has a direct effect on productivity, through some unavoidable physiological
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effect. The maximization problem could be changed to reflect this possibility in the following
way:
max
ey ,eq
w¯ + (αy(ey,Ω) + (1− α)q(eq,Ω)K − c(ey, eq,Ω) (B.10)
The first order conditions remain the same, but taking the derivative with respect to
temperature now yields:
αK(
∂2y
∂ey2
)
∂ey
∂Ω
+ α
∂y
∂ey∂Ω
K =
∂2c
∂ey2
∂ey
∂Ω
+
∂c
∂ey∂Ω
(B.11)
(1− α)K( ∂
2q
∂eq2
)
∂eq
∂Ω
+ α
∂q
∂eq∂Ω
K =
∂c
∂eq2
∂eq
∂Ω
+
∂c
∂eq∂Ω
(B.12)
The resulting expression for the effect of temperature on effort allocation is as follows:
∂ey
∂Ω
=
∂c
∂ey∂Ω
− αK ∂y
∂ey∂Ω
αK ∂
2y
∂ey2
− ∂2c
∂ey2
(B.13)
∂eq
∂Ω
=
∂c
∂eq∂Ω
− (1− α)K ∂q
∂eq∂Ω
(1− α)K ∂2q
∂eq2
− ∂2c
∂eq2
(B.14)
The overall effects of temperature on effort allocation on both tasks remains negative,
as long as temperature is assumed to decrease the marginal productivity of effort. The weight
put on each task in the job retention probability function now appears both in the numerator
and the denominator, however. The effect of an increase in the weight is to increase the size
of both the numerator and the denominator in absolute value. Intuitively, temperature now
decreases the returns to effort, and if this effect is large enough the differential effect on
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separate tasks may be swamped. Therefore, it is ultimately an empirical question whether
temperature will have larger effects on the less observable dimension.
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